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Abstract 
In this thesis I analyse the contemporary Serbian national imaginary. Combining theories of 
nationalism and the social imaginary with fieldwork in Belgrade 2013 and 2014, I document 
and analyse the resurgence of Serb nationalism since the Yugoslav wars. Data suggests that 
there is a strong Serbian identification with an ethno-religious imaginary that asserts Serbs are 
a unique people who have achieved their long-held goal of national self-determination despite 
overwhelming historical obstacles. There is also an emphasis on 'inherited' markers that 
suggests Serbs are essentially a certain kind of people: those 'who do the good'. Their 
fundamental goodness translates into actions for the ‘right’ reasons. This way any self-
perceived negative behaviour of Serbs is attributed to unfavourable circumstances. This 
imaginary rests within a significant sense of disappointment with the present state of Serbia in 
a context of declining living standards, widespread corruption and distrust of political elites. 
The post-Yugoslav civic project of European integration exemplified by the push for European 
Union (EU) membership of successive Serbian governments, has met with declining popular 
support and uncertainty. Despite some Serbs hoping for a powerful authority to 'clean up' 
Serbia and provide the means for a better future, they are deeply suspicious of EU integration 
and what it may mean for national integrity. I analyse these Serbian dilemmas in this thesis.  
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1. Introduction to the Serbian national imaginary 
Let me begin with a vic. A vic is a type of joke that is common amongst Serbs and other 
peoples across the Balkans. The one that I will share here is about the kriza (the ‘crisis’), 
referring to the recent Global Financial Crisis. It goes like this: “The crisis came to Serbia. It 
stopped, looked around and said ‘oh hell, I’ve already been here!’ And so it went on its way”. 
For a social scientist, a vic like this offers insight into the daily lives of Serbs and their view of 
life (Boskin and Dorinson 1985). It is one of the ways that Serbs use humour to make sense of 
misfortune or trouble. The typical vic represents the urban vs. rural divide, as naïve country 
folk find themselves in unfamiliar urban or ‘modern’ situations. It also points to an evaluative 
hierarchy operating between ethnic communities. For example, the typical butt of the joke 
will, more often than not, be the peasant, the Bosniak or the Montenegrin. Details are most 
often signified by the names used, to typify the rural, regional or ethnic groups. Sometimes, as 
in the vic told above, the person telling it—or the group they represent—is positioned as the 
victim, or the joke is aimed towards them. The joke about the kriza is ultimately a window 
into the unfortunate circumstances that Serbs believe they live in. It suggests that they see 
Serbia as being in a permanent state of crisis. They see their country as one where the ‘normal’ 
is what chaos is for others. They wish to say that what other states are experiencing as the 
financial crisis is the everyday reality for Serbs. They identify with it, and the humour shows 
their reluctant acceptance of it. I have opened the thesis with this vic not only because of its 
tragic nature, but also because it so clearly demonstrates the acceptance by Serbs of a certain 
bleak reality. 
This is a sombre perception to have of one’s home country and fellow nationals. For a people 
who supposedly have a strong nationalist identity, this joke is not filled with the amount of 
pride one would expect. It is also not filled with the positive characteristics that one would be 
proud to identify with. But, nonetheless, this vic was indeed a typical description of Serbia that 
I encountered. We can only try to find out why such a perception of one’s own national 
community may exist and what it may mean for that community’s future. 
This is precisely what I set out to achieve in this thesis: I have examined the trials and 
tribulations of the contemporary Serbian national imaginary. I have analysed a national 
community that is imagined and understood, one that is experienced and expressed. I have 
also explored what impact this may have on the future for Serbs. Over a decade since a 
seemingly major turning point for the country and its people, Serbs are still faced with the 
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difficult task of engaging with their past as they face their future. The vic above is an insight 
into this process and the issue of coming to terms with how one’s own community is 
understood and the uncertain future it faces. The joke articulates the politics of identity that I 
wish to emphasise, which I will return to a number of times throughout the thesis. 
 
From the beginning 
Before I introduce my thesis any further, however, it is important that I introduce my own 
relationship with its content. I am familiar with such uses of the vic because that type of joke 
has been a constant in my own life. I was born to a Serbian Orthodox father from Croatia and 
a Muslim mother from Bosnia. We lived in the small town of Dvor na Uni in Croatia. Dvor was 
right on the border with Bosnia along the River Una (hence the name ‘Dvor on the Una’), 
while my mother’s childhood town, Bosanski Novi (often referred to as simply Novi), was just 
across the river in the Bosnian Republic. Both towns had ethnic Serb majorities, with Novi a 
large Muslim minority. The Bosnian town was the bigger of the two, and crossings between 
them were frequent. My parents met at Cafe Gool (‘Cafe Goal’) in Novi along the quay. My 
father attended the gymnasium (secondary school) there, despite being from the small 
Croatian village of Gorička. They decided to build their lives together in Dvor, where we lived 
until early August 1995. 
Their marriage could simply be described as a ‘mixed marriage’: the marriage of two people 
from two distinct national groups. In the region, national differences were based on ethnicity, 
with religion at their core (Duijzings 2000). Even before the civil wars, people were 
categorised in this way. We know this by Yugoslavian census data, as well as the research on 
‘ethnic distances’ between groups and the amount of ‘mixed marriages’ since the 1960s (Gordy 
1999). Even though the ‘ethnic distances’ between groups in Yugoslavia were noticeably low, 
the group differentiation existed nonetheless, categorising my parents’ marriage as a ‘mixed’ 
one from an early stage. Their pairing would not have been common, and others like them 
would have most certainly drastically reduced once conflicts escalated. 
In the late 1980s, and during the 1990s, the differences between national groups amounted to 
tension, violence and conflict. The wars were complex; they were characterised by bitter 
conflicts amongst the people of the former Yugoslavia. The 1980s saw a political vacuum, 
where previous arguments for equality based on class differences were transformed to that of 
national differences (Džihić, Segert, and Wieser 2012; Gordy 1999; Oberschall 2000; Pešić 
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2000). It was also a time of great economic and social distress (Uvalić 2010). Ethno-
nationalism was reproduced on a mass scale. For people in the region, ethnicity, and therefore 
nationality, became the basis of their realities. That is, national belonging dictated citizens’ 
quality of life, and often their basic right to life. An ethnically homogenous nation-state, 
therefore, appeared to be the way to gain protection. Yet the goal of a right to national self-
determination by these groups did not correspond to the nationally mixed populations on the 
ground. The ideas of national sovereignty in the former Yugoslavia relied on ethnic 
boundaries, but ethnic groups were physically dispersed across the region.  
The subsequent civil wars between 1990 and 2001 were many, and metastasised to involve 
most of the national groups in the region. They were between Serbs and Montenegrins on one 
‘side’, and Croats and Bosniaks on the other in Bosnia; between Serbs as part of the 
Yugoslavian National Army (YNA) and Slovenes in Slovenia; between Serbs from Croatia and 
Serbia against Croats in Croatia; between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in Serbia; between 
Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo; between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia; 
between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia; and even between different Bosniak groups in Bosnia. 
During and after these conflicts, the Yugoslav state dissolved and new democratic states were 
being formed. Ethno-nationalism was rife in these new states and democratic governments 
were elected under extreme circumstances (Džihić and Segert 2012). Thus, newly independent 
nation-states were founded on popular ethno-nationalist grounds. 
My parents experienced many of these communal conflicts when they met in 1984, which 
would only become more complicated for them over time. They experienced negative 
reactions to ethnic ‘mixing’ when they first married, being rejected by the Muslim community. 
In the 1990s, they would see the tension between the ethnic groups escalate into violence. 
They would learn at first hand the atrocious consequence of mobilising community identity as 
a means to realise a violent political agenda. Dvor would be part of what became the self-
proclaimed Serb autonomous province of Krajina, which was short-lived once the Croatian 
state launched ‘Operation Storm’ to regain control of their territory in August 1995. With the 
Croatian army advancing and the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ becoming normal, we left with 
200,000 or so other ethnic Serbs as refugees. 
We subsequently lived in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, for over a year until our arrival in Australia 
in November 1996, owing to the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 
Despite the hardships of beginning again in such a foreign country—we joked that Australia 
was “at the end of the world”—we were leaving behind newly formed nation-states whose 
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citizens had both perpetrated and been the victims of major, persistent human rights abuses. 
At the heart of my parents’ decision to leave was a deep concern of the historical and future 
role played by ideas of national identity. In 1996, I was only a child and did not fully 
comprehend what nationalism was, despite having my Serbo-Croatian dialect corrected in 
Belgrade, or seeing my friends’ confusion as to why I referred to one of my grandmothers as 
majka (which was a common term amongst Bosnian Muslim families from my mother’s 
birthplace). 
Since our arrival in Australia, my parents have retained their connections to the former 
Yugoslav communities, but have refrained from solely participating in ethnically-specific 
organised groups or events. This was a tension they had left behind and wanted to keep there. 
They have reunited with old friends and family, and befriended members of the Serbian, 
Croatian and Bosnian communities in Australia, as well as people outside of the former 
Yugoslav communities. While they have made a new life in Australia and travel to new parts of 
the world, they still take regular trips to the region. Dvor na Uni is now simply called Dvor, 
while Bosanski Novi is now Novi Grad (‘New Town’). Movement between the two towns is still 
common amongst citizens, but the two are now part of different states, and border controls 
are stricter. When my parents return to their past hometowns, they still see the remnants of 
war. They see homes with bullet holes, group segregation, and the emphasis of national 
insignia in places where it didn’t used to be. They also see the economic and political 
consequences of the conflicts. Corruption is rife, employment dire. Many of my parents’ 
friends are now in Serbia, having left Croatia as refugees in 1995 as we did. Belgrade may not 
be Dvor, nor Novi, but the same poverties remain. 
I see these hardships too in the Balkans and unconsciously make comparisons to Australia. I 
observe how Balkan citizens try to cope with these living conditions, especially those in 
Belgrade. It is a city that I enjoy going to, have childhood memories of, and friends in. I love its 
energy and find it fascinating. Yet I am aware that some citizens instead see it for the 
hardships they experience in it. For them, it is a place where it is difficult to make ends meet 
and in which their future does not seem bright. For them, it is a place where corruption and 
disorder is the norm. This point is precisely what directed me to take the thesis down the path 
that you will read in the chapters to come. 
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What comes first 
In my thesis I address one major question: What is the structure and the dynamic of the 
contemporary Serbian national imaginary? To answer this key question, I propose to engage in 
a series of subsidiary questions: 
a) What image of the nation is being produced in Serbia, and by what forces or agents? 
b) How is that image understood? 
c) What are the implications of this imaginary for the national future of Serbia?  
Throughout this thesis, I analyse the images and understandings of the Serb nation that 
emerged in my data. I look for commonalities in Serbian national imaginaries: understandings 
of the imagined national community that enable its experience and reproduction. I will 
address how nationalism maintains that imaginary. That is, how a certain identity is secured 
through legislature in a given territory, making it a political reality for citizens (Hearn 2006).  
In this thesis I argue that a predominantly ethno-nationalist identity is being reproduced in 
Serbia. It is created through ‘forward looking’ and ‘backward looking’ rhetoric (Nairn 1997). 
The ‘backward looking’ rhetoric are historical narratives that promote an ethno-nationalist 
sensibility. The historical narratives give meaning and authenticity to Serbs a nation, offering 
an understanding of what it means to be a Serb. Emphasis tends to be on tradition and 
inheritance, tangible items that citizens can have attachments to. My evidence suggests that 
the social world in Belgrade encourages ethno-nationalism through space. While theory would 
imply that the dominant image would be accepted by citizens, my evidence suggests that 
citizens' lived experiences are making some of them question the dominant image. 
The ‘forward looking’ aspect is the rhetoric of Serbia’s future and the contemporary contexts 
that Serbs find themselves in. Here I demonstrate how some citizens negotiate their place in 
the world through their understanding of their own community and themselves as Serbs. I will 
discuss how the contemporary context is one in which current life is difficult for Serbs and the 
future context is one where life seems bleak. Consequences of war remain, progress appears to 
have stagnated, and meaningful reforms ever more unlikely. This type of environment 
pressures them to behave in undesirable ways and—as summarised in the vic above—is 
exposing apathy and distrust amongst the citizenry. 
In the ‘forward looking’ discourses, there are also a number of remedies offered to reverse the 
stagnation. One solution that has been emphasised as a primary goal of successive Serbian 
governments is that of European Union (EU) accession. Membership has dominated public 
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discourse for years, making it a key part of my research. I therefore analyse how Serbs picture 
themselves in the context of EU integration. The evidence suggests that the prospect of 
membership raises the issue of national state sovereignty. Further, the government’s claim of 
joining the Union is overshadowed by state institutions continuing a strictly ethno-nationalist 
vision of Serbia. Based on theories of nationalism (Hearn 2006) and the social imaginary 
(Anderson 2006; Taylor 2004), such an image of the nation is unlikely to encourage political 
support for EU membership. 
 
Why this matters 
There are a number of considerations which point to the value of addressing the research 
questions outlined above. The mobilisation of nationalist sentiment has been frequently 
referred to by a range of scholars addressing the history of conflicts in former Yugoslavia 
(Čolović 2002; Džihić and Segert 2012; Gordy 1999; Milosavljević 2000). A national state was 
presented as the solution to problems to the numerous national groups across former 
Yugoslavia and ultra-nationalism became common. Nationalist rhetoric dominated political 
discourse in Serbia under Slobodan Milošević, leaving little room for alternative voices (Gordy 
1999). Even after his ousting in the 5 October revolution in 2000, national identity continues 
to be a key factor in the politics of Serbia (Čolović 2014; Listhaug, Ramet, and Dulić 2011; 
Volčič 2011). 
Some writers on the subject seem to imply—or state—that Serbia’s continued concern with 
nationalism is due to some fundamental fixation with it. The same kind of view would lead 
writers to also imply that a Serb reliance on violent nationalism is inevitable, due to its history 
or some allegedly innate ‘genocidal tendencies’ (Anzulović 1999; Judah 1997). Anzulović (1999) 
for example, appears to imply that Serbs are naturally more violent than their non-Orthodox 
Balkan counterparts. He interprets the visibility of myths and symbols pointing as this evil 
inherent quality, attributing to the ‘genocidal nature’ of Serbs to Serbian Orthodoxy. For 
Anzulović, a Serb carrying a nationalist poster at a rally was enough evidence that they 
supported the Greater Serbia political agenda and the genocide committed in its name. Judah 
(1997) also argues that the violent history of the Serbs had made the Yugoslav conflict seem 
like a natural progression. 
In reality, arguments supporting the notion that violent nationalist ‘tendencies’ are somehow 
‘natural’ or ‘cultural’ phenomena found in one or two societies are highly problematic; indeed, 
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entirely un-evidenced. A better case can be made for allegedly ‘natural’ tendencies is that they 
are a result of deliberate mobilisation. More evidence exists in making the case that the 
manipulation of normalised symbols and beliefs centring on a given national community 
possessing a unique identity occurs because of such political mobilisation (Billig 1995). We 
must more reasonably assume, then, that Serbs are not fundamentally different or more 
violent from their regional counterparts. Rather, there have been other forces at work. 
On the other hand, some scholars have begun to play down the role played by nationalism. 
Mudde for example, writing about ‘nativism’ (the idea that the state “should be inhabited 
exclusively by members of the native group” (2007, 19)) has discussed the Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS) as an example of an ostensibly nationalist party. The SRS was founded in the early 
1990s and is led by Vojislav Šešelj who had been on trial for war crimes at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during the course of my data collection. 
Despite calling the SRS nativist, Mudde dismissed their influence on the basis of a small 
following. Other authors have also suggested that ethno-nationalism in Serbia may no longer 
be playing a key role. Pešić (2014; Radio Peščanik 2013a) has argued that “nationalism is 
finished” and that it can no longer mobilise the Serbian population. She argues that Serb 
citizens are fed up with it. Ilić (Radio Peščanik 2014b) also claims that Serbian nationalism 
cannot be used to mobilise the population any longer.  
However, a number of factors suggest the value both of exploring the continued role of 
Serbian nationalism in the years since 2000, and of testing the validity of claims like those 
made by Mudde. Such claims are odd considering that the SRS received the most votes as a 
single party in the 2007 and 2008 parliamentary elections. Although the popularity of the SRS 
had declined considerably since then, the popular party of the moment—the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS)—formed after most of the SRS leadership and members left in 2008. 
The SNS gained victory in the 2012 elections. As of the 2014 parliamentary elections (called two 
years earlier than planned), the SNS consolidated their power, receiving 156 out of 250 
parliamentary seats (CeSID 2016). The SNS won the majority of seats again in the most recent 
2016 parliamentary elections, cementing yet another victory (National Assembly of the 
Republic of Serbia 2016). Milošević’s old Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) came second in the 
same 2016 elections, continuing to have a place in the Serbian national parliament. Further, 
the SRS also regained popularity in these 2016 elections. It was the third most popular party 
winning 22 seats, effectively returning from their post-2008 popularity slump. Vojislav Šešelj’s 
recent ICTY acquittal may have provided momentum for that. With these 2016 elections, elites 
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who were in power during the 1990s remain part of the current government. What’s more, 
former president, and strong EU sceptic, Vojislav Koštunica has paired with the extreme-right 
group Dveri and their coalition became part of the National Assembly in the same 2016 
elections. 
Equally the argument promoted by Pešić (2014; Radio Peščanik 2013a) and Ilić (Radio Peščanik 
2014b) that nationalism is no longer a mobilising factor in Serbia is questionable, given 
evidence of the continued salience of ethno-national identity in Serb society. A strong 
attachment to national identity can be used for political mobilisation purposes (Billig 1995). 
And where a political programme is based on an exclusive image of the nation, this can be 
problematic. 
Despite such scholars arguing that the nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s may not resonate 
with a significant number of the population any longer, there is no indication that a sense of 
national identity is no longer a factor in Serb society. ‘Traditional’ markers of Serb identity, 
especially Serbian Orthodoxy, have continued to flourish since the transition to democracy 
(Radović 2013; Ramet 2014). Known nationalists and criminals from the 1990s hold political 
power (Biserko 2012; Čolović 2004; Džihić and Segert 2012; Džihić, Segert, and Wieser 2012; 
Pešić 2007), while successive governments have resisted recognition of Serb involvement in 
war crimes (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2011). Extreme nationalist groups also remain visible, 
however marginal (Byford 2002; Čolović 2011b). The groups have increased their use of modern 
technological tools to promote their cause, especially the internet (Byford 2002; Samardzija 
and Robertson 2012). Scholars and public intellectuals are also utilising modern technology to 
express ethno-nationalist sentiments, such as the online platform Nova Srpska Politička Misao 
(NSPM) (Spasić and Petrović 2013).  
The value of addressing the research questions outlined above is further suggested by the 
prominent role played by contemporary discussion in Serbia of its culture and language. The 
prominent Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić (2012), for example, promoted an ethno-nationalist 
Serbian state up until his death in 2014. He defended the protection of the Serbian language 
and culture as the essence of national identity, integrity and survival. Even while advocating 
Marxist internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, Ćosić was promoting Serbian nationalist 
views (Shigeno 2004). In the 1980s, he argued that in order for Serbs to achieve equal footing 
with the other national groups in Yugoslavia, the Serbian nation needed to realise self-
determination. Ćosić (2012) continued to express similar views up until his death by urging 
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young and educated Serbs to rescue the Serb society he claimed was in crisis. He was adamant 
that Serbia’s sovereignty remain intact, and urged Serbs to return from abroad. 
A number of local academics echo similar sentiments. In a speech that populated Serbian 
social and news media, Dragićević from the University of Belgrade argued the case for 
protecting Serbian language and culture in the hope of strengthening the nation (“Rajna 
Dragićević: Lekcija iz etike” 2013). She believes that a society can only be good if its members 
stayed true to their culture, and thus hoped that an emphasis on language will lead to that. 
Other academics publish in the politically conservative NSPM, where they advocate an ethno-
nationalist identity (Spasić and Petrović 2013). Research on national identity and culture in the 
context of EU integration is also being conducted at the University of Niš and funded by the 
Serbian state. Publications that have stemmed from such research focus on tradition and 
culture being the essence of the nation (L. Mitrović 2011; L. Mitrović and Stojić 2012; Petković 
2011). In fact, a volume edited by Mitrović and Stojić (2012) heralds Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations as the supposed explanation for why Serbia does not ‘fit’ with Western Europe. 
The authors praise Japan for progressing technologically but keeping its traditions. This was 
the future they envisaged for Serbia: a package of modernity and tradition. It may be that the 
authors interpret globalisation as losing one’s individualism and national integrity, and thus, 
in their view, protecting culture is integral. 
This promotion of strengthening the role of institutions to protect culture comes at a time 
when Serb citizens appear to have low trust in the state. Recent polls and surveys point to an 
odd relationship between Serbian national identity and a range of contemporary political 
issues. Many polls, surveys and reports suggest that Serbian citizens don't trust the Serb 
government because of a widespread perception that it is corrupt (BCBP 2012; CeSID 2012a; 
Džihić and Segert 2012; Džihić, Segert, and Wieser 2012; Gallup 2010; Pešić 2007; UNODC 
2011). These polls suggest that Serbs are also worried that their living conditions are 
worsening, as unemployment rises and wages fall. One Gallup (2010) survey in the Western 
Balkans found that Serbs experienced the lowest levels of happiness, especially due to their 
living conditions and fears about the future. Yet the same survey, also found that Serbs were 
not expressing any strong desire to leave Serbia. So while there may not be immense trust in 
the state and there is unhappiness in living in Serbia, there is no indication of a mass desire to 
leave the country. This, along with the continued support of nationalist political parties 
demonstrated above, implies that there is a strong identification with being Serb and 
remaining in a Serb state. These indications can in turn make us question the arguments 
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proposed by Ilić (Radio Peščanik 2014b) and Pešić (2014; Radio Peščanik 2013a) that 
nationalism no longer resonates with the Serbian populace.  
Further, the distrust in the state may certainly not be an indication of the level of 
identification with the nation. However, the nation cannot be separated from the nation-state; 
the Republic of Serbia was constructed on the basis of ethno-national sovereignty and those 
who have the power to direct the national imaginary are most often part of state institutions. 
Dissatisfaction with life in Serbia is problematic when there are also perceptions of economic 
and social degradation in the country (Mojić 2012; Spasić 2012). There are concerns about 
future prospects in Serbia and, as my evidence suggests, perceptions of Serb society as tainted. 
It is important to be wary of this, as people experiencing a state of crises have been more 
prone to mobilisation in the past. Oberschall (2000) describes how the ‘crisis frame’ was 
formed in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, when fear and a sense of crisis were used to mobilise a large 
ethnic constituency. Economic and social hardship was presented as deprivation of Serb 
integrity and their disappearance as a people. Ethno-nationalism was provided as a potential 
solution to problems, legitimising ethno-nationalist governments. If living conditions are 
worsening in Serbia again and there is widespread anxiety, then there may be a potential for 
political and social unrest in the future and the use of nationalist sentiment to encourage it.  
Since Milošević’s ousting in 2000, the EU has become the preferred answer to Serbia’s most 
recent social and economic woes. Membership has been presented as a solution for Serbia by 
many prominent politicians. The Democratic Party’s (DS) Boris Tadić led the ‘For a European 
Serbia’ coalition that saw him gain two presidential terms. Tomislav Nikolić’s SNS has been 
advocating EU integration since its break from the SRS. Aleksandar Vučić, the current leader 
of the SNS, and now once again Prime Minister of Serbia, likewise is advocating a strong, pro-
EU approach. 
Vojislav Koštunica has been one of the few leading Serb politicians who opposes EU 
integration. Koštunica served as Serbia’s president following Milošević’s ousting until 2003, as 
well as the country’s prime minister from 2004-2008. Koštunica was consistently critical of the 
West and NATO throughout his presidency (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2011). Since his term 
ended, he has been publically opposing EU integration and has even published books 
elaborating on his anti-EU views (Koštunica 2009; 2012). The former leader insists that 
membership would undermine Serbia’s sovereignty and hurt her national honour. He 
contends that globalisation and Western individualism would mean the disappearance of 
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those elements that make Serbs unique. As mentioned earlier, his 2016 coalition with far-right 
group Dveri has gained them a place in the Serbian national parliament. Their stance 
regarding Brussels will no doubt be echoed by the now ‘resurrected’ SRS, who accuse the West 
of weakening Serbia and of seeking global hegemony (Samardzija and Robertson 2012). Such 
groups have also questioned the legality of intervention by the international community 
treating it as an attempt to eradicate Serbia as a state and Serbs as a people. 
Others have employed nationalist sentiment to encourage enthusiasm for EU accession. In 
these narratives, Serbia is presented as problematic and even ultra-nationalist. EU 
membership is claimed to be the key to strengthening the country and changing Serbs for the 
better. It is thus used as a strategy for strengthening national cohesion. Aforementioned Pešić 
(2014), an ‘anti-nationalist’, urges EU membership, arguing that Serbia needs to ‘modernise’. 
By doing this, though, she urges Serbs to unite in order to become a ‘modern’ and ‘good’ 
nation. Despite the differences of opinion towards EU integration, both ‘sides’ argue for a 
strong nation, and utilise nationalist rhetoric in doing so. 
At this stage, it seems that the positive future-oriented political discourse on the EU is failing 
to engage or motivate the majority of the population (BCBP 2012; Džihić and Segert 2012; 
Gallup 2010; J. Greenberg 2010). That evidence again suggests that while the political elite are 
promoting EU integration, the lack of popular support for it may reflect widespread defence of 
a Serbian autonomy model. After all, there has been a tense relationship with Europe and the 
potential weight of the Union would impede national sovereignty, a concern expressed by 
Koštunica (2009; 2012). Subotić (2010) writes that the political elite’s promotion of EU 
integration is done for personal gains, rather than true reform. The declining support of 
membership by the population, and the lack of trust in the government suggest that perhaps 
the citizenry hold similar sentiments to Subotić: they believe government institutions to be 
corrupt, and may be suspicious of the political elite’s ‘true’ aims regarding EU accession. 
Unfortunately for Serbs, their distrust tends to lead to political disengagement, which in turn 
solidifies the power of the elite they criticise (Džihić and Segert 2012). 
It is important to note that the relationship between the EU and the former Yugoslav states 
has been explained by an identity framework (Subotić 2011). Serbs’ general lack of European 
identity has been interpreted as the reason for not committing to accession. This identity 
framework can be understood in light of Balkanism (Todorova 2009). I expand on these in 
detail later in the thesis, and so will refer to them here only briefly. Firstly, the Balkans as a 
region have tended to be perceived as ‘exotic’, yet ‘backward’ (Balkan) compared to ‘successful’ 
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Western Europe (Todorova 2009). Secondly, the East-West dichotomy has also been evident 
within former Yugoslavia, with some groups seen as ‘more European’ and therefore more 
‘progressive’, and others (such as Serbs) more 'backward' (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Bakić-Hayden 
and Hayden 1992). Thirdly, there are indications that perceptions of being ‘backward’ and 
‘exotic’ may have been internalised by Serbs (Volčič 2005). There are therefore indications that 
national identity impacts Serbia’s current geo-political ‘reality’; identity (or a lack of) 
translates into political goals and policies. 
Finally, the issue of human rights and the commitment to a program of intergenerational 
justice is yet another litmus test which can serve to establish the extent to which Serbian 
politics has let go of its preoccupation with national identity. The contested relationship 
between Serb sovereignty and the promotion of human rights has been perceived as a key 
issue in contemporary Serb politics. Although a number of Serbian war criminals have been 
extradited to the ICTY, admitting collective wrong and collective guilt has proved to be a 
persistent issue in Serbia. Serbian politicians have had difficulty acknowledging what was 
done in Serbia’s name in the 1990s. The genocide committed against Bosnian Muslims in 
Srebrenica has proved an especially contentious issue, with the Serbian government refusing 
to recognise it as genocide. Some feel that the fundamental idea of justice and reconciliation 
within the ICTY has been undermined by making cooperation with the court a pre-requisite 
for EU accession and aid (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2011). For others, accepting guilt for 
crimes, such as genocide, questions the legal and moral grounds on which today’s Serbian 
nation-state has been built on. Treating national sovereignty as the pre-eminent political 
value, however, is a position which affects the willingness to treat the imperatives of 
reconciliation and justice seriously (Evans 2008). 
 
What follows 
The themes outlined above are discussed in depth in this thesis. In the chapter following this 
introduction, I review the literature and explain my theoretical approach. The chapter is titled 
Serbia Imagined. By combining Hearn (2006), Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004), I developed 
a theoretical framework for understanding ‘the nation’, how it is imagined and how it is 
secured. I ultimately use the idea of a Serbian national imaginary, which covers the 
understanding of the image of the nation, as well as the experience and expression of it. The 
imaginary is therefore not only an attachment to an image of the nation; it also the role of that 
attachment in the political ideology component of nationalism (a political programme which 
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can direct experiences and expressions). Billig (1995) is used to understand the specifics of this 
process. After establishing my theoretical framework, I discuss the scholarship on the Serb 
national imaginary in particular—which is mostly discussed in terms of national identity 
'substance' and nationalism as a political ideology—and the problems that have arisen with 
this scholarly treatment. 
The process of data collection for this thesis is thoroughly explained in the third chapter, 
titled Making meaning out of national identity. I explain my position as an insider/outsider to 
the community I am researching and how it affects my interpretation of the data. I then go on 
to discuss how ‘the nation’ has come to have meaning through the reproduction of an image 
and the different levels of power that direct that reproduction. With that I demonstrate the 
relevance of using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (van Dijk 2001) to interpret my data. I 
then explain the multiple qualitative methods employed to obtain the evidence underlying 
this thesis. Primarily the methods were: analysis of contemporary texts and media analysis, 
observation of museums and public spaces, and interviews. The overlap of themes and issues 
that emerged in the data provide texture to the theoretical framework put forward in the 
second chapter. 
The next chapter, titled Markers: ‘Us’ as Serbs, leads the four discussion chapters that provide 
the bulk of this thesis. In this fourth chapter, I begin the ‘forward looking’ aspect of the 
imaginary, focusing on the most prominent indicator of Serbdom in my research: religion. 
While scholars have agreed that Orthodoxy is a key element of ‘being Serb’, I discuss the 
contemporary experience of it. I demonstrate how Serbian Orthodoxy is taught as central to 
national history and used as a moral grounding of the Serb people. It makes them unique, 
authentic and essentially ‘good’. I also expose the pockets of contradiction in my data: the 
emphasis on religion does not always resonate with experiences of citizens. 
In Chapter Five, Memory-making in Serbian national consciousness, I turn to the use of 
collective memories in making sense of the nation, history and directing future actions. I focus 
on two key memory frameworks from my research and their potential role in understanding 
the Serbian national imaginary. The two are: Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav civil wars. In the 
first memory, I demonstrate the tension between remembering socialism and celebrating anti-
fascism. Although there is a tendency to remember socialist Yugoslavia fondly by some 
citizens (Luthar and Pušnik 2010; Spasić 2012; Velikonja 2010; Volčič 2011), the state is 
attempting to create a negative image of Tito’s regime. The political elite appear to want to 
separate their government from the past socialist one. Citizens seem to separate the two states 
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(Yugoslavia and contemporary Serbia) as well, as they tend to compare their lives today to that 
of socialist Yugoslavia. This ultimately leads them to question why the ideology was left 
behind in the first place. Their memories of Yugoslavia are thus important to understand how 
the Yugoslav civil wars are remembered as well.  The end of socialism led to conflict, and now 
tougher living conditions. I demonstrate how some citizens are coming to this realisation and 
questioning the worth of the wars.  
In Chapter Six, The European Union for a better Serbia, I begin to analyse the ‘forward looking’ 
aspect of the national imaginary discourses. EU integration dominated public discourse during 
my research, and offers a renegotiation of Serb self-imagining. The country’s slow integration 
process has been attributed to corruption and bad politics, a questioning of the EU's integrity, 
and a lack of identification with the EU. Members of the Serbian government tend to be 
accused of corruption and vested interests, at times deemed to encourage EU accession only 
for personal gains (Subotić 2010). It appears that these same elite wish to maintain the power 
they have in a sovereign non-member state. In the chapter I will also discuss this latter 
concern of national sovereignty in light of suspicions of EU integrity; Serb citizens appear to 
be concerned with the institution's vested interested. Despite this, however, I will 
demonstrate how these concerns can be outweighed with the prospect of change. The 
'Balkanist' framing of identity as an East-West divide (Todorova 2009) has made EU 
membership seem to be a battle between national integrity and modernisation for Serbs. 
Joining the Union appears to be their only chance to stimulate their weakening economy, yet 
there are concerns that membership may not bring about the required economic prosperity. 
Further, a Serb relationship to tradition and the East is a way to honour their nationality. In 
this chapter, I delve into these contentions deeply and identify the positions that Serbs may 
take as a remedy to ease the tensions. In light of this, I look at a potential place that Europe 
may have in the Serb national imaginary. 
Chapter Seven is the final discussion chapter and is simply titled Disappointment. It is divided 
into three sections: victimhood, corruption, and wildness and irrationality. Here I unpack the 
evidence of disenchantment in Serbia. I suggest that a national self-identity as victim, corrupt 
and wild drives a sense of disappointment that was so visible in my research (and the vic from 
the beginning of this thesis). I note the reasoning for these sentiments provided in my data, 
and the tendency to attribute Serb behaviour to the culture that surrounds them. The corrupt, 
wild and irrational behaviour may thus be explained as being outside of their control: that is, 
Serbs are fundamentally ‘good’ people who are pressured to act negatively. Despite offering 
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these reasons though, disappointment appears to prevail amongst Serbs. This feeling 
potentially leads to disenchantment in politics, which only perpetuates the problems 
identified by the citizenry (Džihić and Segert 2012).  
Finally, the concluding chapter considers the third subsidiary research question in detail: 
What are the implications of this identity for the national future for Serbia? The theoretical 
framework in this thesis is that identity is articulated, expressed and secured, and 
consequently made ‘real’; it is then an imaginary. That reality is embodied in legislation and 
the geo-politics of a nation-state (a political programme). The national imaginary analysed in 
the preceding chapters can provide suggestions for the geo-political directions Serbs may 
experience, keeping in mind the current developments in Europe.  
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2. Serbia imagined 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the lived experience of past and contemporary 
Serbia. My theoretical framework is based on Hearn’s (2006) definition of nationalism, 
Anderson’s (2006) understanding of the ‘imagined community’, and Taylor’s (2004) theory of 
the social imaginary. In this second chapter, I explain this theoretical framework and how I 
combined the three key theorists to analyse the imagining and understanding of the nation. I 
discuss how an image is reproduced and spread, how it is experienced and then expressed by 
members of that nation. I also bring in Billig’s (1995) work on ‘banal nationalism’ here, as he 
provides specifics on the normalisation process of a nation’s image. I then move on to the 
scholarship on the Serbian national imaginary specifically. With this there is a focus on 
national identity in that I discuss perceived Serb characteristics and the role they have had in 
political programmes. 
 
Imagining the nation 
Hearn's (2006) definition of nationalism is the starting point of my theoretical framework as 
he has demonstrated how national identity is embedded in the modern political context. He 
explains that nationalism can be both a political programme and a sense of attachment to a 
national identity. He defines it as “the making of combined claims, on behalf of a population, 
to identity, to jurisdiction and to a territory” (Hearn 2006, 11). The claim to identity refers to 
the categorisation of nations, their naming and labelling, as well as their ‘substantive content’. 
Hearn defines the latter as the supposed peculiar characteristics of the national group that sets 
them aside from other national groups. The characteristics can be symbolic markers, 
language, religion, values, and so on. The claim to jurisdiction points to both national 
sovereignty and the goal of legally implementing identity. This constitutes a modern politics 
of national self-determination (creating a state representative of the nation), and securing 
identity through a legislature. So if we take language to be a key marker of a national group, 
then that language is secured through standardising it. The claim to territory is the physical 
area where this legal implementation can take place, where laws have the opportunity to be 
‘real’. The claims to jurisdiction and territory form a specific political ideology, securing the 
sense of attachment to a national identity through a political programme. 
The relative importance of each of the three claims depends on the context and community in 
question. For example, a territory may already be established for one national group and not 
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be a contentious issue, while for another group territory presents the biggest obstacle. Hearn 
recognises this unevenness; it is the ‘packaging’ of the claims together that makes nationalism. 
Hearn’s definition is purposefully broad. He makes the case that reducing nationalism to one 
claim would be too simplistic once confronted with the richness and depth of empirical data. 
He writes that nationalism tends to be categorised as a feeling, an identity, an ideology, a 
social movement and/or a historical process, but does not find these classifications 
particularly useful. He finds that individually they limit the meaning of nationalism and 
approaches to studying it. Instead, Hearn argues that it is “all of these at once – feeling, 
identity, idea, movement and process – though certain cases, and approaches to research will 
tend to direct our attention to some aspects more than others” (Hearn 2006, 7). His definition 
allows the context to bring out the key elements of the nationalism being studied. 
The focus of my own research is the identity component of Hearn’s definition of nationalism. 
Yet, just as Hearn believes that all claims are inter-related for nationalism to ‘work’, I see it as 
insufficient to analyse claims to identity without considering jurisdiction and territory. 
Together they form a political ideology; a national identity only makes sense in the context of 
the modern political framework. 
Before I go on, it is important to consider what the nation is and how it comes to be 
understood. For this I use the works of Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004) to discuss national 
identity and its manifestation in the world. Anderson's definition forms the basis for what a 
nation is, while Taylor's work on the social imaginary is used to discuss how it has come to be 
understood, experienced and expressed in the social world (leading to members of society as 
key in the reproduction of the imaginary). I turn to Anderson’s now classical theory of the 
‘imagined community’ first. The concept has been alive and well for decades, but it remains 
useful as at its core is an explanation of what a nation is: an “imagined political community” 
(Anderson 2006, 6). It is a large collective whose members share feelings of belonging, despite 
not knowing the other members. There is an imagining of what that nation is, and an 
imagining of the identity markers of its members (what Hearn would call the ‘substantial 
content’, the perceived unique characteristics). Members form an attachment to the markers 
and to the imagined collective. The markers are often tangible, such as customs and language, 
which are also often communal and easier to form an attachment with. 
Anderson (2006) also states that the nation is limited and sovereign: it is sovereign in that it 
gives legitimacy to collective independence and self-rule in a world of collective self-
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determination, but it is limited in that there are boundaries beyond which lie ‘other’ nations. 
Therefore, there is not only an imagining of one's own nation, but also of other nations. Those 
who do not share the communion are not members of one’s community. The use of the word 
‘sovereign’ in his definition is part of the modern nation-state vocabulary. As with many 
‘modernists’, Anderson argues that nations have formed alongside modern political 
formations. With the modern international state system, national self-determination and 
sovereignty become the emancipation of the nation. His stance therefore works alongside 
Hearn’s definition of nationalism, which also relies on the modern system of nation-states. 
With their imagining of the nation, members or citizens who comprise it have an 
understanding of its meaning. In simple terms, there is a shared understanding of the nation. 
Members feel that they know it and they understand behaviours associated with it. They act it, 
they essentially ‘be’ it. In exploring this contention, I draw on theorist Charles Taylor (2004). 
Building on the works of Bourdieu, Taylor uses the concept of social imaginaries in order to 
understand modern societal structures and practices. For him, the social imaginary is the 
“common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy” (Taylor 2004, 23). The practices of a society are enabled by its members having 
made sense of their image of that society. That is, they understand their social world in a 
particular way, which suggests ways of expression and practice in that world. Their common 
understanding of society makes possible the common practices of that community. It makes 
particular practices rational, expected and acceptable. The imaginary is thus a worldview of 
sorts. Taylor’s conceptualisation can be applied to the national imagined community: there is 
the understanding of what the nation is, who belongs to it and what is rational, expected and 
acceptable in it. It is subsequently expressed in ways deemed ‘acceptable’. Through this 
understanding, the nation is reproduced, becomes and stays ‘real’. 
Taylor argues that the ‘imagining’ is expressed through images, stories and legends. These 
means, in turn, reinforce that imagining. Billig (1995) articulates the potential of the national 
imaginary, and provides practical examples. Although he puts the following in the context of 
discourses, it captures the position of the three aforementioned theorists. He writes that: 
an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of 
thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about 
nationhood… Having a national identity also involves being situated physically, legally, 
socially, as well as emotionally: typically, it means being situated within a homeland, which 
itself is situated within the world of nations. And, only if people believe that they have 
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national identities, will such homelands, and the world of national homelands, be 
reproduced. (Billig 1995, 8) 
In Billig’s description of the imaginary here, he refers to the claims to identity, jurisdiction and 
territory that Hearn defines as nationalism. There are resting social claims of identity and an 
understating of what those claims mean. For the identity claims to manifest in reality, 
however, they need to be translated into laws and social structures. In order for this to be 
possible, a territory must exist to allow that to happen. Ultimately this can only exist in a 
nation-state system, in what Billig calls “the world of national homelands”. Nationalism is 
therefore secured through making it a social reality for citizens. It is what enables the national 
community to form an understanding and ways of being. Nationalism, then, is what maintains 
the national imaginary. 
Some researchers have positioned the normalisation of national markers within neo-liberal 
economics. This has largely been overlooked by theorists of nationalism, although it clearly 
applies. For example, the images and clichés that Billig (1995) describes fit market principles in 
that they can be commodified and consumed. Neo-liberal processes are used to ‘sell’ an image 
of the nation, ultimately evoking feelings, understandings and experiences of it. Anderson 
certainly referred to commercialisation when discussing the role of print capitalism and a 
national language; he wrote that “had print-capitalism sought to exploit each potential oral 
vernacular market, it would have remained a capitalism of petty proportions” (2006, 43). 
Anderson therefore refers to the market, and specifically consumers. More recent work, 
however, expands on this and demonstrates the tendency to treat ‘the nation’ as a corporation 
that can adopt market principles. Volčič and Andrejević (2011; 2015) have written about ‘nation 
branding’ and the commercialisation of the nation-state specifically. Symbols are not only 
normalised to represent the nation, but also commodified as such. Marketing is applied to 
nationalism, leading to the ‘selling’ of the nation both locally and globally. Using Slovenia as 
an example, the authors demonstrated how an image of an organic nation was to draw out an 
identification with Slovenia, and shared feelings amongst Slovenes. Even the word ‘love’ in 
‘Slovenia’ was accentuated, an attempt to encourage a love for the nation. The same campaign 
was also used to evoke an interest in Slovenia amongst the global community, whether to 
draw tourists or to build a positive self-image. Although my own thesis does not focus on the 
commercialisation of the nation, this emerging area of research is important in that it takes 
into account neo-liberalism. This is an integral part of modernity, in which nationalism is 
situated. 
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Forming the imaginary 
Members come to form a national imaginary by constantly being exposed to an image of it, 
and through a societal structure that enables it. National identity markers become reproduced 
en masse by different means, touching the lives of individuals in many directions. The markers 
are constant and become everyday norms. They are also personalised by being treated as a 
normal, natural part of individuals. Anderson (2006) describes the spread and normalisation 
of the nation through means such as standardising a language, myths, the census system, the 
mapping of territory, and museum displays. A language is formalised through the written 
word and standardised as the 'correct' one. Myths are treated as 'the truth' through national 
holidays and history teaching. The census categorises people and influences access to 
resources. Maps provide an additional image of the nation, formalised through territories with 
borders. The nation is made physically 'limited and sovereign' through a territorial map, as 
beyond it are other nations within their own territories. 
Billig (1995) argues that citizens become subconsciously familiarised with images and clichés 
of their nation through the aptly named ‘banal’ nationalism. He gives a sociological account of 
what life is like in a nationalist state: flags loosely hanging off a government building, the 
national anthem being sung at sports games, even seeing one’s nation-state on a map, 
although banal, familiarises the individual with their citizenship, and thus their membership 
to a larger collective. The state reproduces a cohesive, strong national identity for its benefit: 
its legitimation. In times of crisis, the images and clichés are reproduced, ‘reminding’ the 
citizenry of their nation-state membership and their duty to it. With Billig’s description we 
also see that the nation is a lived experience through space, rituals and the structure of a 
society. 
To return to Hearn’s definition, he states that the combined claims to identity, jurisdiction 
and territory are made on behalf of a population. It is therefore important to understand who 
makes those claims. Hearn argues that those who make these claims are a small group of 
individuals who understand that nationalism only works through the interdependency 
between the claims. The individuals are those who have the power to direct the claims, which 
I call the agents of meaning-making in this thesis1. These agents are often members of 
institutions who influence peoples’ lived experiences, who have power to communicate a 
message to the masses. Importantly, Hearn situates nationalism in the modern condition of 
                                                     
1
 This is explained in detail in the third chapter Making meaning out of national identity in which I 
discuss my methodological approach and data collection methods. 
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communication. By this he speaks about the expansion of literacy and the printed word 
making nationalism possible, the banal nationalism I discussed in the paragraph above. Those 
with power over these means of communication are then part of the small group of individuals 
that he speaks of. 
 
Imagining Serbia 
Having discussed the theories behind the imagining of the nation, I would like to move on to 
the imagining of the Serbian nation. First let us discuss what the Serbian national imaginary is 
understood to be thus far, and how it has come to be so. To refer back to Hearn’s definition 
framing my thesis, the claim to identity constitutes the naming or labelling of a group, as well 
as its “substantive content that characterises  the group” (2006, 11). The Serb nation is the 
group studied in this thesis; it is ‘real’ and there is a collective who feel that they are part of it. 
The community members are aware of there being boundaries to their collective, and that 
they lie amongst other nations. The content Serbs differentiate themselves by—the common 
understandings and common practices—are important here. Hearn explains that the content 
includes “religious beliefs or language, or notion of shared biological substance, or of inherited 
historical experiences...[or] more abstract qualities such as core values (e.g. egalitarianism, 
liberty, democracy)” (2006, 11). These are the cultural or ethnic elements of the nation, its 
identity markers and characteristics. When we discuss the national imaginary, it is about the 
common agreement on what those characteristics are and an attachment to them. 
In the case of Serbia, what is considered ‘Serb’ has been widely written about following 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration; scholars have endeavoured to explain the differences amongst the 
warring groups in an attempt to make sense of the conflicts. Ultimately, the major group 
differentiation marker in the Balkans has been perceived to be religion, in which Serb 
Orthodoxy has been established as a substantial part of ‘being Serb’. The writers who discuss 
the Serbian imaginary in some form have focused on the Kosovo myth—central to the story of 
Serb Orthodoxy—as the framework for the Serb worldview (Anzulović 1999; Živković 2011). In 
them, the story of ‘Heavenly Serbia’ provides meaning to the nation, how it came to be and 
what its destiny is. That understanding directs the behaviour of Serbs. As I stated in the 
introduction, however, writers such as Anzulović (1999) suggest that violence may be accepted 
as ‘inevitable’ by Serbs. That is, if violence is a means to their Heavenly end, then Serbs would 
assumingly support aggressive (and even ‘genocidal’) behaviour if necessary. This is a 
concerning perpetuation of essentialism; the framework points to Serbs as somehow 
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‘naturally’ prone to violence more so than other groups. Anzulović appears to accept the 
politicization of religion without critiquing it. 
Duijzings (2000) carefully critiques the politicisation of religion and identity. He analysed how 
group distinctions in the Balkans were emphasised for political purposes and religion 
gradually became the core differentiator. Analysing social groups in Kosovo, he demonstrated 
how ethnicity, religion and cultural traditions were packaged together to form group 
dichotomies. Religious rituals were pooled with folklore and tradition; customs passed down 
through generations often have religious undertones. Culture and religion have been 
combined and offer an inherited ancestry. Despite upbringing, or the level of practice or 
religious belief, religious identity is practiced as inherited and thus group membership 
determined. Religion is also used as a framework to categorise ‘us’ against ‘them’. Duijzings 
(2000) simplifies this  by stating that religious elements allow the nation to be sacralised, 
while its enemies demonised. The complexities of the imaginary are made simple and clear, 
differentiating the good ‘Us’, from the evil ‘Other’. This gives the impression of inherent good 
in the Self, and inherent evil in the Other. As such, if a nation’s members have an inherent 
quality, they have inherited it and it comes ‘naturally’. If we refer back to Hearn’s explanation 
of the substantial qualities of the national identity, then religious beliefs and values are linked 
to “notions of shared biological substance” (2006, 11). 
The politicisation of religious institutions further made Serb Orthodoxy a key national marker. 
With the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) receiving autocephalous status, the concept of 
Serbdom was vital for its relevance and survival. The Church was thus an advocate of 
movements that would give it power and longevity. Žanić (2007) explains how political events 
were held on religious holidays to give them a wide sense of appeal. His research also analyses 
how the Kosovo Battle and the cult of Prince Lazar2 became embedded in the political agenda 
of a Serbian state. Žanić describes how St Vitus Day3 celebrations were prepared by the young 
Serbian state in the late 1800s: a celebration of a past Serbian ‘Golden Age’ and a 'resurrection' 
of Serb independence. For Žanić, these celebrations across the region were a turning point for 
Serbian national consciousness; from then on, political demands were made by a group who 
                                                     
2
 Prince Lazar is the protagonist of the Kosovo Battle myth, choosing heaven over rule by the Ottoman 
Empire. He is a hero and martyr of the Serb people, and that particular battle marked the end of 
Serbia’s perceived Golden Age. Since the loss of that sovereignty and esteem, Serbs had been ruled by 
foreign powers.  
3
 St Vitus Day (Vidovdan) is Serbian Orthodox holiday that venerates St Vitus and to remember all Serb 
martyrs. It is now an important national holiday. See the beginning of Chapter Four for the 
contemporary experience if Vidovdan. 
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shared a religion. Serbs as a nation therefore only began to make sense once there was a push 
for autonomy4. 
Beyond being practiced as a hereditary element, Serb Orthodoxy is also considered to be the 
protector of the nation. In turn, members of the nation have a duty to protect the religion. The 
SPC is considered to have been the saviour of the Serbian people. Radić and Vukomanović 
write how ‘secular’ socialist Yugoslavia saw people turn to religion the more distrustful they 
became of the state, as it was considered to be “the keeper of national institutions and values” 
during times of oppression (2014, 180). The framing of the nation through religion is also a way 
to ‘sacralise’ it, marking the Serb nation as an embodiment of the divine. Leustean’s analysis of 
the role of Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities demonstrates that 
mythical imagery has had an important role in the evolution of the Balkan nation-state:, 
“myths that combine religion and politics have been milestones in the creation of national 
identity as political leaders have employed religion in forging an ‘imagined community’” 
(2008, 421). That is, a sovereign nation-state means implementing the exclusivity of God’s 
chosen people and their heavenly status. We can tie this back to Hearn discussing the claims 
that make up nationalism, including the legal implementation of identity on a given territory. 
The sacralising component makes national self-determination a ‘right’ of the chosen people, 
and becomes the embodiment of national emancipation. 
Religious symbols and rituals as national are also normalised through visible aesthetics and 
use of space. Pantelić (2007) analyses public manifestations of identities and notes how 
religion in the Balkans has become a public affair. He writes how cultural identity markers are 
“shaped into a visual framework using a formal and symbolic language that is believed to be 
innate to the group or to echo ancient traditions, an ‘aesthetic’ that reflects affiliation with 
broader cultural contexts” (Pantelić 2007, 132). Where religion is supposedly the foundation of 
a culture, different religious symbols and customs are the materialisation of it. And since a 
national culture is practiced collectively, the once private symbols and customs become 
collective identity markers, and publically so. The practising of a religion is therefore enabled 
(a space is created making it ‘easy’) and encouraged. Although Pantelić’s analysis is of earlier 
manifestations of religion in public spaces, little has changed following the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Since the end of the wars, there has been religious resurgence amongst the region’s national 
                                                     
4
 Sovereignty has had many forms in Serbia; it was an Empire, a vassal state, and then part of 
Yugoslavia. See Jovanović (2012) who argues that Serbs hadn’t experienced independence the way that 
other nations have; he writes how the Serb uprisings of the 1800s (which are widely seen as 
independence movements) were in effort of establishing a monarchic state rather than sovereignty en 
masse. 
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groups. We have seen a ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘re-evangelisation’ of discourse and space, with 
religious markers and customs emphasised. Radović (2013) analysed cityscapes in former 
Yugoslav cities and in them saw the articulation of religion too. The national group in power 
expressed it in the design of the towns and cities; religious monuments were raised and places 
of worship built. For example, Belgrade’s St Sava Temple stands as the tallest Orthodox 
Church structure in the world, and the majority of Serbs consider themselves Orthodox 
(Ramet 2014). Some symbols have been used provocatively in places, mocking the other group. 
Another key national identity marker for Serbs is ‘lore’ (Čolović 2007; 2011a; Žanić 2007). Tying 
in notions of shared biology and inherited historical experiences, traditional customs and 
characteristics are supposedly passed down through generations of Serbs. They are part of 
tradition, myths and folklore, and tell the story of the nation. In the Serbian context, lore is 
embodied in the peasant in traditional dress abiding by customs learnt from family. The 
peasant wears opanke on his feet, plays the gusle, and tells epic tales of his people. This is of 
course a stereotypical image, one which very few peasants embody. Nonetheless, that image of 
lore is spread. The folklore stories are taught to children, encouraging the young to have a love 
for their country. As noted above, these traditional customs often have a religious affiliation; 
epic tales are frequently religious (such as the myth of Prince Lazar choosing the heavens), 
while a traditional Serb custom is for a family to celebrate the feast day of their patron saint. 
Like religion, lore has also been politicised. Žanić (2007) published an anthropological account 
of such uses of lore. In his analysis of the Yugoslav wars, he identified how cultural motifs 
were manipulated for political purposes. National epic myths and cultural artefacts were used 
to justify contemporary actions and legitimate the political elite. They were also incorporated 
into contemporary political events; such as the events being held on religious holidays and 
men in traditional dress singing political songs along the gusle instrument. Žanić writes that 
the appearance of the gusle player at political events in the 1980s and 1990s was, “above all to 
develop social solidarity and encourage national identification, that is, to renew the common 
value system into which contemporary relations, events and personalities will then 
automatically fit” (2007, 71). The idea was to touch a wide audience by appealing to the 
peasant 'roots' in the countryside. Once again, contemporary people and events were 
understood through a traditional framework. The modern context of popular self-
determination is thus situated in this framework. That is, the modern nation-state is 
seemingly based on a natural and traditional meaning of identity. 
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Lore is also an opportunity to incorporate art in the making of the ‘nation’. Art can be a form 
of national expression and artists are agents by which an ideology can be spread (Pantelić 
2007; Žanić 2007). The aforementioned gusle, for example, is a musical instrument which 
accompanies traditional songs and poems. The instrument itself can bear patterns and motifs 
that tell a story, which “complete the meaning and increase the intensity of the message” 
(Čolović 2011a, 124). Žanić’s (2007) analysis of folklore and poems demonstrated how they 
touched on familiar images amongst a wide audience, later being used for political 
mobilisation. Hudson (2003) mentions this as well, but exposed parallels between 
contemporary music and older folk songs. Although seeming different, many songs from the 
1990s encouraged communities to unify and some were even calls to arms. Volčič and Erjavec 
(2010) analysed music even more recently. They asked why Ceca, the Serbian ‘turbofolk queen’ 
was so popular in Croatia and Slovenia, despite her known identification with Serbs and past 
marriage to war criminal Arkan. They saw a perceived image of a ‘resurrected’ Ceca as an 
independent, powerful woman, despite her perpetuating an image of a fellow co-national. 
Fine art can also be politicised for this purpose. Individual art works can eternalise moments 
important in national history and art styles can be attributed to national schools. Uroš Predić’s 
depiction of the dying Prince Lazar in the famous painting The Kosovo Maiden (Kosovska 
Devojka) is an example of the eternalisation and embodiment of a national myth. It provides a 
physical image of an epic tale and belongs to the National Museum of Serbia. The 
classification of style and groups under national schools is common too, with Serbian art being 
but one example of many (Gavrilović 2011; Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović 2011). Doing so 
provides an opportunity to celebrate art made by national members. It demonstrates the 
capability and talent of the community, showing their ability to sustain themselves. Art is also 
a key part of culture, where to ‘be cultured’ is often interpreted as having an understanding 
and appreciation of the arts. It can indicate both intellectuality and wealth. Even a state 
institution owning art pieces is a sign of wealth and power. In fact, the ongoing closure of the 
National Museum which would house such art can be interpreted as a loss of culture. The 
seeming lack of interest in funding culture by the political elite is seen as leaving “gaping holes 
in Belgrade’s cultural life” (Zaba 2016, para. 7). Likewise, the lack of funding for the National 
Library—a place that holds and conserves items, including Serbian literature—has some 
accusing the government of committing “cultural genocide” against Serbs (Bogdanović 2012, 
para. 15). People fear that the nation’s history and culture (in a society in which both history 
and culture are valued) are neither physically in sight, nor are they actively preserved. 
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Another shared characteristic of Serb culture is language, both in its spoken and written form. 
The Serbian language is differentiated from others in the region by its standard form, the 
Cyrillic alphabet and, in the recent past, by the ekavica language style. The accent is instantly 
recognisable and, at least in the Balkan case, automatically assign the person speaking to the 
Serb ethnic, national and religious identity (Susnjic 2011). In the lead up to and both during 
and after the Yugoslavian civil wars, there have been attempts to justify a Balkan group's 
alleged ownership of a language, despite assumptions based on inaccurate understandings of 
old languages and their fluidity over time5. Since the 1990's, each ethnic group has scrambled 
to distinguish its particular language from others, emphasising it in areas under their control 
and erasing the use of rival languages (R. D. Greenberg 2008; Radović 2013; Subotić 2013). 
Serbo-Croatian was slowly abandoned, and each nation standardised its own language. Bosnia 
has provided much comparative analysis, as there are three major ethnic groups competing for 
power in the one state; what is otherwise banal language nationalism in Serbia, is more 
profound in Bosnia.  
Calling it an “obsession with language distinctions”, Subotić (2013) describes the language 
development in Bosnia since the civil wars: 
Bosnian Serbs have come to use the Cyrillic alphabet exclusively to differentiate their 
written language from its Bosniac and Croatian counterparts. However, the Bosniac and 
Croatian linguists have gone out of their way to construct increasingly separate 
language variants: the Bosniac version includes ever more Turkisms; the Croatian 
version brings back old-Croatian elements. This is all in the effort to make the Serbo-
Croatian language (historically the principal unifier of the region) increasingly a marker 
of divergence and ethnic difference. (Subotić 2013, 275) 
In Serbian cities such as Belgrade, this type of contrast is unseen as other ethnic minorities do 
not have a large presence there. Cyrillic has a dominant official and visual presence 
nevertheless; Cyrillic is the official script used by the government, the country’s major 
newspapers use it in print, and many websites provide both Cyrillic and Latin6 script versions 
on their websites. School textbooks are also in Cyrillic. So is the cityscape: street names, public 
signs, government building signs, public transport stops, and so on. 
                                                     
5
 Kordić (2010) provides a detailed analysis of the language variants in the region. She brings to 
attention how today’s assumptions about language ‘purity’ are inaccurate; for example, at the time of 
standardizing the Croatian and Serbian languages, some Croatian linguists campaigned for the 
adaptation of ekavica, while Karadžić and his colleagues preferred ijekavica. 
6
 In the region, the Roman script is referred to as the Latin script (latinica). For consistency, I will use 
‘Latin’ in this thesis. 
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Relationships with Other groups 
Moving on from language, perceptions of shared historical experiences are also key factors in 
the Serbian national imaginary. For a nation in which the hereditary element is important, 
perceived inherited historical experiences give ‘substance’ to the national imaginary. The 
details of experience is fed through national memories that form a history of the nation. Just 
as language has been, national memories are fed through means that reach the masses, such as 
history education in schools and popular songs. Todorova’s (2004) edited volume offers an 
insight into means of memory making by both public and private discourse; storytelling 
reproduces an image of the nation, whether through oral history or literature and film. History 
is also articulated in sites such as monuments and national heroes: they are “masonry of 
national memory” (Todorova 2004, 158). History textbooks transmit national memories and 
encourage national consciousness through ‘official’ means. If done through enough channels, 
a dominant narrative is seen, experienced and understood. 
Like all nations, Serbia’s national memories are influenced by its political climate and 
historical context. We need only to look at Serbian national myths to see that they are 
appropriated to the then current political climate (Duijzings 2000; Čolović 2007; Žanić 2007). 
For example, Serbs have emphasised the medieval Serbian Empire as their ‘Golden Age’, and 
the story is told through the Kosovo epic. It was a time when they were able to fulfil their right 
and duty of national self-rule. That ‘Golden Age’ allegedly came to an end when Serbs were 
beaten by the Ottomans in the Kosovo Battle, beginning a centuries-long rule by foreign 
powers. This epic was repeated again during the Yugoslav civil wars, making it appear as 
though contemporary Serbs were continuing an ancient battle (Bieber 2002). Bosnian Muslims 
and Albanians were portrayed as the modern descendants of the Ottomans, while Serbs were 
the descendants of Prince Lazar and his soldiers. Croats, on the other hand, were positioned 
within memories of WWII. Prior to, and during the Yugoslav conflicts, Serbs were reminded of 
their killing by Croat Ustaše, of the ‘genocide’ committed against Serbs in Croatia (Byford 
2007; Stojanović 2013). Reminders were spread throughout media and through small, but 
significant, exhibitions held to commemorate Serbs killed as part of the Holocaust. These 
exhibitions were silent on the Jews who were killed, but were vocal in the Croats’ involvement 
as perpetrators and Serbs as victims. Most recently, World War I (WWI) has been reproduced 
in the public space due to centenary commemoration. The events of the Great War are 
remembered differently amongst the Balkan national groups, with Serbs portraying Gavrilo 
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Princip’s assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as a “shot for freedom” from the grip of 
foreign powers (Halilovich and Phipps 2015, 37). The timing of the commemorations is 
evidence enough that old national memories continue to be reimagined today. 
The remembering of the Yugoslav civil wars are indeed affecting the Serbian national 
imaginary as well. With their controversies and ongoing debates, the memories of the wars are 
still being formed (Subotić 2013). There remains debate about ‘the truth’ and who is to blame. 
Court cases are still running, mass graves remain undug and people are still missing. People 
have personal memories of the wars and are experiencing the consequences of them too. For 
some, it was when people committed crimes in the name of their nation and should be held 
accountable. Civil society groups such as the Women in Black commemorate the Srebrenica 
genocide and urge government apologies for the war crimes committed in the name of Serbia 
(Bilić 2012). Local intellectuals write about collective responsibility of crime (Dimitrijević 2011), 
and condemn a political climate in which the crimes are championed (Biserko 2012; Čolović 
2007; Pešić 2014). However, these discourses tend to not dominate the public space. Čolović 
(2004; 2007; 2011b) analysed what Todorova calls the “masonry of national memory” (2004, 
158) in Serbia, and demonstrated how criminals from the 1980s and 1990s are becoming 
celebrated war heroes. Their legacies remain through monuments and through sport fan clubs 
and hooliganism. The ongoing ICTY trials also affect the ways that the wars are remembered 
(Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2011; Samardzija and Robertson 2012; Stojić 2006); some court 
decisions are interpreted as anti-Serb, others as confirmation of heroism, and some as even 
revival of traumatic memories and aggressive ethno-nationalism. 
In the problematic nationalist discourses, Serb heroism tends to be presented as retaliation to 
oppression. That is, those who fought did so in roder to take hold of the power they were 
deliberately denied. For example, anti-socialist rhetoric that has been rife in Serbian 
nationalism since the 1980s suggests that nationalist Serbs were fighting against oppression 
imposed by Tito's regime (Milosavljević 2000). Such sentiments are visible in public references 
to history today. In Belgrade, many socialist markers have been replaced with nationalist ones 
(Radović 2013). Ramet (2013) analysed the replacement of socialist references in street names 
with those of figures from the Serbian Empire. Sekulić (2014) analysed street-naming further 
and found that the majority of these royal figures' names were male. This choice meant that 
the patriarchal image of the nation was visibly emphasized, while the tragic fate that met 
many of the female figures was silenced. These cityscape transformations inform a certain 
interpretation of identity and history, affecting what one remembers and forgets. 
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Another point to consider in understanding the emphasis on Serb uniqueness is the accepted 
perceptions of Serbs as non-Europeans. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992) looked at symbolic 
geography in Yugoslavia through the lens of Orientalism in the early 1990's. They found an 
Orientalist representation of cultures and societies amongst Yugoslav peoples. There was the 
impression that Europe was more progressive than the Orient or East. For Yugoslavia, the 
republics were divided into progressive (north) west nations and backward, barbaric (south) 
east nations. Croats and Slovenes were represented as more ‘European’, while Serbs less so. 
Todorova (2009) also discusses an identity struggle between the ‘East’ and ‘West’7 for the 
Balkan nations. She broadens the Orientalist framework to be that of the Balkans region itself. 
Todorova argues that with the label ‘the Balkans’ comes perceived assumptions of 
‘backwardness’ and ‘exoticism’. For her, ‘Balkan’ refers to the Ottoman legacy that the region 
has inherited, a time of stagnation for the Balkan peoples. This legacy existed alongside the 
increasing success of the West, who are ‘progressive’ and a ‘modern’ form of civilisation. 
Todorova has labelled this ‘Balkanism’8.  
More recently, Volčič (2005) has found that this complicated relationship with Europe leaves 
Serbs in an ambiguous position. She argues that there is 'vagueness' about Serbia's position 
within Europe and beside Europe, and especially the EU. It has long been seen as 
geographically a part of Europe, but its political, social and economic positions have been 
unclear. While Serb national markers suggest Eastern ties, they only point to certain parts of 
the East: the ‘backward’ Ottoman legacy is rejected (Todorova 2009). Of the Eastern identities, 
Serbdom seems most acceptable. In the meantime, Europe is ever more ‘successful’ and EU 
membership has been presented as the progressive choice by politicians. Interestingly, Volčič 
(2005) noticed that Serbs have, in a way, accepted the Balkanist view of the Balkans as being 
‘exotic’, ‘wild’ and ‘mystical’. The participants that she interviewed tended to discuss the 
‘selling’ of that image through art and film, attempting to profit from the embodiment. 
Perhaps this is an indication of an acceptance of being non-European. 
The Balkanist framework not only offers no memories of a Serb-European relationship, it 
points to a lack of 'European legacy' specifically. If notions of shared experiences are to 
provide directions for the present and future, then there seems to be no precedent for a 
‘European path’ for Serbia. That is, where Croatia's government may have nurtured its 
                                                     
7
 ‘The West’ and ‘the EU’ are often used interchangeably in my thesis, as the EU is considered the 
institutional embodiment of Western values. 
8
 I use the term ‘Balkan’ throughout this thesis as a way to speak about the region—or the peoples living 
within that region—as a whole. I am not assigning them the connotations of Balkanism. 
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supposed European connections after independence (Subotić 2011), Serbs' option was to 
embrace their alleged uniqueness. Gordy's (1999) analysis of no alternatives seems apt here; 
where an exclusive national identity seemed to be the only option, an exclusive nation-state 
seemed to be the logical end. The subsequent reinforcement of Serb national markers is thus 
somewhat unsurprising; their markers are what differentiated, and were used to justify, Serb 
actions during and after the wars. 
 
What contemporary Serbia can offer 
What the above discussions indicate overall is that a social imaginary is reproduced over time 
through the images, stories and legends that Taylor (2004) speaks of. There are meanings 
associated with them, giving an understanding of society and the appropriate ways of 
behaviour in it. The above discussion also indicates that elites were deeply involved in the 
reproduction of a national imaginary. They—individuals with power—appeared to have been 
aware of how important the combination of claims to identity, jurisdiction and territory are. 
For example, we saw memories of WWII used selectively to encourage ‘bravery’ amongst 
Serbs, but to also point them towards their enemies. This memory was used to justify a fight 
for sovereignty over a certain territory and legitimised the right to do so: attachment to 
national identity and traditions was used as part of a political programme. Throughout this 
process we also see those individuals utilising modern communication networks, from the 
media to museums, to ensure the widespread dissemination of these images. 
The ability of a social imaginary to change over time suggests that the Serbian national 
imaginary may not be what it was in the 1990s. Kosovo may no longer be at the centre of that 
image, as Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and thus is no longer Serbia’s to 
control. What’s more, the political elite continue to argue that EU accession is a priority. If the 
elite really do want Serbia to join the EU, and are aware of the potential for identity to 
encourage support for a geo-political entity, then this begs the question whether they are 
advocating for identification with Europe amongst Serbs. A strong identification with Western 
Europe could ignite support for membership. This is an avenue of research that I have taken in 
this thesis. 
I have also endeavoured to analyse the implications of a negative national self-identity that 
has been noted in research thus far. The Balkanist image suggests negative connections, where 
Serbs can be criticized for not being the seemingly progressive East. This surely affects the 
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pride one has of the nation. This does, in a way, question the ability of nationalism to be 
maintained; if the image of the nation is understood and experienced negatively, then its 
expression by the community is uncertain. 
My evidence I collected opens these discussions further, providing a vehicle to discuss the 
problematics named above. How the data was collected is explained in detail in the next 
chapter, where I discuss my methodological approach and how it framed the data collection 
methods in this research. 
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3. Making meaning out of national identity 
In this third chapter, I expand on my methodological approach and outline the rationales 
informing my choice of methods. I first discuss my position as a researcher and my role as a 
‘marginal native’ in this project. This then leads me to a discussion on power dynamics 
involved in making concepts meaningful. In particular, I outline the appropriateness of using 
Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the national imaginary. I then explain my choice of 
mixed methods. Borrowing data collection techniques from qualitative, ethnographic and 
digital research methods, I conducted semi-structured interviews, structured observation and 
analysed a range of contemporary texts in Serbia’s capital Belgrade. The contemporary texts 
were: eight history textbooks from Serbia’s primary school curriculum; media articles from 
two newspapers, and a series of articles from a third newspaper; and reports from local and 
international organisations. I undertook structured observation of: five museums; two public 
outside spaces; three public temporary exhibitions; two key street names; and six public stalls 
selling cultural and souvenir items. Twenty-two interviews were conducted with participants 
from the following groups: academics; the creative industry (who I refer to as ‘artists’ 
throughout the thesis); and vendors at stalls that sell souvenirs and cultural artefacts. Finally, 
the chapter ends with an acknowledgement of the ethics and limitations of my research. 
 
Researcher positioning 
Conducting qualitative research on and about an established cultural community requires me 
to carefully consider my position as the researcher. For all researchers ‘in the field’, their 
position depends on their historic perceptions of the community and the community’s 
perceptions of the researcher. Both the researcher and the researched can influence the data 
in numerous ways. Both can make assumptions that affect the data given, collected and 
interpreted. My position in the Serbian community can be understood by my proximity, or 
distance, to it, as well as my identification with its members (Kondo 1986; Voloder 2008). 
Reflecting on my marginality with the Serb community, I conducted my research for this 
thesis in the position of a ‘marginal native’ (Freilich 1970). As a researcher in Serbia, I am both 
an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’. I am an ‘insider’ in that my family and I come from former 
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Yugoslavia and we are ‘Serbian’9. However, I am also an ‘outsider’ for two main reasons: being 
a child of mixed marriage and of having lived in Australia for the majority of my life. 
We moved to Australia when I was eight years old; this has pushed me to the margins of the 
communities I research. As I was removed from the lives of those in former Yugoslavia, the 
context of my research is a physical world that I enter only sporadically, and am not immersed 
in fully. I have lived in and was educated in a ‘Western’ country and speak English better than 
Serbo-Croatian. In fact, I speak Serbo-Croatian, and not with the Belgrade ekavica accent that 
my participants are accustomed to. My father is a Serb from Croatia, my mother a Bosnian 
Muslim. Neither practice a religion, and I have not been baptised. I have the means to travel 
and return to my old home in Europe on a regular basis. I had also experienced the war and its 
consequences differently to others. Even my gender and age affect my relationship to the 
participants. All of these experiences affected the participants’ positioning of me as the 
researcher, as they may put me at a distance due to my ‘marginality’ (Hayano 1979; Kondo 
1986; Voloder 2008). 
However, my past and frequent travel there does make me a partial ‘insider’ to the Serb 
community. Serbia is a home; it is a place of childhood and a culture that is familiar to me. It 
is a place where I shared life-changing experiences with other members of society. These 
factors can reduce the distance between myself and the participants that is created from my 
‘outsider’ position (Voloder 2008). My linguistic ability also increases my group membership 
level to an extent. It breaks down language barriers as I am literate in Serbian, and allows me 
to deeply experience and observe public discourse of Serbia. I can conduct firsthand data 
collection, as I understand the published material written in Serbian, observe the Serbian 
language, and can conduct interviews in that language. 
 
Critical discourse analysis and agents of meaning making 
Scholars who have written on national identity have paid much attention to its construction as 
a reality (Anderson 2006; Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997; Hearn 2006). It is a reality in the sense 
that Hearn (2006) talks about nationalism being a feeling, identity, idea, movement and 
process. Each of these has meaning and there is substance to them. In the national imaginary 
theory, the ‘reality’ is in that the nation is imagined, understood and then expressed. This 
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 As you would have read in the introduction, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, my father sees 
himself as a Serbian from Croatia, while my mother identifies herself as Bosnian Muslim. Children tend 
to ‘inherit’ their father’s nationality. 
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cyclical process allows it to stay real and secure nationalism. Billig (1995) helps to understand 
how this happens. He discusses the normalisation of markers as symbols of identity and how 
they are made to appear traditional and ‘natural’. They are reproduced over time and become 
familiar. Much of the reproduction occurs through the media, space and state apparatuses; 
schools teach the history of the nation, celebrations and commemorations are held annually 
to remind citizens of their nation, symbols depicting the nation such as flags and maps are 
created, distributed and normalised, citizenship laws control who is legally included in the 
nation, and so on. These expressions of national identity are controlled by social actors who 
have the power over the state institutions, space and the media. Hearn refers to them too by 
arguing that the claims that make up nationalism are made by a small group of individuals on 
behalf of a community. 
It is with this that I bring in scholars who have discussed exactly those who ‘do’ the 
constructing, reproducing and normalizing. I focus on van Dijk (2001) as he has extended 
general discourse analysis to suit the complexities of sociology and political research. He talks 
of discourses as a means of making meaning out of society and argues that these discourses 
are directed by agents with different levels of power. The acknowledgement of power relations 
within the society in which the discourses are played out are the critical component of his 
approach, hence the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that he offers. 
In the context of national identity, the discourses that van Dijk (2001) may refer to are the 
expressions of national identity through the media, space and state institutions that make that 
identity have a meaning. The discourses produce 'texts' and can be Billig’s (1995) examples 
such as national anthems and the teaching of national history. These discourses are limited 
and also limit those involved in it; that is, there are prescribed ways to express a national 
identity based on the context. Even the language used in understanding and expressing a 
national identity is limited by discourses available. Having the discourses shape an 
understanding of society and encouraging its re-expression is the process of the social 
imaginary that I discussed in the previous chapter; van Dijk (2001) describes a process just as 
Taylor (2004) does. 
From van Dijk’s (2001) perspective, there are individuals and groups who have power over the 
discourses. Specifically, the individuals and groups are named ‘agents of meaning-making’: 
they have the power to make meaning out of concepts, making the concepts into social 
realities. The agents control the media, space and state apparatuses, and have the power to 
direct the meaning that is produced through them. The state apparatuses that I speak of are 
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those that Baylis and Smith (2005) describe as covering the executive, legislature, 
administration, military, armed forces and police. These range from the education system and 
citizenship laws that manifest ideological beliefs, to minority and gender rights. The authors 
give this as one of the definitions of ‘the state’; thus where I refer to ‘the state’, I mean the 
aforementioned state apparatuses. 
The ‘agents of meaning-making’ are in positions of power that influence the direction of 
discourses and shaping of knowledge. They have influence by constructing social knowledge 
through their contribution to public discourses and institutionalisation through state 
administration access. Much of the literature available argues that such processes control 
what, and the way, the masses think. Van Dijk (2001) tells us that controlling people’s minds 
enables the reproduction of dominance and hegemony. The masses are taught meanings and 
are limited in their expression of those meanings. It is with this in mind that Phillips and 
Hardy (2002) consider the potential of an individual and groups with power over a discourse. 
They stress that discourses can be used by groups or individuals to bring about certain 
outcomes. In the context of national identity, the agents in power can make their 
understanding of the national imaginary expressed and disseminated through different means, 
normalised and institutionalised. To return to Hearn discussing claims to identity, jurisdiction 
and territory, those with power can make their idea of the nation a ‘reality’ through legislature 
in a given territory. An example is the control of language through the education system and 
other policies, such as described by Anderson (2006) that I referred to in the preceding 
chapter.  
Here let us understand van Dijk’s (2001) simple definition of the power of these agents: for 
him, power is measured in terms of control. That is, those with more access to influential 
discourses, such as economic organisations, political institutions, government legislation and 
the media, possess more power. 
The different levels of power van Dijk (1997) attributes to different levels of ‘doing politics’. 
The political realm is an important factor in the national imaginary as nationalism is an 
integral part of modern politics (the right to national self-determination is political). Those 
who ‘do politics’ range from political parties and groups to political actors: individuals 
performing political action. Van Dijk (1997) describes political parties as organisations that 
work within political institutions to structure political action. Political parties and the political 
elite have access to the media and influence dominant discourses. They also have the power to 
influence state apparatuses and different forms of national expression. 
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Van Dijk (1997) also refers to intellectuals and other elites as agents of meaning-making. They 
fall under the umbrella of ‘political actors’ whose engagement in politics accomplishes 
political action. This is relevant to my thesis as intellectuals have had power in making 
nationalism a reality (Boyer and Lomnitz 2005). For the purpose of this study, I will take on 
Boyer and Lomnitz’ view of intellectuals being social agents who have, “by local, historical 
standards, a differentially specialised engagement with forms of knowledge and their social 
extensions” (2005, 107). They range from academics, politicians, clerics, linguists, artists or 
architects. There are a number of ways that they can contribute to securing the national 
imaginary: academics can categorise groups of people based on shared characteristics, 
politicians can use those categories to direct distribution of resources, a church may support a 
fight for national sovereignty, a linguist can create a standard language, artists might write 
songs about a national past, authors can document myths, and architects tend to design 
public spaces in a particular style. The idea is to focus on intellectuals as social agents who 
contribute to the normalisation of public nationalist discourses. 
At times the political actors have the potential to form political groups which van Dijk defines 
as “independently of their organization in political organization, collections of political actors 
may form more or less formal, cohesive or permanent groups” (1997, 17). Such groups can 
control the national imaginary in the same way that political parties and political actors do. 
All of these parties, groups and actors produce texts. For the purpose of my research, ‘text’ 
refers to the observations, interviews and general texts collected as data. The text themselves 
were analysed, as well as the authors and the wider context, reflecting CDA. Van Dijk (2001) 
explains that CDA requires analysis at three different levels: the macro-levels, meso-levels and 
micro-levels. The macro level looks at the broader context, taking into account things like 
power, dominance, and inequality amongst social groups through things like government 
policies, legislation, newsmaking, and so on. The intermediary level, the meso-level, considers 
the production and consumption factors; that is, who is reading?, who is producing?, what is 
the impact of this text? Then this is taken deeper to the micro-level. This includes language 
use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication – the rhetorical structure of the texts. I 
applied this analysis technique to the data obtained from all of the various methods, looking 
for repetition of themes amongst the texts. I found similar problematics amongst the different 
texts, building the narrative of this thesis. 
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CDA in the Serbian context 
Analysing the making of meaning through different levels of power is a useful approach for 
studying the Serbian national imaginary. There is a rich body of scholarly work that supports 
this claim, each piece of research offering a number of methods to study this. 
To begin, the role of the Serbian intellectual and academic community in the reproduction of 
Serbian national identity has been noted by scholars (Dragović-Soso 2003; Milosavljević 2000; 
Šajkaš 2008; Shigeno 2004). It was intellectuals who first voiced the idea of a need for certain 
national autonomy in the former Yugoslavia, a goal that was not yet embraced by much of the 
political elite of the time. That idea was later adapted by politicians and used to create policies 
and legitimise ethno-nationalism. 
There has also been significant work exploring the role of the political elite and the role of the 
media, mostly in creating the ethno-nationalism before and during the Yugoslavian civil wars 
(Cohen 2002; Gordy 1999; Kolstø 2009; Volčič 2006). The media is seen to have had a role in 
igniting and encouraging nationalism in the region, often driven by those who had power over 
it. Tito’s use of the media to encourage brotherhood and unity was replaced with ethno-
nationalist rhetoric by the Milošević regime. Milošević used the media to legitimise his power 
and, as Morus (2007) argues, to normalise violence. Through carefully orchestrated media 
appearances (and their continual repetition), an image of Milošević as the saviour and 
redeemer was reproduced and normalised alongside a rhetoric of Serb ‘the people’ as victims. 
Byford (2007) also highlights the media when analysing the Serb-centric interpretation of the 
Holocaust. He argues that media was used to remind Serbs of their WWII history as victims of 
Croatian Ustaše, such as with reporting on the 1992-established Museum of Genocide Victims. 
Although the Museum has never had a large permanent display, the then-director made 
regular media appearances to keep the Museum on people’s radars. Some citizens today also 
remember the media having influenced their opinions of other ethnic groups, such as Volčič’s 
(2006) interviews with young Serb intellectuals. Her participants appeared to ‘blame the 
media’ for the conflicts and any ethno-nationalist sentiments that they have had. They 
suggested themselves helpless agents influenced by a culture of ethno-nationalism available in 
the media. Recent analysis has demonstrated the use of the internet in articulating the 
national image, whether continuing an ethno-nationalist narrative, providing alternative views 
or using it for organisational purposes (Samardzija and Robertson 2012; Spasić and Petrović 
2013). 
   
39 
Although the stronghold that Milošević had of Serbian media has somewhat relaxed, the 
Serbian government continues to influence popular media. There are reports that journalists 
struggle for media freedom and those with an anti-government agenda face setbacks (“OSCE 
Worried by Serbia Government Online Censorship” 2014; Reporters Sans Frontières 2014). We 
can therefore say that there are indications of government influences over Serbian media. 
Historical consciousness has also played a prominent role in forming the nation, as discussed 
in Chapter Two. Some scholars have focused on personal narratives to understand this. 
Volčič’s (2011) work on ‘Yugo-nostalgia’ was a product of a comprehensive amount of 
interviews. Through their telling of their lives, she was able to assemble a general image of 
Yugoslavia by her participants and why these memories were shaped as such. In another 
aforementioned study by Volčič (2006), her interview participants attempted to make sense of 
the Yugoslav civil wars by remembering what drove ethno-national prejudices and discussing 
the ways that Serbs are perceived by the West. In this way, Volčič’s participants allowed her a 
glimpse into their self-identity and where they position themselves in Europe and the 
globalizing world. Todorova’s (2004) edited volume also offers storytelling as a form of 
historical consciousness; stories of the nation are passed down through oral retelling, where a 
sense of self is positioned within the community and national framework (Neyzi 2004). 
Živković (2011), on the other hand, did not conduct interviews, and the reader is left 
wondering whether his conclusions obtained from his sources resonated with the general Serb 
public. 
History education has also been found to have been a means for reaching the historical 
national consciousness. A number of researchers have analysed Balkan school curricula to 
look at identity, collective memory and what it may mean for the future of the region. 
Stojanović (2004; 2012), a professor at the University of Belgrade and a prominent Serb 
historian, is the leading researcher on history textbooks in the country. She has described how 
the textbooks reflect the ideologies of the government in power at the time, influence national 
consciousness and influence us/them dichotomies. She found that history textbooks taught 
conflict as an inevitable part of Serbian history and the 1990s textbooks, especially, vilified 
Croats and Muslims. At a time when Serbs were fighting against Croats and Muslims, the 
historical context legitimised the conflicts. Also from the University of Belgrade, Vukomanović 
(2008) analysed the image constructed of Ottomans and Islam in Serbian history textbooks. 
He found that they were most often portrayed as barbaric and ‘backward’, atypical Orientalist 
understandings of the East-West divide (Todorova 2009). Other former Yugoslav states are no 
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strangers to the politicisation of school history textbooks (Subotić 2013; Torsti 2013). 
Textbooks used in Bosnia and Croatia reflect the ethnic majority in power, with the in-group 
being shed in a mostly positive light. They reinforce the ethno-nationalist attitudes that rose 
during the civil wars. 
Subotić (2013) analysed these educational processes alongside other memorialisation processes 
in Serbia and Croatia, as together they form dominant national memories. She argues that 
these memories prevent reconciliation amongst ethnic groups as the historical narratives are 
‘mutually exclusive’. For Subotić, these fundamental differences do not allow productive 
conversation or the possibility of restorative justice. 
Others scholars agree with space being used for national memorialisation purposes. Anderson 
(2006) writes how ‘symbolic spaces’ are important for ensuring collective memories and there 
has been research about public and urban spaces being used in such ways. The spaces make 
participating in the national imaginary easy and expected, often designed to invite such 
behaviour. Sumartojo’s (2015) focus is on space used for national commemoration purposes; 
she writes how monuments embody a national history and offer contemporary citizens to 
form a connection with their perceived ancestors. The monuments tend to embody ‘timeless’ 
virtues such as bravery and a love for country: precisely virtues that contemporaries can 
identify with. 
The former Yugoslav context is no exception, using space to secure a national imaginary. A 
number of scholars have used space to make sense of identity politics in the Balkans (Dulović 
2004; Radović 2013; Ramet 2013; Sekulić 2014; Šakaja and Stanić 2011). In the comprehensive 
City as a Text, Radović (2013) argues that cityscapes reflect the ideology of the group in power; 
as ethno-nationalism is central to Balkan ideologies, ethno-nationalist references—such as 
places of worship, statues, the naming of spaces—are emphasised in public spaces. 
Let us look at Radović’s Banja Luka and Priština examples. Following WWII, both towns had 
socialist street names and monuments in the aim of spreading and legitimizing the dominant 
socialist narrative. However, as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, public space echoed the 
ethnic conflicts that were occurring. Banja Luka, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Republika Srpska, was ‘cleansed’ of Croats and Muslims, along with their symbols such as 
mosques and churches. This was followed by renaming of roads, squares and other public 
spaces after Serbian history and mythology, or replicating Belgrade’s topography. Cyrillic also 
became prominent. In Kosovo’s Priština, public markers have changed to represent the 
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growing power of the Albanian population. Serb figures such as Vuk Karadžić have been 
replaced by names and statues of Skanderberg, Adem Jašarija10 and other Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) members. Even a main road has been named after Mother Teresa. Just as Banja 
Luka replicated Belgrade, Priština has been replicating Albania’s capital Tirana. By following 
the public symbolism in these cities, we can see that political and social transformations have 
taken place.  
Museums have also been used to secure a national imaginary. Like other public spaces, they 
demonstrate the ideologies of the state and what kind of nation they want to present. Where 
the nation and history are concerned, museums show which elements are highlighted, which 
histories are remembered, and which are forgotten (Ramet 2013). The museums run by 
socialist leaders, for example, often used the institutions to legitimise their regime. Petkova-
Campbell (2009) writes of Bulgarian museums being under strict control by the socialist 
government. The museums had to suit the state narrative and showcase the success of the 
‘brotherhood and unity’ ideology. In Serbia, there have emerged a number of studies where 
museums were used to understand politics of national identity specifically. For example, Simić 
(2006) has analysed the Ethnographic Museum of Serbia extensively. She argues that tradition 
is seen as the materialisation of nationality in the Museum, which agrees with other scholarly 
work on tradition as a key Serb national marker. Simić describes the Museum’s emphasis on 
the Serb nation across the region, customs of peasant Serbs, and Serbian Orthodoxy. 
Consequently, other ethnic groups are excluded from the Serb imagined community. And 
importantly, modernity is presented as an opponent to tradition (and, in turn, the national 
identity) in the Museum; amidst growing Western ‘modern’ influence coming from foreign 
lands, traditional (national) culture is depicted as in decline. 
Further, Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović (2011) used five Serbian museums as representative 
of dominant discourses to analyse identity- and state-building in Serbia. They explained how 
museums defined temporal and territorial boundaries of the nation, and provided narratives 
of the nation’s being. For starters, museum collections began to be categorised according to 
national schools; the early National Museum in Serbia divided its collections between ‘Serbian’ 
art and ‘foreign’ art. At a time of Serbian nationalism and expansionism, the museum exhibits 
focused on Serbian art and themes that were becoming important in Serbian national history. 
Similarly, the Museum of Contemporary Art separated ‘Serbian’ art from ‘Yugoslavian’ art, 
despite the museum objective of celebrating Yugoslavia. No clear explanation was given 
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leading figures of Kosovo nation-building (Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers 2006) 
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between ‘Serbian’ and ‘Yugoslavian’ art by the Museum, suggesting that the differentiations 
were assumed to be understood. 
Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović were also able to use the museums to demonstrate 
expressions of state policies. They analysed the government’s decision to display Slobodan 
Milošević’s body at the Museum of Yugoslav History (MIJ) after his death in The Hague. The 
authors argue that the decision to choose the MIJ is due to Tito’s memorial being on the same 
premises, it being the residential area of both of the former leaders, and as a symbolic move by 
the state. Since the museum was “gradually fading to oblivion” and its importance 
diminishing, placing Milošević there can be “understood as a certain form of official break-up 
with socialism and Yugoslavia… Milošević finally and literally became an artefact exhibited in 
a museum dedicated to socialist Yugoslavia” (Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović 2011, 785–86). 
This is a perfect example of how the state sometimes has power over its institutions and how 
public space can be a means of policy articulation. It also shows the context of a ‘history’ 
museum being treated as part of a distant past that the current nation and state have 
separated from. 
 
Multi-method data collection 
All of the research mentioned above points to the many ways that a national imaginary can be 
studied. I employed a multi-method approach for my own research and have split them into 
the following three categories: analysis of contemporary texts, structured observation and 
semi-structured interviews. Each is explained below. 
The data was collected during fieldwork in Belgrade over two periods in 2013 and 2014. The 
first visit (March-September 2013) allowed me to immerse myself in the community, to 
conduct extensive observation, and to gain an idea of possible key themes. I was also able to 
make contact with potential interviewees in my first visit and to find out which public spaces 
and museums were relevant to my research. The second visit (August-October 2014) was 
systematically planned in terms of the spaces to observe, media to follow, and participant 
groups to interview. My evidence is consequently partial and nuanced: my immersion in 
Belgrade—and my position as a marginal native—means that I have had an active part in the 
creation of my thesis’ narrative. In line with traditions in qualitative research, my thesis does 
not work on the level of generalisations. Instead, this thesis builds a narrative out of multiple 
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sources. The data can be viewed as vehicles for exploring problematics faced in the context of 
the national imaginary. 
I kept handwritten and digital fieldnotes throughout my research, which allowed critical 
reflection from early on (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2001). The notes were both intellectual and 
personal, and kept safe in the case of any identifiable information of participants. 
Analysis of contemporary texts 
A large proportion of my data was obtained from a range of contemporary texts: history 
textbooks from the Serbian primary school curriculum; media analysis; and secondary sources 
such as reports and surveys from a number of local and international organisations. 
The eight history textbooks from the Serbian primary school curriculum that I analysed were: 
a) three history textbooks from the sixth grade (Bubalo and Bečanović 2010; Mihaljčić 
2011; Šuica and Radić 2012); 
b) three from the seventh (Antić and Bondžić 2012; Bataković 2010; Bečanović, Jevrić, and 
Petrović 2011); and 
c) two from the eighth (Đurić and Pavlović 2010; Vajagić and Stošić 2011). 
These are the final three years of primary school, beginning with history of the Middle Ages in 
sixth grade and ending with contemporary history in the eighth. 
The media used for analysis in this thesis were: 
a) two popular Serbian newspapers (Politika and Večernje Novosti); and 
b) one article series from the newspaper Dnevni List Danas11.  
The Danas series of articles was titled ‘Why does Serbia need the EU?’ and written by a 
number of government members, political elites and intellectuals. It was a host of opinion 
articles leading up to Serbia receiving the official date for the beginning of accession 
negotiations in June 2013. Although Danas is not the most widely circulated paper, the authors 
of the articles are in positions of power, sounding the opinions of the government, intellectual 
community and organisations. They are all part of the agents of meaning-making who 
participate in ‘doing politics’ (van Dijk 2001). The series of articles were also written during a 
particular period and for a specific purpose. Politika, on the other hand, is a popular daily 
newspaper and one of the oldest in Serbia. It is circulated widely and is seen as reflecting 
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views of the government. Večernje Novosti is a daily tabloid newspaper. Its wide circulation 
suggests that a large proportion of the population read it. I bought the two hardcopy 
newspapers each day for eight weeks (23 August – 18 October) and collected the articles that I 
deemed relevant to my thesis. I have included a link to their online version for quicker access 
where possible12. 
Finally, I also used a range of secondary data for analysis, primarily reports and surveys 
conducted by Serbian and international bodies. The local researching bodies are the Belgrade 
Centre for Security Policy (BCBP), the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), and 
the Statistical Office of Serbia. The international organisations are the United Nations (UN) 
bodies and Gallup. I used the reports and surveys as data on the current political situation in 
Serbia and opinion polls of the wider public. 
I identify the authors’ names of the contemporary texts analysed in this thesis, as well as their 
affiliation where possible. Due to the public nature of the means of discourses I have studied, 
much of the material is available for public consumption. Whether obtaining these texts in 
hardcopy or online, obtaining them did not require permission. It is with this view that I do 
not believe that my analysis requires consent from these authors. 
 
Structured observation 
The key role of space in identity reproduction has been identified above and the method best 
suited for studying it is structured observation. Observation allows the researcher to get a 
sense of ‘reality’, what people experience and how it is in the everyday (O’Leary 2005). It helps 
provide detailed background information and does not rely on secondary accounts and 
narratives. It shapes a holistic approach to research as it provides more data sources for 
common research questions. 
I observed five museums, three temporary exhibitions, two outdoor public spaces, two street 
names and six souvenir stalls in Belgrade. 
The six stalls that I analysed were ones where Serb cultural artefacts and souvenirs were sold. 
The majority were along the main pedestrian street in the city centre, Knez Mihailova Street, 
and the Kalemegdan Fortress. These are popular tourist spots, but locals also visit frequently. 
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The five Belgrade museums that I observed were: 
a) the National Museum of Serbia (Narodni muzej); 
b) the Historical Museum of Serbia (Istorijski muzej Srbije) (IMS); 
c) the Military Museum (Vojni Muzej); 
d) the Ethnographic Museum (Etnografski muzej); and 
e) the Museum of Yugoslav History (Muzej istorije Jugoslavije) (MIJ). 
These museums specifically focus on the national history and national culture in Serbia. Of 
the five museums, only the National Museum does not hold a permanent exhibition. The 
Museum has been closed for a number of years for renovation and conservation purposes, and 
only holds temporary exhibitions. The Military Museum only holds a permanent collection in 
its building, but joins other museums for temporary exhibitions. The MIJ is a museum 
complex that includes the House of Flowers (Kuća cveća) which is the mausoleum for Josip 
Broz Tito, the Museum ‘25 May’ (Muzej 25 Maj) and the Old Museum (Stari muzej). Of the 
three, only Museum ‘25 May’ holds temporary collections. 
Specifically, five temporary exhibitions were a source of observation. They were: 
a) The following one held at the National Museum of Serbia in 2014: 
a. Light in the Darkness of World War One: the finest creations of the protagonists 
of Impressionism in Serbia: In honour of the 170th anniversary of the foundation 
of the National Museum in Belgrade: a cautionary reminder of 100 years since the 
outbreak of World War One13 (Miljković 2014) 
b) The following two held at the Historical Museum of Serbia: 
a. Imagining the Balkans: identities and memory in the long 19th century: travelling 
exhibition (Ilie et al. 2013) in 2013 
b. Serbia 1914 (Ković et al. 2014) in 2014, held in conjunction with the Military 
Museum; 
c) The following one held at the Ethnographic Museum in 2014: 
a. Gusle: they speak when all else is quiet: gusle of the Ethnographic Museum in 
Belgrade (M. Mitrović 2014); and 
d) The following one held at the MIJ in 2014: 
a. Art and authority: landscapes from the collection of Josip Broz Tito (Panić 2014)  
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Where accompanying catalogues were available, I have used them as part of museum 
observation. The catalogues enrich data, giving more detail of the exhibits and their 
interpretation. 
The three non-museum temporary exhibitions observed were: 
a) Long live life! International exhibition of [the] good life from 50s till 90s held from 4 
June to 31 July 2013 at the Belgrade Cultural Centre next to the city centre’s Republic 
Square 
b) (Aesth)etics of nationalism: design for turbofolk14 held from 28 August to 3 September 
2014 at the Mikser House  
c) Gazed into the sky an installation on WWII on the Sava Promenade, Kalemegdan 
Fortress, observed in September 2014 
The aim of ‘Long live life!’ was to showcase Yugoslavian memorabilia by following the 
‘Yugoslav’ man and his ‘good life’. ‘Aesthetics of nationalism: design for turbofolk’ was 
designed by a Croatian artist and travelled throughout the Balkans (Nešić 2016; “Izložba 
‘(Est)etika nacionalizma - dizajn za turbo folk’ u Mikseru” 2014). It was hosted in Belgrade by 
Mikser House, a ‘concept store’ with a bar, restaurant and locally designed items for sale. The 
organisation heads the now popular and recurring cultural Mikser Festival, and is considered 
part of the ‘alternative’ scene in Belgrade. It was reported on by the public Radio Television of 
Serbia (RTS) evening news. The third installation, ‘Gazed into the sky’ was run by Belgrade 
Fortress, the Belgrade City Museum and the Military Museum in Belgrade (Beogradska 
Tvrdjava 2014). It was based on the war diaries of famous Yugoslavian laureate Ivo Andrić with 
photos accompanying his quotes or diary excerpts. 
The three public spaces observed were: 
a) Tašmajdan Park; 
b) Karađorđe Park (Karađorđev Park); and 
c) The Generalštab memorial complex. 
I chose the two parks due to their significance and locations. Tašmajdan Park is one of the 
biggest in Belgrade and underwent extensive renovations in the last decade, funded by the 
government of Azerbaijan (Embassy of Azerbaijan 2011). It sits on the busy King Alexander 
Boulevard and is right next to the Church of St Mark. Tašmajdan has a long history, from 
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having been the Old Belgrade Cemetery in the first half of the 20th century, to having parts of 
it destroyed during the 1999 NATO bombing. Karađorđe Park is where the Saint Sava Temple 
and National Library are. It is located further from the city centre, on Liberation Boulevard. It 
is on one of the highest points in Belgrade, with the Temple having been built where Saint 
Sava’s bones were allegedly moved to and burnt by the Ottomans (Velikonja 2003). Finally, the 
Generalštab complex memorial are the former government buildings that were bombed by 
NATO. The bombings made significant dents in Milošević’s regime and have remained 
generally untouched since. 
Finally, I analysed two Belgrade street names: 
a) Koča Popović Street, formerly Zagrebačka Street; and 
b) Peko Dapčević Street, formerly Kumodraška Street. 
The two street names were chosen because the renaming occurred during my fieldwork in 
2014, and it was gaining much media attention in the newspapers that I analysed at the time. 
I had prepared questions and schedules prior to conducting my observations; one for each 
type of space or event observed. My observations were recorded through note-taking and 
digital photography (O’Leary 2005). Both notes and photographs were later transferred to the 
computer for quick access. All of the events and spaces that I observed were public and I 
observed as both a candid and covert researcher. I was honest about who I was, and disclosed 
my aims when approached, even though it happened only once. Despite the public nature of 
the spaces observed, I did not seek permission from the public and will therefore keep their 
anonymity by excluding photographs of people or any personal identifiable information. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
The third method of data collection was through semi-structured interviews. I conducted 
twenty-two interviews that lasted thirty minutes each on average. The participants selected 
belonged to one of the following three industry groups: academia, creative industries, and 
souvenir vendors. Seven interviews were conducted in the academic industry, nine in the 
creative industry and of six souvenir vendors. I made contact with a number of participants 
through obtaining their information online, the snowball method (O’Leary 2005), or by 
approaching them directly in public. 
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I chose to interview academics as they are part of the group of individuals who have the power 
to direct discourses (Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; van Dijk 2001). As discussed above, Serbian 
academics and intellectuals have had a role in national identity reproduction and I am 
building on this literature. Members of the creative industry were my second group. As my 
interests lie with cultural centres and museums, I felt compelled to speak to those who would 
be connected to such institutions. Speaking to this group was also timely as during my 2013 
visit members of the Serbian cultural scene were publically questioning the government's 
commitment to the industry (“Protest umetnika pod sloganom ‘Stop uništavanju kulture!’ 
održan na Trgu Republike” 2013; “Umetnici protiv uništvanja kulture” 2013). I refer to this 
group as ‘artists’ throughout the thesis for simplicity. The group of souvenir vendors are those 
who sell souvenirs and cultural artefacts at stalls in popular Belgrade spaces. Three were 
owners of the stalls, selling items made by themselves or family members. Three others were 
sellers working for others. Although a small business, souvenir stalls are part of the economics 
sector nonetheless and the vendors are participating in the capitalist system. They also sell, 
quite literally, national symbols as commodities. I will refer to this group as ‘souvenir vendors’ 
or simply ‘vendors’ throughout the thesis. 
I followed the interview protocols as outlined by Jacob and Ferguson (2012). I began most 
interviews with an attempt to ease the participant into the conversation, explaining my 
research, my role in it and their options regarding consent. I then proceeded to have a 
conversation that covered the eight or so main questions that I had in the interview schedule. 
Under each of these were prompts to ask the participant to expand on any information if they 
were having trouble. I took extensive notes in all of the interviews, and twenty-two of them 
were recorded. 
 
Ethics and limitations 
Despite my multi-method approach, my research has its limitations. I acknowledge that the 
experiences, identifications and understandings that I have with the research context and its 
subjects will affect my study. I have attempted to reduce this by not relying on one form of 
data collection and included methods that weren’t dependent on direct communication with 
Serbian community members. 
The scope of my thesis and time constraints has also meant that twenty-two participants were 
interviewed. The data obtained from these interviews are thus a small portion of the national 
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group I write about, and are not representative of the population. I do not make the claim that 
I am explaining every Serbian national imaginary, nor that it will remain this way in the 
future. I can only describe what I believe to be the case according to the data I have collected 
and type of analysis that I have chosen. I am offering suggestions and adding texture to our 
understanding of the Serbian national imaginary, rather than providing generalised 
conclusions. Another point I must acknowledge is the gender disparity amongst my third 
interview group, the souvenir vendors being predominantly women. This was mostly a result 
of stall workers having to be approached for an interview, with female sellers being most open 
to this. 
In terms of observing museums, it is important to note the issues that Serbia as a case study 
presents. Martinović (2011) has written on some issues in the museum sector in Serbia, such as 
low attendance and stagnation. She cites a lack of funding, no employment of new staff, 
unwillingness to modernise and poor advertising as some of the problems that museums need 
to address. I therefore cannot make the assumption that museums influence a large 
proportion of the population. Nevertheless, the small number of research projects that have 
used Serbian museums as data sources do portray the involvement of these institutions in 
expressions of identity (Gavrilović 2011; Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović 2011; Simić 2006); in 
particular, the ‘national’ is emphasised, the in/out groups defined, and history is selectively 
retold. What’s more, the mere inaction of using museums as political tools is still meaningful 
in the study of politics. 
Using Belgrade for my fieldwork also limits the generalisations that I may make. Nationalism 
is experienced differently amongst groups and regions in Serbia. The political environment 
changes as different issues become subjects of political discourse in various parts of the 
country. I believe that analysing national identity in the capital city, however, is important as 
Belgrade is a point of disjuncture. In some respects, it has come to represent Serbdom (such as 
the spread of the Belgrade accent). It is also a space where the accepted traditional image of 
Serbs may be most challenged; the capital city is where globalisation is most visible and is the 
hub of politics. 
Finally, the RMIT University Human Research Ethics Committee approved these methods of 
data collection. The Committee previewed an interview schedule and the participant 
information sheets. All interview participants received information about the research prior to 
the interview, signed participation consent forms, were advised that they could terminate the 
interview at any moment and had the choice of anonymity. Of all, only two chose to use a 
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pseudonym. Thus, I use the first names of all participants who gave me permission15. None of 
the participants were from vulnerable groups. Furthermore, I kept data collected safe as per 
the ethical requirements. 
 
Where this leads 
The complexity of studying identity is clear and there are numerous ways to approach it. My 
own approach is that a national imaginary is maintained through a reproduction of an image 
of the nation, the way it is experienced, as well as the limitations in which it can be expressed. 
It is not stagnant, however, and that imaginary can change over time. A main point of this 
chapter was to highlight that there are actors who direct the normalisation processes. 
Whether through media reports or a personal memory, the image of the nation in these 
discourses is shaped by agents who have power over them. These agents make meaning out of 
a concept such as ‘national identity’ and limit its expression. Critical Discourse Analysis allows 
all of this to be taken into account; it requires the analysis of a text, its producer and the wider 
context that it is produced in. In the upcoming thesis chapters, you will see what evidence I 
collected through these methods and form of analysis.  
                                                     
15
 Two interview participants were named Ivana, two Ana, and another two Aleksandar. I will 
differentiate between them with the use of their last name initials: Ivana L and Ivana S, Ana C and Ana 
P, and Aleksandar B and Aleksandar P. 
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4. National markers: ‘Us’ as Serbs 
28 June is a significant day for Serbia and the Serbian nation, which also coincided with my 
fieldwork in Belgrade. It is Vidovdan, Saint Vitus Day. It is the day of paying tribute to, 
glorifying and celebrating the patron saint, Saint Vitus. In Serbian, days like these are called 
the slava, ‘the celebration’. The slava is an important ritual in the Serbian Orthodox tradition 
and one considered unique for the Serbian people. Families follow a patron saint and organise 
the slava on that patron saint’s day, inviting relatives, friends and acquaintances for a feast. If 
invitations are extended one year, it is assumed that the invitation stands for the following 
years. Although Vidovdan is not the slava that all families celebrate, it is of high importance 
for Serbian Orthodoxy in general; it commemorates the heroic martyrs of the Serbian people 
and their fight for freedom from foreign rulers. In particular, it commemorates Prince Lazar, 
referred to earlier in this thesis, who died at the battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389. Just 
like Saint Vitus, Prince Lazar was a martyr for his faith and his people. This day has become 
entangled with political life in Serbia and many significant events have occurred on this date 
since Serbia’s independence in the late 1880s; Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on Vidovdan 
in 1914, while King Alexander proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 
Vidovdan in 1919. Many future events are set for that day too, continuing this tie between the 
nation, religion and politics. 
In 2013, Vidovdan continued to signify more importance than solely that of a religious holiday. 
Firstly, on 28 June of that year, the EU was to provide the Serbian government with an official 
date for membership negotiations to begin. The media and political elite anticipated the 
moment as the ‘green light’ that Serbia needed to continue with the integration process. 
Receiving it would have meant that the government had done all that was necessary at that 
point in time to be an official contender for EU membership. The fact that the date was to be 
received on Vidovdan was no coincidence. Rather, it was presented as an omen for the fate of 
Serbs. Political elites were confident that they would receive the positive news from Brussels, 
as it was due to be given on such an important day. When the government received the ‘green 
light’ on that day, the faith in Vidovdan was legitimised. 
The second event that took place on Vidovdan in 2013, was scheduled for that evening; it was a 
social event that tied music, politics and criminality all into one. It was the evening of Ceca’s 
concert, Serbia’s turbofolk queen and the widow of accused war criminal Arkan. That Friday 
night, the Belgrade city centre was empty of the usual teenagers and adults walking along the 
main city streets. Knez Mihailova Street was surprisingly quiet and relaxed. Media reported 
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that over 50,000 people went to the open air event, where Ceca sang her big hits. As most 
concerts, a grand fireworks show closed the ceremony and she apparently reaffirmed her 
status as pop queen. Ceca’s concert was free and a ‘gift’ to her countrymen and women. 
The events of the 28 June 2013 connected contemporary events to ones of the past and gave 
them spiritual meaning. The religious holiday that year was tied to both the everyday life of 
the ‘mainstream’ population, as well as to the future of the country. It intertwined nationhood, 
religion, politics and pop culture. In the process, it further reinforced religion as a normalised 
national identity marker. It is such an important element of the ‘substantive content’ that 
makes the Serbian nation, that even as a contemporary researcher, I cannot ignore the 
perception of Serb Orthodoxy as central to the Serbian national imaginary. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore this perception. I analyse whether the religion continues to be reinforced 
as a key national marker (and in what ways), how it can be experienced, and whether such an 
image is accepted by citizens. I begin with analysis of how the religion is experienced through 
public practice, and then through symbols. In the third section I focus on language and how 
Serb Orthodoxy provides perceived ownership of it. 
 
Religion as practice 
I opened this chapter with the Saint Vitus Day slava celebrations in 2013 for a reason. It was 
performed as a public ritual, told the future fate of the state and a celebrated national singer 
provided entertainment to celebrate ‘the people’. The slava has been normalised as a public 
ritual so much so that Serbian cities, state institutions and professions often follow their own 
patron saint. For example, Saint Sava is considered to be the protector of schools and 
education, and is therefore the patron saint of the educational sector in Serbia. 
The history textbooks that I analysed reinforced the connection between religious figures and 
education. They all detailed the life of Saint Sava, his role in the SPC and helping it achieve 
autocephalous status, and what he did for knowledge and literature. He is presented as a 
significant player in a medieval history that tells a linear story of the Serb people. The ‘Freska’ 
textbook details Saint Sava’s role in Serbian literature and the authors write that “because of 
what he has done for education and the spreading of literacy, Sava became the guardian of 
schools and students” (Šuica and Radić 2012, 114). Accompanying the text is an image of a 
fresco of Saint Sava, and another in a contemporary setting. In it, the slava ritual is being 
performed by young school students and seemingly their parents. The focus on Saint Sava 
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sacralises both knowledge and the nation; the 
existence of education and knowledge is 
attributed to him, while he also laid the 
foundations for the Serbian religion and 
nation. The education system today seemingly 
exists due to his work in the Middle Ages. 
Other religious figures are described and 
images of monasteries are aplenty in the 
textbooks too. The story of Cyril and 
Methodius, for example, is told. They were 
missionaries who developed the Glagolitic 
alphabet, from which the Cyrillic alphabet 
stems. They translated many religious 
teachings to the Old Church Slavonic language. 
They spread literacy amongst the Serb people, 
encouraging their cognitive development. 
Contemporary Serbs are to show their 
gratitude to these Saints through the ritual of 
the slava, as they do for Saint Sava in the 
textbook image. The image, deliberately 
chosen, is one of the very few depicting 
contemporary Serbian life in a textbook on 
medieval history. It might have been chosen to 
show students modern relevancy of an 
otherwise ‘ancient’ ritual. 
That slava ritual is encouraged in the public 
education system through practice as well. On 
Saint Sava day of every year, 27 January, 
Serbian educational institutions pay tribute to 
their patron Saint. On the day, schools 
participate in the religious ritual that includes 
the breaking of the blessed bread, just as 
depicted in the textbook image. On the same 
day the Ministry of Education, Science and 
From a grade 6 history textbook: the key 
words of ‘autocephalous’ and 
‘Archbishopric’ explained; an image of the 
‘School Slava of Saint Sava’ and a fresco 
image of Sava Nemanjić (Šuica and Radić 
2012, 114). 
 
1. Saint Sava, protector of education 
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Technological Development also awards those with outstanding achievements in learning and 
teaching with the ‘Saint Sava award’ (“Svetosavske nagrade najboljima u obrazovanju” 2014; 
“Dodeljene Svetosavske nagrade” 2016). The day is celebrated on a number of levels where 
participants show their gratitude and respect, but also legitimise his position as the patron 
saint of knowledge and education. 
 
The Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade is another state institution that actively upholds 
Orthodoxy as a significant part of its existence and cultural meaning. The Museum has its own 
patron feast day, Nativity of Mary, and staff celebrate it collectively. On 21 September 2014, the 
museum celebrated its slava and posted images of the celebration on its Facebook page. The 
album description states:  
This cultural institution of national significance celebrated its slava, Nativity of Mary. The 
religious ritual of remembrance cake, consecration and blessing was performed by priest 
Slaviša Popović. Members of the choir ‘Kir Stefan the Serb’ performed. 
2. Slava at the Ethnographic Museum 
Facebook photo album from the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade, posted on 22.09.2014. 
Original screenshot taken 23.09.2014, then cropped on 5.12.2014. 
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The album images are of museum staff participating in the rituals and the images were made 
public. The museum used social media to spread the image of a state institution paying 
respect to their patron saint, and to spirituality. The images published by the Museum can be 
combined with the teaching of slava celebrations in school history textbooks; together they 
add to a narrative in which the Orthodox tradition is a regular practiced part of Serbian life.  
This would come as little surprise considering the research that has been conducted on the 
Ethnographic Museum. Simić (2006) demonstrated in her work how Orthodoxy is at the 
centre of Serb culture, tradition and history in the Museum. The religion is incorporated into 
traditional customs and artefacts, ultimately excluding all non-Orthodox peoples from the 
Serb imaginary. We can see that the aforementioned slava celebrated in 2014 is an extension of 
this narrative. The displays have changed little since Simić conducted her research and the 
same narrative therefore continues. I will therefore not duplicate her work here. I will, 
however, extend her discussion of the second-floor displays of ‘everyday life’ of Serbs. This 
floor of the museum has displays ranging from village housing architecture and their interiors, 
to information on harvesting and marriage rituals. Notably, the village house interior displays 
were set up to be during a religious event. Three included displays ready for a slava or Easter. 
This meant that there were candles and the slava bread on the table, the bread ready to be 
broken just like it was in the images from the history textbook and the Museum’s social media 
album. There were also dyed Easter eggs in a table bowl and a hanging image of a saint. 
Depictions of the everyday life of the traditional Serb in these displays emphasise peasants 
practising their faith at home. It is as though the Museum was capturing Serb families in an 
intimate setting conducting intimate religious rituals. Yet by being on display, this intimate 
moment was made public to viewers. Pantelić (2007) writes how private rituals were made 
public during the formation of Balkan national identities. Religious symbols were used during 
public gatherings, including political ones, slowly forming the image of the religious and 
political side by side. In a similar way, these displays—available for public view—at the 
Ethnographic Museum are affirming the religious rituals as having a place in the ‘traditional’ 
Serbian household. For a space that makes tradition the materialisation of national identity, 
pooling Orthodoxy with tradition also makes religion part of that material being. 
The Ethnographic Museum's emphasis on religion was evident in its temporary gusle 
exhibition too. This exhibition was solely dedicated to the instrument16 and was titled ‘They 
speak where everybody is quiet’. Spanning instruments made mostly from the late nineteenth 
                                                     
16
 For an explanation of the history of the gusle and its political significance for Balkan peoples, see 
Žanić (2007) and Čolović (2011a). 
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century to now, some gusle were ornate, while others of simple design. They were displayed 
along the walls of the showroom, with some sections made to resemble a traditional Serbian 
home. The opening ceremony included a performance of older men in national costume 
singing alongside the gusle. An older man, also wearing the traditional peasant costume, held 
the opening address. In it he repeated that the instrument was an important part of Serbian 
national identity. An Orthodox priest in his long black robes was also in attendance. The 
opening address launched the exhibition’s overall narrative of the gusle carrying the national 
story and awakening the national spirit, reiterating the narrative of the instrument as an 
integral part of national identity (Čolović 2011a; Žanić 2007). 
 
3. Gusle at the Ethnographic Museum 
Images from the exhibition ‘They speak when everybody is quiet: gusle from the Ethnographic 
Museum of Belgrade’ taken at the opening in September 2014. The top right image is a close-up of a 
gusle depicting a man with an eagle above his head. The bottom right is the body of a gusle from 
1939, with the coat of arms of the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The image to the left is supposedly a 
house interior with stools for member to gather and share stories along gusle playing. 
Photos by A. Samardzija 
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The instrument was presented as the story teller and the information sharer in the exhibition. 
The catalogue authors describe how the story of the Serb nation has been told along gusle 
playing when families gathered and together sung about ‘the Kosovo tale’. Prince Lazar 
allegedly sent a mythical code through the gusle, hoping that future generations would hear 
and understand it. As the gusle is presented as the teller of Serbian history, it telling the 
Kosovo story reaffirms the significance of the Kosovo territory for the nation. As Bieber writes, 
the use of the Kosovo myth “establishes a historical continuity between the contemporary 
Serbian nation and the ‘Serbs’ of the Middle Ages, suggesting a perennial nation” (2002, 96). It 
makes the Serbs of today part of Lazar's battle for freedom and sovereignty. This exhibition 
adds evidence to this analysis. The gusle tells the story of the nation; it teaches contemporary 
Serbs where they had come from. They inherited both the instrument and the stories from 
their ancestors. The practice of playing the gusle is thus a traditional custom, one in which 
(religious) folklore has prominence. 
Importantly, Serbian Orthodoxy is presented as the moral grounding of the nation through 
the gusle exhibition. The catalogue’s introduction states that the instruments: 
have been the voice of public opinion, the internet of the past; they embody the moral 
principle of epic poetry, always taking the side of those who do the good…[Their] social role 
has been to turn people towards the good through a critical stance expressed in poetry. (M. 
Mitrović 2014, 185) 
‘Those who do the good’ are Serbs; they have a spiritual relationship with the instrument. 
They hear the spiritual messages of goodness from the gusle, and it allegedly appeals to their 
social consciousness. The catalogue and exhibition posters dedicated a section to a 1984 
speech given by the SPC’s Patriarch Pavle. In the speech, Patriarch Pavle urged young Serbs to 
guard the gusle, “this beautiful Serbian instrument”, as “with the gusle and song, we awaken 
what we essentially are: people of the Jugović Mother, dignity and courage, a nation of fairness 
and veracity” (M. Mitrović 2014, 36). The function of the instrument here is a carrier of 
meaningful, positive and ‘right’ messages. Hearing it supposedly triggers the goodness in 
Serbs, reminding them of their inherent qualities such as dignity and courage. In national 
myths, the Jugović Mother had nine sons who died in the Battle of Kosovo. In folk songs, she 
weeps for her sons who died for their nation. Through his speech, Patriarch Pavle therefore 
reminds Serbs of the ancestors who sacrificed themselves for the nation, reminding 
contemporary Serbs the sacrifices that they may need to make themselves for the ‘greater 
good’ (the nation) one day. It also reminds listeners of Kosovo. Although this was a 1984 
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speech, it featured prominently in the Ethnographic Museum exhibition here. Through it the 
Museum also incorporated religious narratives of the good/evil dichotomy, as Serbs are ‘those 
who do the good’. Through this, the Museum directs viewers and readers to use Serbian 
Orthodoxy as their moral grounding; religion is what makes Serbs ‘a nation of fairness and 
veracity’. 
 
According to the exhibition authors, the national instrument can allegedly only be played by 
true Serbs for whom the instrument ‘opens’. It is in partnership with 'good' people and 
therefore allows these moral people to play it. So when the authors acknowledge that the gusle 
is played by non-Serbs in the region, it is suggested that this is only because these groups are 
converted Serbs. The Albanian nation are given as an example of those who converted; 
labelling them as ‘Mohammedans’ or ‘Arnaut Catholics’, they ‘clearly’ have Serbian blood in 
their veins by being able to play the gusle. The instrument supposedly responds to the 
Albanians’ ancient inherent Serb quality. Yet in the religious narrative of devotion and duty, 
Albanians are no ‘true’ Serb co-nationals as they distanced themselves from their spiritual 
beginnings. Such a message ultimately renders national claims by Albanians (and other Balkan 
gusle-playing nations) illegitimate. Furthermore, the catalogue also speaks of similar 
instruments being played in places such as Russia, the Middle East and Spain. As with the 
above, the catalogue authors argue that the people of these lands were influenced by Serb 
4. Ulaznica 
The entry ticket for the Ethnographic Museum of Serbia. It depicts the Serb countryside, the 
traditional ćilim carpet, and the stereotypical image of a peasant family. 
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travellers; the gusle originated in Serbia and nowhere else. Such rhetoric here not only gives 
exclusivity to Serbs and this instrument, but also highlights a supposed admiration of a Serb 
culture by other communities. 
Two other exhibitions lent themselves to the narrative of Serbs as those who ‘do the good’. 
Held in commemoration of WWI, they were: ‘Serbia 1914’ held at the Historical Museum of 
Serbia in conjunction with the Military Museum, and ‘Light in the darkness of WWI: the finest 
creations of the protagonists of Impressionism in Serbia’ held at the National Museum. Both 
exhibitions explain Serbia’s involvement in the Great War as necessary: Serbs were forced to 
fight for their right to sovereignty and survival. ‘Serbia 1914’ tells the story of WWI through 
military manoeuvres and battles. When explaining the reason for the assassination of Franz 
Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, the exhibition author stated that the “dependant peasantry” of 
the Balkans were deeply unhappy by Austro-Hungary’s “colonizing attitude” (Ković et al. 2014, 
58). Princip’s actions are presented as necessary; as stated in one exhibition board, he and 
other members of Young Bosnia17 were “deeply aware of the necessity to resist Austro-
Hungarian domination”. Curator Ković writes that the group were “brought upon memories of 
the Kosovo oath and the Saint Vitus Day tradition” (Ković et al. 2014, 14). As I stated in the 
introduction of this chapter, these memories are of martyrs who made sacrifices for their 
nation. Princip apparently made his own sacrifice with his decision to assassinate Ferdinand. 
He sacrificed his freedom (and ultimately his life) for the nation and for the ‘right’ thing. The 
public allegedly made him and Young Bosnia “part of the Saint Vitus heroic tradition” for 
doing so (Ković et al. 2014, 14). The ‘Serbia 1914’ curators therefore suggest that Princip is a 
martyr of the nation, just as Prince Lazar had been in the Kosovo Battle. These martyrs were 
not only fighting for their nation, but also against evil. 
Similarly, ‘Light in the darkness of WWI’ curator Miljković also names Serbs as fighting for 
their divine rights. She focuses on impressionist artists in this exhibition, a number of them 
who became politically active in the war. One of the protagonists is famous Serb painter 
Nadežda Petrović. Of her, Miljković writes: 
As with other Serbian impressionists, we would connect Impressionist experiences to 
Orthodox Christian enlightenment which finds serenity in higher spheres and does not 
succumb to the current and temporary. That is why the portraits of her fellow fighters and 
the tents of the military field hospital in Valjevo are free from the drama of the earthly 
plane. She, too, was defined by the vow of Kosovo, i.e. the choice of the kingdom of heaven. 
                                                     
17
 Young Bosnia was a revolutionary movement active in the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Miljković explicitly places Petrović’s actions in the biblical stories of the Serb heavenly nation. 
Her behaviour was seemingly directed by the word of God. Impressionist artists in general are 
seen as heavenly themselves by Miljković and their art is therefore sacralised. They were 
allegedly attuned to the underlining messages behind events and articulated them in their art. 
Miljković goes on, “They did not love war, they loved their country…They earned their place in 
the pantheon of the righteous, and defeated the evil of the war”. Once again, as in the 'Serbia 
1914' and gusle exhibition narratives, the tie to religion makes the artists those who ‘do the 
good’ and their enemies ‘evil’. These three exhibitions therefore offer further evidence to 
Duijzings' (2000) argument that not only does a religious framework categorise Us and Them, 
it paints Us as 'good' and heavenly, while Them as 'evil'. 
I discussed religion and the national imaginary with my interview participants as well. 
Interestingly, the problematics emerged out of the interviews did not replicate the narrative 
discussed so far in this chapter. Instead, only three female vendors emphasised Serb 
Orthodoxy as uniquely Serb. Of them, Maja was my only participant to explicitly discuss 
religion as a major part of her life. She expressed concern about spirituality having become 
irrelevant to the population. She told me that Serbs are an unhappy people because they have 
strayed from their religious path; the selfish behaviour amongst Serbs she spoke of “is not in 
our essence and that is why we are unhappy”. Her view tends to resonate with the above 
discussions of religion offering a moral grounding. Other participants did not emphasize 
religion as much as Maja. They did, however, refer to values that dominate the Serbian 
Orthodox narrative. The interviewees spoke about the 'morals' and 'ethics' of people, their 
nation and their government. They expressed concern for the behaviour of Serbs today and 
their political representatives. One participant accused Serbs of having a broken moral 
compass, while others considered the participation in the recent civil wars as irrational. They 
couldn’t see a humanity in the past and present actions of their fellow nationals. Their 
discussions of ethics and morals—or that Serbs have gone down the wrong path—have 
religious foundations; they are references to ‘those who do the good’, common in the 
textbooks and museum exhibitions explained above. 
Of the items sold at the cultural stalls, many had religious symbols on them or connotations of 
religious practice. For example, the rakija flasks had religious insignia on them, while the 
folklore costumes sold are most often worn during religious celebrations. Other items had 
images of the popular Saint Sava cathedral on them. The religious symbols have clearly been 
appropriated to the contemporary context and sold as commodities. When I asked the 
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vendors whether they sold symbols of Serbia, however, they were not eager to point many 
items. The typical souvenirs such as magnets or cups were never described as specifically 
Serbian items by my participants. Some of the vendors instead pointed to the traditional 
souvenirs and artefacts as items that symbolised Serbs. These were the opanke (folk leather 
shoes) or traditional woven carpets. One male vendor pointed to the Četnik šajkača cap as an 
item symbolizing Serbia. He told me that “Of course they’re Serbian symbols. History proves 
that they are Serbian symbols”, suggesting that he has accepted the history of Serb patriotism 
that has been widely told. The vendors therefore did not specifically point out religious items. 
 
This is no doubt a contradiction considering the reportedly large affiliation with Serb 
Orthodoxy amongst Serbs (Ramet 2014), as well as the centrality of religion discussed so far. 
Here, I wish to point out that such contradictions are possible. They are also probable in the 
context of the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis. That is, a national identity is 
subject to questioning and reinterpretation as it comes into contact with the lived experiences 
of citizens. The narrative produced prior to my discussion of my interviews is thus not one 
5. For sale 
Items sold at the stall of an interview participant in Belgrade’s Kalemegdan Park. The flags have 
the Serbian coat of arms of the two-headed eagle, the ‘four S’ and a crown. The right image shows 
the ‘traditional’ items of Serbia, such as the opanke, šajkača hat and ćilim rugs. 
Photo by A. Samardzija. 
   
62 
that can be generalised as final. My interviews instead offer nuances; they indicate how the 
narrative of the Serb national imaginary is complex, as described in the second chapter. Below 
I will demonstrate the contradictions further, where citizens appear to understand the 
politicization of religious symbols, and some choose to reject them. 
Interestingly, the items that were considered to be ‘Serb’ by the vendors—as well as those that 
were purchased by the Serb diaspora—suggests that the traditional Serb scene has come to be 
their national branding. If we are to consider Volčič and Andrejević’s (2011) argument that co-
nationals have been encouraged to “live” their national brand and simultaneously participate 
in the country’s economic development, then we can see both the vendors and the Serb 
diaspora participating in this. The vendors are selling the brand, while the diaspora are “living” 
it. In relation to this particular chapter, they are living a culture in which religion is difficult to 
separate from. 
 
Symbolic devotion 
The experience of religion also comes through symbols and symbolic gestures in Belgrade’s 
public spaces. Karađorđe Park is but one example. The park is a space that combines politics, 
the nation and religion in the cityscape. It is situated on Vračar Hill, a high point of the city, 
and named after Karađorđe, the leader of the 1804 First Serbian Uprising and the 'founder' of 
the modern Serbian state. There is a large statue dedicated to Karađorđe at the North-West 
entrance of the park. The statue stands tall on a grass mound, legs firmly parted and a sword 
held in the left hand. He is elevated and at a distance, forcing the viewer to look up at him and 
to see 'the whole picture'. That 'whole picture' is his whole body, as well as the grand Temple 
of Saint Sava18 that looms behind him. The Temple is the largest Christian Orthodox structure 
in the world and has been under construction for decades (Ramet 2014). Fountains run along 
the Park's centre and lead to the Temple's large front doors. To the left of it is the drastically 
smaller Church of Saint Sava, and to its right the National Library. Both Karađorđe and the 
Temple face Liberation Boulevard, a main road and popular public transport route. At the 
northern entrance of the park is a dark statue of Saint Sava, with the Temple standing behind 
him. 
 
                                                     
18
 I will refer to the structure ‘Hram Svetog Save’ as the Temple of Saint Sava. ‘Hram’ directly translates 
to ‘Temple’, while the 'Church of Saint Sava' is the name of the smaller religious structure right next to 
the Temple. 
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The size of the Temple and its position on Vračar Hill means that it dominates Belgrade's 
cityscape. It can be seen from many parts of Belgrade, including from Topčider Hill19. At night 
it is lit up in the same way that the national parliament is. It is visually a powerful structure 
and institution. It is also a physical representation of the government’s priorities; there is 
allegedly scarce government funding for public infrastructure and cultural preservation, yet 
the Temple is continuously under construction. The smaller Church of Saint Sava has freshly 
painted murals, while the Temple's are yet to be completed. The Temple’s position behind 
Karađorđe's statue demonstrates the prominence of religion in Serb nationhood. While the 
presence of the founder of the modern Serb state may seem at odds with the religious symbol 
of the Temple, the positioning of the Park's monuments lends them to the traditional 
framework; Karađorđe's statue is essentially positioned as a guardian of a central and powerful 
faith. Naming the park after Karađorđe can also be read as proof that Saint Sava’s original goal 
of national self-determination was eventually realised. If we look at Karađorđe’s statue closely, 
his body is not positioned as if in battle or recently victorious with his sword in the air. 
Instead, he stands tall and established, as though his victory has been claimed. The centrality, 
                                                     
19
 Topčider Hill is the highest point in Belgrade’s cityscape. Tito’s old residence was built on it precisely 
for that reason and Milošević took up residence there during his rule. The Museum of Yugoslav History 
remains next to it. 
6. Karađorđe Park, Vračar 
The monument to Karađorđe stands on a mound in the park. The Saint Sava Temple looms 
behind him. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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elevation and size of the Temple suggest that Karađorđe kept the SPC central to his cause and 
protected it. He also continues to protect it by standing guard and appearing alert.  
As such, Saint Sava and Karađorđe are positioned as part of the same history and the same 
national agenda; they were both heroic and fought for their national right. These are both 
‘timeless’ virtues that are often a tactic in memorialisation processes, as they allow 
contemporary members to form a connection to co-nationals of the past (Sumartojo 2015). 
The roles of the two figures are understood in the modern framework of national sovereignty, 
and their agendas are put on par: they laid the foundations of the modern nation-state as 
though they had envisioned the state to be in the form that it is today. Yet, we do know that 
the state is a modern concept which Sava most likely had not envisaged. Similarly, Karađorđe’s 
involvement in the First Serbian Uprising of the early 1800s was for the establishment of a Serb 
monarchy and not of sovereignty en masse20. Thus, although neither Saint Sava nor Karađorđe 
would have pictured the contemporary version of a modern nation-state, the Park can be 
viewed today from this framework and be interpreted as such. 
Interestingly, Karađorđe’s monument is in a more strategic position compared to the statue of 
Saint Sava in the Park’s vicinity. The Saint Sava statue is at the Park’s northern entrance to the 
side and it is a similar colour to the granite ground. He does not hold a prominent position 
and does not stand out. Saint Sava also stands to the side of the Temple; there is no door to 
the Temple behind him, only the large white walls of the giant structure. Although he is 
considered the most important Serb in history, the Temple is ode to him enough. The design 
strategically places the Temple behind a national independence fighter instead (as discussed 
above).  
Furthermore, the National Library in the vicinity is a place of knowledge and historical 
documentation. This may suggest another tension between modernity and tradition; a 
national library (a secular idea) can be a symbol of modern Serb statehood, rather than 
tradition and religious teachings. However, the National Library can also be seen as the 
protector of cultural artefacts and theology. For a long time, education was offered in 
monasteries and these religious institutions are often seen as carriers of knowledge. The move 
to the modern education system and the National Library can be interpreted as the evolution 
of these initial knowledge hubs. Furthermore, the institution can also serve as an education 
provider, in which Saint Sava has a role. As discussed above, Saint Sava is celebrated as the 
                                                     
20
 For more on Serbian independence movements not being for the modern idea of sovereignty, see 
Jovanović (2012). 
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patron saint of education. The position of the National Library provides an opportunity for it 
to be in the protected vicinity of Saint Sava. Some, however, may see this symbolic 'protection' 
as inadequate. One journalist has indeed pointed to the defunding of the National Library as 
“cultural genocide” being committed against Serbs (Bogdanović 2012, para. 15). In his piece, 
Bogdanović accused the government of deliberately defunding the institution, which means 
poor preservation of cultural artefacts. For him, the consequences of losing these artefacts is 
the loss of tangible cultural heritage. Visibly, the National Library's aesthetic clearly 
demonstrates that it receives less funding than the Temple: it is certainly less grand and is not 
the centrepiece. Government members appear to direct funds towards religious institutions 
rather than those that are more 'secular'. Rather than 'protecting' these cultural artefacts, the 
resources put into the Temple is a way to mark Orthodoxy as a core value for society. What's 
more, the emphasis on the Temple makes spirituality a public, collective ritual.  
The Temple’s style solidifies Serbia's ties to other Orthodox countries, but symbolically 
opposes the Ottomans. The Temple design reflects the Byzantine influence that infiltrated 
Balkan identities and their manifestation in architectural designs (Pantelić 2007). The ‘less 
European’ Yugoslav republics such as Serbia have more Byzantine or Ottoman influence in its 
architecture, as opposed to the Habsburg influences in Croatia and Slovenia. Bakić-Hayden 
(1995) argues that such visible influence perpetuates the beliefs that former rulers exerted 
influence on their subjects and Serbs, for example, are essentially more ‘Eastern’. The Temple 
building reinforces this image of Belgrade as more Eastern, especially with Orthodoxy 
stemming from the Byzantine Empire, and being the religion of Eastern European states.  
However, despite the visible Byzantine influence, the symbolic meaning of the Saint Sava 
temple and its location are an ode to anti-Ottoman sentiments. Lavrence analysed how 
gatherings on Belgrade’s Republic Square was used by the media as “redemptive signs of the 
enduring heroism of the Serbian spirit and the valorisation of Serb sociality as a mark of 
resistance to Western individualism” (2005, 31). Vračar Hill may not be a place of gathering 
during political turmoil or protest, but it is still the symbolic meeting point of nation and 
state, with Orthodoxy at its centre.  While the Temple solidifies its membership to an 
Orthodox imaginary, the site is symbolically ‘anti-Ottoman’ as well. It is believed that the 
Ottomans burnt Sava's relics on Vračar Hill, hoping that people's faith would burn with it. The 
location is therefore a holy site of Saint Sava. As such, it is also a symbolic space of Serbian 
unity and resistance against those who wish to dispose of them. Instead of their faith being 
burnt along with Sava’s bones, Serbs rose up, as symbolised by the large Temple; they have a 
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nation-state and powerful faith to show for it. To return to Duijzings’ (2000) discussion of 
Kosovo as an epic myth that is rooted in popular culture and assures mass appeal, this myth is 
part of that long battle against the Ottomans. The Temple on Vračar Hill can therefore be seen 
as a contemporary space and symbol in this myth, in which “every Serb can feel himself a 
living link in a great drama that is being played out across the centuries” (Duijzings 2000, 95). 
They can celebrate Saint Sava and prove that the Serb spirit did not die. 
The road that the park is situated on reinforces Serb bravery, albeit in a banal way. The Park 
sits on Liberation Boulevard and is a remnant of the socialist regime. It heralds the fight for 
brotherhood and unity and serves as a reminder of socialist achievements. On the surface this 
seems like a paradox. However, the name suits the story of Karađorđe. He was, after all, the 
leader of the Serbian uprising against the Ottomans. He revolted against their rule, fought for 
independence and liberated Serbs from the Ottoman grasp. As such, the otherwise socialist 
symbolism of the road can be recontextualised to an ethno-religious framework; while the act 
of 'liberation' may remain the same, liberation by who and from who changes in this 
contemporary context. 
Scientist Nikola Tesla is another public figure central to Serbian identity. Tesla is regarded as a 
source of national pride, Belgrade has a museum dedicated to him, and the country's largest 
airport is named after him. In 2014, there was an attempt to eternalise Tesla as an Orthodox 
Serb by removing his urn from the Nikola Tesla Museum and burying it in Karađorđe Park. 
During my analysis of the media at that time, Večernje Novosti dedicated a section of a front 
page to the 'Tesla issue' (Dragović 2014a). The article did not offer a new idea, as Tesla's urn 
had been part of public debate earlier in the year. Dragović, the author, instead updated Serbs 
on the status of the campaign. He referred to the government's alleged approval of the 
mission, but concentrated on the arguments that the SPC gave for the burial: cremation is not 
part of Serbian Orthodoxy and that all Serbs need to be buried. Tesla's burial in the Saint Sava 
Temple vicinity would thus be a sign of respect and an act of gratitude for the work that he 
did. In the religious framework, this was a duty that contemporary Serbs owed to Tesla. 
Another argument made in the article was that Tesla would be buried alongside other 
important Serb figures. Dragović (2014a, para. 6) wrote that: 
The idea is for Tesla’s monument to join the Greats of the Serbian people who already have 
monuments on the Vračar plateau: Saint Sava and supreme leader Karađorđe. 
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The Večernje Novosti writer is clearly aware of the symbolical nature of the campaign and 
argues that the reburial would symbolically combine the state, church and science. Saint Sava, 
Karađorđe and Tesla would inhabit the spiritual place of Vračar Hill. Tesla is seen here as the 
scientist who proved that Serbs were capable of success, and lifted Serbs into modernity. 
Against the spiritual backdrop of Saint Sava, he is another ‘who does the good’ and who 
benefited from the patron saint of education. The move would add the contemporary element 
of science to the national imaginary while remaining within the traditional framework of 
religion and folklore. There would therefore be no need for Serbs to distance themselves from 
tradition in order to participate in modernity: a common concern amongst nationalists. 
In the article, Dragović referred to the strong 
opposition to this idea by civil society members 
from earlier in the year, but he did not make 
that the key point. The massive opposition to 
the campaign is too important not to be 
considered, however. Citizens and intellectuals 
had been vocal against the removal of Tesla's 
urn by the time this article was published 
(Komarčević 2014; “Ostavite Teslu na miru” 
2014; Pešić 2014; “Prenošenje urne je degradacija 
Teslinog nasleđa” 2014). Protests outside of the 
museum were held and social media served as 
the key medium for criticism. A Facebook page 
titled 'Leave Tesla alone' (Ostavite Teslu na 
miru) was launched and the hashtags 
#SaveTesla and #OdbranimoTeslu remained active throughout the writing of this thesis. Public 
intellectuals also voiced their opposition. Writing for Peščanik, Pešić accused the state of 
"attacking" civil Serbia with an "anti-modern definition of the Serbian nation once again by 
reducing its identity to religious affiliation, i.e. orthodoxy" (2014, para. 6). The community 
backlash is a window into the opposition to an institutional campaign, in particular one that 
was initially openly supported by the government. It is also a moment in which civil society 
participated in politics, a reference to van Dijk's definition of 'doing politics'. The participants 
showed an awareness of the politicization of religion; they opposed the permanent christening 
of a scientist and saw it as a cheap attempt to make Tesla 'Serbian'. Civil society was instead 
ready to embrace an expanding image of Serbs. In this less exclusive image, modernity and 
7. #SaveTesla 
Logo and slogan used in the campaign 
against the burial of Tesla’s urn in 
Karađorđe Park (“Ostavite Teslu na miru” 
2014). 
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technology are present, reflecting the contemporary experiences of citizens. The public 
therefore did not appear to ascribe to the exclusive image of Serbdom presented 
institutionally, as has been demonstrated in this chapter thus far. 
Another example of normalizing the marriage of religion and politics in the public sphere was 
during the preparation for the unveiling of the statue of Nikolai II Romanov in Belgrade in 
November 2014. Večernje Novosti and Politika reported on the preparations for this during my 
research (B. Vasiljević 2014; “Spomenik caru Nikolaju biće postavljen u ponedeljak” 2014; 
“Spomenik caru Nikolaju stigao u Beograd, uređuje se Devojački park” 2014). The statue was to 
serve as a memorial to Nikolai II, the last Russian emperor. The online platform Nova Srpska 
Politička Misao reportedly initiated his memorialisation in the form of a statue (“Inicijativa da 
ruski car Nikolaj Drugi Romanov dobije spomenik u Beogradu” 2013). They argued that there 
is a strong Serbian-Russian relationship that needs to be acknowledged and that Serbs have a 
duty to show gratitude to the Tsar. The argument is that the Tsar urged the Allies to save the 
Serbian army crossing into Albania because he believed in Serbs’ right to sovereignty. He 
therefore allegedly deserved more than the street that was named after him in the Vračar area 
(Georgijev 2002; Grad Beograd 2014). NSPM’s idea was accepted and adopted by the Serbian 
government, with the Russian government supporting the memorial with the donation of the 
statue. 
Večernje Novosti and Politika’s reporting of the preparations glorified a Serbo-Russian 
relationship. The Tsar was allegedly a true friend of Serbs, wanting them to fulfil their rightful 
destiny. The crossing through Albania is considered a painful time in Serbian history; Serbs 
fleeing persecution found themselves in unforgiving mountainous and freezing conditions. 
The history is told in a way that suggests the events were a moment when Serbs came close to 
extinction. The Tsar was allegedly the only one to understand their plight and was the only 
one to offer assistance. And, importantly in the nationalist narrative, he discussed Serb 
national integrity long before Serbs achieved it. Once erected, the monument was placed on a 
mount that included a quote by the Tsar: "All my efforts will be directed at preserving the 
dignity of Serbia. And in any case, Russia will not be indifferent to the fate of Serbia." (B. 
Vasiljević 2014, para. 8). The story of Tsar Nikolai II can therefore be added to one of a historic 
struggle for Serb national survival and autonomy. When this long-standing relationship is 
positioned within an already existing understanding of a shared religion between Serbs and 
Russians, the brotherhood of the two nations is intensified even more. 
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The topography associated with this statue is of interest. The monument was erected on the 
former location of the Russian consulate before its destruction in WWII and also allegedly 
where resistance movements against the Ottomans were organised (“Spomenik caru Nikolaju 
biće postavljen u ponedeljak” 2014). It was placed in Maiden Park, and touches Kosovo Maiden 
Street on its north. To the west is King Milan Street, while Queen Natalie Street is to the east. 
Between Maiden Park and Queen Natalie Street is Ruski Dom (‘Russian Home’). Andrić’s 
Wreath, named after laureate Ivo Andrić, is across from the Park on the main road. The 
Wreath itself stands between the Old Palace and the current Presidential Residency. 
 
There are references to Serbia’s ‘Golden Age’, the Kosovo myth and Serb royalty in this 
topography. The name Maiden Park refers to the Kosovo Maiden, a mythical figure from the 
Kosovo Battle epic. A typical image of her is in a famous painting, aptly named ‘Kosovo 
Maiden’. The painting depicts a young woman in traditional dress giving water to the dying 
Prince Lazar. In the epic, she is a motherly figure nurturing the prince who died fighting for 
his nation (Bieber 2002; Hudson 2003). She was also the fertile woman who would give birth 
to future kings. The Kosovo Maiden is thus a reference to fertility and to being the mother of 
the nation. The streets named after King Milan and Queen Natalie can be part of the same 
story of national emancipation. They are husband and wife from Serbia’s royal history and 
were leaders of the Kingdom of Serbia, the independent Serb nation that Prince Lazar had 
wanted. Just like Lazar and Karađorđe above, they were part of the fight for autonomy, placing 
8. Map of Devojački Park 
A screenshot of Google Maps showing Maiden Park where the statue of Tsar Nikolaj II Romanov 
was placed in late 2014. 
Screenshot saved and cropped on 23.01.2015 by author. 
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contemporary Serbs in a linear history where they are part of the initial Kosovo battle 
(Duijzings 2000). Placing a statue to a Russian tsar in Maiden Park also symbolically connects 
Serbs and Russians. It suggests a common history: religion and a respect for national integrity 
is what bonds them. Together they allegedly fought for the similar goals of preserving the Slav 
people and their faith.  
 
Language sacralised 
Finally, I now discuss the Serbian language and Cyrillic script. The politicisation of language is 
not as noticeable in Belgrade as it is in other parts of the region (Radović 2013; Subotić 2013). 
Belgrade is not home to major ethnic groups competing for power, where space offers visible 
points of contrast. Cyrillic is instead the common script. It is recognised as Serb and has 
infiltrated all state institutions and public signage. The history textbooks that I analysed are in 
Cyrillic, while street toponomy is mostly in Cyrillic. Throughout my research I realised that I 
personally accepted the Cyrillic script as ‘Serbian’; even though I remember learning both 
alphabets in the Belgrade schooling system (with both alphabets having been used for a long 
time in Serbia), I have since become familiar with Cyrillic as a symbol of Serbdom. It has taken 
critical work to remind myself that a script is made to appear as belonging to a group of 
people. It is precisely this acceptance of Cyrillic as the dominant script that is of interest here. 
My interview participants demonstrated an awareness of the politicisation of language, having 
been exposed to this process in their daily lives. Four of my participants specifically spoke 
about the ‘controversy’ of the Cyrillic script. Each of them brought up the topic themselves, 
being prompted when signing their interview consent forms. In fact, the majority of 
participants first asked which script they should use, while some even apologised for signing 
in Cyrillic as they do it ‘out of habit’. One informant who spoke about it was Ivana L, a young 
woman who sells souvenirs on Knez Mihailova Street. She sells ceramics made by two local 
artists, where many of the items have Serbian or Belgradian motifs on them. When I picked up 
a small ceramic bell with ‘Belgrade’ written in the Latin script, she mentioned how some 
prefer the Cyrillic as it is more ‘exotic’. She also told me how people sometimes react 
negatively to the stall selling Latin scripted items at all. She told the story of one woman who 
was appalled at the sight of the Latin script. The woman was apparently a linguist at the 
university and, as an ‘expert’, argued that the use of the Latin script in Serbia was simply 
‘wrong’. The Latin alphabet was apparently only a perverted version and deserved no space 
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amongst traditional Serbian artefacts. The professor argued that the Cyrillic alphabet is the 
true, traditional script of the Serbian language and should be the only one used. 
Ivana L told this story with frustration. She did not see the different alphabets as an issue, but 
as an asset to Serbian knowledge and culture instead. She told me that rather than being so 
defensive, “we should be proud of having two alphabets; it brings richness to our culture to 
have two alphabets”. Aleksandar P, a musician at the Serbian Philharmonic Orchestra, echoed 
Ivana L’s sentiments. He described having two scripts as a sign of cultural wealth. He didn't 
appreciate it being an issue. For both Ivana L and Aleksandar P, the two scripts were a source 
of pride at their disposal, something to be celebrated. For them, the Cyrillic and Latin 
alphabets were substantive markers of an identity that has the potential to strengthen society 
rather than divide it. The participants were therefore not necessarily against the politicisation 
of it, rather, they opposed the way that it was politicised. They opposed the exclusive image 
that a Cyrillic-only Serbia would offer, similar to that of the Tesla campaign discussed above. 
Through their discussion, Ivana L and Aleksandar P demonstrated an awareness of language 
used as a tool for political purposes. Their wish to use two scripts in a positive way can be 
interpreted as nationalist rhetoric, however, as they were suggesting ways to strengthen the 
nation and to provide a source of pride for their members. 
Those who are proponents of the sole use of Cyrillic, such as the linguist Ivana L spoke about, 
would interpret the state of a nation's language as the equivalent of the nation's health. They 
tend to see language as the materialisation of a culture, which is central to the expression of a 
national identity (Kordić 2010). The narrative of the grade six history textbooks that I analysed 
can help us understand how these perceptions may be developed. The textbooks teach that 
the Cyrillic alphabet stems from the Glagolitic alphabet developed by Orthodox Christian 
missionaries. It was the script of 'Old Church Slavonic' and Orthodox scriptures are written in 
it. The textbooks tell the story of Cyril and Methodius who developed the Glagolitic alphabet, 
and then Clement who developed the Cyrillic alphabet. The Glagolitic script is taught as the 
unique script of the Croats. For example, one textbook writes that “Croats kept and nurtured 
Glagolitic as their unique script” (Mihaljčić 2011, 53). Rome, the Catholic capital, opposed this 
and forced the spread of Latin. Rome also imposed Catholicism, where converted Slavs later 
became Croats. By converting to Catholicism and accepting Latin, Croats consequently moved 
away from their true (Serb Orthodox) roots. Serbs, on the other hand, kept Orthodoxy and 
Clement’s Cyrillic alphabet, alongside Macedonian Slavs and Bulgarians. The Serbian language 
   
72 
and the use of Cyrillic is therefore more 'authentic', being closer to the original language and 
script. With this, the textbooks isolate Croats from possession of the Cyrillic alphabet. 
The textbooks’ focus on Cyrillic religious scripts is understandable, given that literature from 
the Middle Ages is limited to religious scriptures, and that, for the most part, literacy was 
taught in religious institutions and missionaries to those who were literate. What is important 
to note, however, is the emphasis on the script’s role in enabling Slavs to express their culture. 
According to the texts, Slavs became seemingly civilised once they accepted Orthodoxy. In the 
words of a textbook, the Cyrillic “script is the most important and permanent cultural 
achievement of the Middle Ages. With scripts comes the ability to develop and spread culture” 
(Mihaljčić 2011, 53). Perhaps this is precisely why language has been a political tool in the 
Balkans. The script, as we can see, is taught as the articulation of the (religious) nation, just as 
traditional dress and the gusle are its material expression. In public spaces, the use of the 
language and script is symbolic of a Serb nation in power (Radović 2013; Susnjic 2011). An 
endangered language or script thus suggests the decline of culture and consequently a loss of a 
people. Simić (2006) wrote how Western influence and the abandonment of traditional 
customs (where the customs are the materialisation of the nation) signalled the beginning of 
the end of the nation. The Latin script, as another form of Western influence, can signal the 
decline of the expression of the nation as well. Proponents of this view may therefore push for 
the guardianship of the Serbian language, and emphasise the importance of the Cyrillic script. 
Embracing the Latin script may not mean the loss of national integrity for everyone, though. 
As I discussed above, my interview participants questioned the necessity and functionality of a 
Cyrillic-only Serbia. Their lived experiences suggest that an exclusive national image is 
limiting. They instead appeared to accept Latin as their participation in a modern and 
globalised world. In the most basic of ways, being fluent in both allows access to more 
information and literature. It facilitates communication with a large part of the world's 
population and makes Serbia more accessible to visitors. The continuing use of Cyrillic, on the 
other hand, can provide a connection to tradition and culture. For those who are worried 
about the loss of individuality in a globalising world, Cyrillic can remain that self-perceived 
unique characteristic. The wish to use both scripts is thus a celebration of tradition, culture 
and progress simultaneously. If both are celebrated and encouraged, then there is the 
potential of it becoming accepted as a practice and possibly a national marker. In turn, this 
may reinforce a sense of Serb uniqueness and something tangible for citizens to grow an 
attachment to. 
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Orthodoxy as a national experience 
Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter was to explore whether Serbian Orthodoxy remains 
central to the Serb national imaginary. To do this, I analysed whether the religion continues to 
be reinforced as a key national marker, the ways it can be experienced, and whether such an 
image resonates with citizens. 
Much of my data saw Serbian Orthodoxy presented as an inherited part of a deep national 
history. It appears that agents or makers of meaning—those with power over public 
discourses—are reinforcing the religion as key to the national experience. Orthodoxy 
materialised in public symbols and practices, and is taught as integral to societal evolution in 
the education sector. The religion is to also provide the Serb people with a moral grounding, it 
is the ‘essence’ that directs their thoughts and behaviours. As such, the religious framework 
can approve acceptable ways of being and behaviour, it can suggest what is ‘right’. In a 
political framework where sovereignty is the ultimate outcome for a national group, the 
spiritual backdrop can offer moral justifications for that sovereignty. That is, national 
sovereignty is the ‘right’ outcome for ‘those who do the good’. 
What public spaces offer indeed suggest that Orthodoxy is a key part of Serb citizens’ lives. As 
we saw in some of my data, however, this may not be the case. We instead saw some citizens 
resist attempts to make Orthodoxy central. We also saw them suggest ways to expand the 
national imaginary to better suit their lived experiences. So while some of this data may 
ultimately lead to contradictory suggestions, it is worth noting that a similar problematics 
arose from across different sources. Deeper investigation of these problematics would direct 
us to possible firmer conclusions. 
In the following chapter I delve deeper into the nuances of the national imaginary. I do that 
through an analysis of national memories, as they too serve to direct thoughts and behaviours 
today. The chapter is titled ‘Memory-making in Serbian national consciousness’.   
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5. Memory-making in Serbian national consciousness 
Memories serve a useful purpose for the national imaginary. Normalised as unique to the 
national group, memories are perceived historical experiences that group members have 
inherited (Hearn 2006). With the purpose of forming national consciousness, they are some of 
the ‘substantive content’ of the national imaginary, helping to make sense of the nation. 
Importantly for this thesis, memories help members of the Serb community form an image 
and understanding of their nation. They can serve to explain why the nation has come to be a 
certain way, suggest who or what to identify with, and even provide direction for 
contemporary behaviour.  
During my Belgrade fieldwork I only needed to walk down the popular pedestrian Knez 
Mihailova Street in the city’s centre to see the memory-making process. In 2014, the image of 
Gavrilo Princip adorned bookshop and souvenir shop displays. The image is his famous black 
and white photographic portrait following his arrest after the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand of Austria. While I was there, Serbs marked the centenary of the beginning of the 
Great War, which was therefore a hot topic in Serbian literature, culture, education and 
consumer goods. Princip essentially became the ‘face’ of WWI commemoration in Belgrade in 
2014. Surrounding images of Princip were books on WWI, while a number of Belgradian 
museums held commemorative exhibitions. Displays of his image mark the stores’ 
contribution to the overall WWI commemoration. 
One storefront—a souvenir and bookstore—displayed two t-shirts with Princip’s portrait as 
the centrepiece. One t-shirt was red and depicted an edited version of the image; in it Princip 
was wearing a black hat with the red five-pointed star (petokraka), reminiscent of Che 
Guevara’s own famous image. A tagline on the t-shirt read: ‘It’s a matter of princip’. Through 
this one piece of clothing, we can see an ode to socialism, brotherhood and unity, and 
revolutionary action. The tagline is a play on the word ‘principle’ and suggests Princip’s 
actions were revolutionary and ‘right’, that he acted out of principle. The second t-shirt in the 
display window strayed from revolutionary politics. This t-shirt was white and Princip’s 
portrait was accompanied by the tagline ‘Gavrilo is Princip’ and numerous meanings of 
‘Gavrilo’. One of the words was the translation of his name ‘Gavrilo’ to Saint Gabriel the 
Archangel. This time Princip is embedded in a religious context. He is referred to as a 
messenger of God, as though his actions were fighting for the divine right to sovereignty and 
independence. To repeat from Chapter Four, he was a person who ‘did the good’. 
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Of course, I am aware of potentially deducing too political a message from these two t-shirts 
for sale. It may be that the political message was secondary to catching the eye of a potential 
consumer. Nevertheless, the store window display is an example of a familiar historic figure 
placed in the contemporary context and reappropriated for consumerism. His image already 
has meaning behind it, and can remind contemporary Serbs of this co-national. 
 
Princip certainly wasn’t the only figure from Serb history to be reappropriated to suit the 
current national imaginary. There are other figures alongside Princip who have become cult 
figures and are becoming part of shared Serb memories. Staying on Knez Mihailova Street, 
there were numerous souvenir and cultural artefact stalls that show other figures from the 
nation’s histories. One stall in the middle of the pedestrian street sold items that included the 
image of figures from what one would see as competing, contradictory narratives; there were 
t-shirts adorned with the face of Ratko Mladić, Vladimir Putin21 and tennis player Novak 
Djoković. The Četnik šajkača cap hung alongside Yugoslavian flags, while postcards of the 
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 This was a time before Putin was to visit Belgrade. 
9. Prosveta 
Bookstore in the main pedestrian street, Knew Mihailova, in Belgrade’s city centre. This portrait of 
Princip adorned many store fronts in 2014, the year that commemorated the beginning of WWI. 
Photo by A. Samardzija  
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Saint Sava Temple stood beside badges with Tito’s face. The figures depicted are all from 
different times, support different ideologies, and offer different meanings. Yet, they all have a 
place at the stall. This reminds us that they all also have a place in the Serbian national 
imaginary too, however contradicting they may be. Todorova calls such figures the “masonry 
of national memory” (2004, 158). They are figures who articulate national memory, and are 
often ones who made sacrifices for the people. They become part of a perceived shared 
historical experience for Serbs and their meaning can change according to the present context. 
Some of these figures feature in the two national memory frameworks analysed in this 
chapter: memories of Yugoslavia and memories of the Yugoslav civil wars. These memories are 
critical to the shared memories of Serbs, and I analyse how they are remembered and 
understood. There are competing narratives which appear to offer an incoherent image and 
understanding of them. What is interesting, but unsurprising, is that both Yugoslavia and the 
conflicts are most often recalled only in comparison with ‘today’. In the first half of this 
chapter, I focus on the contradictory images and understandings offered of Yugoslavia. The 
second half of the chapter is dedicated to analysing the selective remembering of the Yugoslav 
civil wars. 
 
Socialism and anti-fascism 
The former Yugoslavia has a prominent position in the way that Serbs see themselves. Petrović 
(2012) argues that after decades of socialism, the norms associated with it have infiltrated the 
functioning of Serb society. Separation from socialism can therefore be neither simple nor 
quick. Nor can they be even or unified. After analysing Serb’s memories of Yugoslavia, I can 
say that the remembering is done inconsistently. Narratives compete and are even 
paradoxical. On the one hand, some members of government members are attempting to 
distance themselves from Tito’s socialist regime. On the other, the Serbian political elite and 
state museums also celebrate the Serbs’ role in the fight against fascism (a fight that socialists 
had lead). As for Serb citizens, many remember Yugoslavia fondly, while simultaneously 
criticising systemic issues that existed during the socialist period too. Overall, we see that 
memory narratives lead by state institutions are orientated towards legitimising the leading 
nationalist political ideology. Serb citizens make sense of these memories through their own 
personal experiences and memories. Most often they compare their memories to the harsh 
realities of today. 
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I begin my analysis of Yugoslav memories with the two eighth grade history textbooks. They 
both paint socialism as failing in practice. The first references to socialism are that of the 
Bolsheviks and Stalin. The rise of the Bolsheviks is told as a negative story and one in which 
the royal family was executed. Descriptions in the ‘Office for Textbooks’ detail explicit and 
emotive memories of the assassinations, calling the executions a “brutal liquidation” (Đurić 
and Pavlović 2010, 64). The descriptions of socialist USSR, in particular Stalinism, are also 
filled with details of inhumane treatment. The Soviet Union government therefore seems to be 
one that actively terrorised its citizens. 
Communism and socialism are also referred to 
when discussing Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito. 
Both textbooks describe Yugoslavia as a time of 
change and modernization, a time of rising 
living standards and positive relations with 
Western states. However, all authors also 
criticise Tito’s regime and the system for 
supposedly allowing nationalism to flourish. 
The 'Klett' publication describes the 
confederation system set up by Yugoslavia one 
with commendable aims, but failing in practice. 
Its authors discuss the building of a Tito cult, as 
well as the heavy debt that the country faced 
shortly after his death. There are also 
descriptions of nationalist movements by 
Slovenes, Croats and Albanians in the 1970s that 
the state didn’t quell. Tito’s falling out with 
Stalin in the late 1940s is emphasized in this 
'Klett' publication. This narrative allowed the authors to separate Yugoslavian socialism from 
USSR socialism, unlike the second textbook. The ‘Office for Textbooks’ is similar in detailing 
the rising state debt alongside rising living standards, nationalism by other groups, as well the 
nurturing of the Tito cult. This textbook, however, paints a picture of an aggressive and 
authoritarian regime led by Josip Broz. According to the authors, Yugoslavia was at first 
modelled on USSR socialism where all anti-socialists were subject to persecution. 
Interestingly, Tito isn’t named as the leader of this regime until two pages in of this section. 
Once he is named, his team is described as having set up elections in which the opposition 
10. Kennedy and Broz 
Image from an eighth grade history 
textbook depicting US president John F 
Kennedy and Josip Broz Tito (Đurić and 
Pavlović 2010, 171). 
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was silenced, and then where his party persecuted Soviet sympathisers after his falling out 
with Stalin.  This publication also emphasises systematic unfairness towards Serbs imposed by 
the Yugoslav system. After writing of his death, the authors state that “some believe that Tito 
was a dictator and that he didn’t leave a system suitable in keeping the republics together” 
(Đurić and Pavlović 2010, 183). Although the authors are careful not to make this claim 
themselves, they nonetheless offer it to students as a closing statement of this section on 
Yugoslav life. 
What the two textbooks offer students is an ideal, but naïve, image of former Yugoslavia. It is 
ideal in that Yugoslavs apparently led a happy life. It was naïve in that it was impractical and 
possibly anti-Serb. That is, good living conditions meant national debt, while groups were 
allegedly treated unequally. Students may find it difficult to form positive images of former 
Yugoslavia and Tito as leader as a result of these narratives. After all, school is seen as offering 
‘facts’. As such, the education system is teaching young Serb citizens of what ‘really’ happened. 
The Military Museum offers an exhibition that is in contrast to the above, especially to the 
‘Office for Textbooks’ publication. In the exhibition, WWII and Yugoslavia are prominent 
topics in the permanent displays, and socialism is portrayed only positively. The museum 
appears to have followed in the footsteps of many communist-opened museums in general 
(Petkova‐Campbell 2009), as the exhibitions legitimise the then-dominant state narrative of 
brotherhood and unity. Belgrade's Military Museum is designed as a winding hallway where 
visitors follow the history of Serbia chronologically through the lens of military campaigns. 
The experience allows only a linear history to be told, a temporal continuity of the nation. It 
has a beginning in pre-history and it has an end with Tito's liberation campaign. The key 
themes depicting socialist Yugoslavia are oppression and desperation, brotherhood and unity, 
and finally emancipation. Nazis and fascists are portrayed as brutal and inhumane; there are 
graphic images of hangings, piles of bodies, refugees, and fascist collaborators proudly posing 
alongside the dead. The resistance movements are documented well too. Visitors can read 
about and see images of Tito, Draža Mihailović,22 and other leaders mobilising resistance 
fighters and participating in dangerous conflict. 
The culmination of exhibited events ends with the Yugoslav Partisans ‘liberating’ occupied 
Slavs. This narrative is symbolically expressed by the museum’s physical levels ascending in a 
crescendo to the last room, where Tito is central. The ‘Tito room’ is grand. Honour medals for 
                                                     
22
 Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović was a staunch royalist and a Četnik leader during WWII. He has since 
become a source of national pride, allegedly mistreated by Tito’s communist regime. See Dulić (2012) 
for more. 
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fallen soldiers hang on the walls. In the middle is a large bronze statue of Tito whose humble 
stance is overshadowed by the larger than life size of the sculpture. Behind the statue are large 
images of each of the republic capitals at the time of their ‘liberations’. In them, the Red Army 
marches through the cities and towns, greeted by happy and relieved citizens. He is 
symbolically portrayed as an impressive man and leader. This is the end of military history as 
told by the museum. Descending steps lead visitors towards the exit23. 
What the layout and content suggest is that the Military Museum's function was to legitimise 
the then state ideology. The narrative implied is one of natural progression of the Balkan 
peoples uniting in brotherhood and unity. The Southern Slav peoples were portrayed as 
desperate victims whom the Partisans saved and liberated: the Partisans were central to the 
aim of legitimising the Communist Party’s power and Tito’s role as leader. Another aim 
appears to be that of fostering group cohesion based on ideological values, rather than 
national or ethnic ones. The latter point would have served the purpose of keeping socialism 
as the dominant system relevant.  
 
                                                     
23
 In the second section of this chapter I will discuss the display added to the exit hallway at the Military 
Museum that commemorates the Yugoslav civil wars. 
11. The Victor 
At the Military Museum, the visitor is lead down the path towards emancipation. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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The aim of legitimising Partisan's power seemingly makes sense in anti-fascist narrative, one 
that was central to the Military Museum’s exhibits. The displays present life under fascism as 
cruel and desperate. After the Partisans' liberation, however, Yugoslavs were ostensibly 
relieved, happy and emancipated. However, the pride comes with tension in contemporary 
former Yugoslav states. In Croatia, the Yugoslav regime is being remembered as oppressive 
towards Croatian nationalists (Šakaja and Stanić 2011). These Croatian nationalists are seen by 
some as the first initiators of Croatia’s independence, but who were stopped by the 
Communist Party. For Serbs, it is difficult to separate the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement from 
socialism in general, though, as the movement originated from the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia, specifically in Croatia (Šakaja and Stanić 2011). A celebration of the fight against 
fascism is therefore not only a reference to Croats, but also an ode to the regime that Serbian 
national discourse has been painting as negative. 
A 2014 renaming of two Belgrade streets left impressions of this anti-fascist/socialist 
contradiction. The two streets were renamed after two men who ‘liberated’ Belgrade; 
Zagrebačka Street in Old Town was renamed Koča Popović Street, and Kumodraška in New 
Belgrade was renamed Peko Dapčević Boulevard. Kumodraška Street was where the Red Army 
allegedly marched before the liberation, while Popović’s family had owned a number of 
buildings in Zagrebačka Street. The decision to rename was made by the commission of 
renaming streets and squares (T. Jovanović 2014).  
The street renaming events were reported in the major newspapers and government officials 
‘unveiled’ the new titles24. The events were defined as tributes to “national heroes” and 
“liberators of Belgrade” in the media, with both men described as sources of heroic inspiration, 
and to whom Serbs should be grateful (“Beograd dobio Bulever Peka Dapčevića” 2014; 
“Beograd dobio Bulevar Peka Dapčevića i Ulicu Koče Popovića” 2014). According to the articles 
and speeches made at the ceremonies, contemporary Serbs enjoy sovereignty because of the 
actions of figures such as these two men. According to Minister Vulin, Popović was: 
a man who is one of the reasons we speak the language we speak, write history the way we 
think it should be written…[Popović is] one of the men we remember when tough times 
and forces come and we don’t know whether we should or can counter them. We 
remember him and say ‘if they could, so can we!’ (“Beograd dobio Bulevar Peka Dapčevića i 
Ulicu Koče Popovića” 2014, para. 9)  
                                                     
24
 Peko Dapčević Boulevard was ‘opened’ by Belgrade Mayor Siniša Mali. Koča Popović Street was 
‘opened’ by Minister Aleksandar Vulin and Belgrade city manager Goran Vesić. 
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Vulin’s description of Popović is reminiscent of what Todorova (2004, 158) labels “masonries of 
national memories”; he is the embodiment of national memory, and a figure whose virtues are 
relatable to today. In simple terms, their bravery has been a characteristic in all respectable 
figures throughout national history, and bravery is possible today. Just as Karađorđe embodied 
the ‘timeless’ virtues of courage and faith during the First Serbian Uprising, Popović and 
Dapčević embodied bravery during WWII. They were patriotic and fought for Serb survival, 
embodying the heroism that contemporary Serbs are capable of as well. Through possessing 
the same virtues, contemporary community members can feel a sense of connection to their 
past co-nationals outside of time and space (Sumartojo 2015). 
While Popović and Dapčević were praised as anti-fascist liberators during the street renaming, 
their socialist activities were largely ignored by the political elite. This is where the 
government members' struggle to separate the two ideologies is most evident. The short 
biographies of Popović and Dapčević in the media omit the words ‘communist’ or ‘socialist’. 
Yet the mere mention of them being part of the National Liberation Movement is a clear 
indication of their active participation in socialism25. If their socialist background was 
mentioned, it was mostly indirect. For example, Popović and Dapčević were described as 
‘complex figures’ with ‘controversial’ political views. In the same speech mentioned above, 
Vulin stated that even though Popović and Dapčević ‘sometimes made mistakes’ and had 
political views that may be ‘questionable’, that didn’t matter to citizens then or to citizens 
now. Politika and Večernje Novosti both quote Vulin: “I ask all of Belgrade not to think about 
politics when walking down the street, but to think about the man [Popović] who came here 
fighting Nazis and brought freedom to this city” (“Beograd dobio Bulever Peka Dapčevića” 
2014, para. 8; “Beograd dobio Bulevar Peka Dapčevića i Ulicu Koče Popovića” 2014, para. 8). 
The fight against fascism is thus portrayed as not being in the name of a communist ideology 
in these discourses. Rather, it was for saving the Serb people from terror in whatever means 
possible. 
Public responses to the new street names showed how pro-socialism can be interpreted as 
anti-Serb. Public figures asked why the state was paying tribute to a regime that “did a lot of 
harm to the Serbian people” (T. Jovanović 2014). Večernje Novosti’s editor at the time, Ratko 
Dmitrović, stressed that the renaming was a glorification of a communism that was anti-Serb. 
                                                     
25
 Popović was a commander in the Proletarian Brigade and a member of the National Liberation Army. 
He later held high positions in the Yugoslavian Army. Dapčević was also part of the National Liberation 
Army, a lieutenant general for the YNA, an ambassador for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and a national hero of Yugoslavia (T. Jovanović 2014). 
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He writes that Popović and Dapčević were part of those “who, in 1944/45, killed more than 
30,000 Serbs…[and]…prohibited hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins from 
Kosovo to return” (Dmitrović 2014, para. 5; T. Jovanović 2014, para. 4). In his piece, Dmitrović 
evokes a sense of victimhood and claims that the Communist oppression was part of an earlier 
anti-Serb agenda. He echoes the message of anti-socialism in Serb ethno-nationalism, where 
the socialist ideology was presented as a mask for Serb oppression. Dmitrović specifically 
mentions Kosovo, referring to events that Serbs have come to know as a time of sacrifice by 
their ancestors. He consequently suggests that WWII is a continuation of the Kosovo Battle. 
An anti-socialist rhetoric as offered by Dmitrović fits the reliance on primordialism as a 
national marker, which I discussed in detail in Chapter Four. By accusing Yugoslavia as a 
violent regime only disguised by claims to brotherhood and unity, then Dmitrović suggests 
that an argument for a Yugoslav identity is redundant. That is, the identity that was to 
transcend ethno-religious boundaries becomes false. The traditional Serb markers are 
consequently emphasised as the ‘true’ and inherent qualities that members cannot deny. It is 
therefore Serbs’ duty to protect those qualities and be cautious of any individual or 
government that may threaten them. 
 
A time long past 
One state institution that narrates contradictory memories of Yugoslavia on its own is the MIJ. 
The most visited museum in Serbia, the MIJ is the amalgamation of the Old Museum, The 
House of Flowers, and the Museum of Revolution. As a museum complex, the MIJ’s auto-
representation (Šakaja and Stanić 2011) is a mixed message; while it is attempting to 
objectively analyse Tito and Yugoslavia, the museum also participates in the discourses it 
criticises. This may be due to contextual limitations. By context I mean temporal limitations, 
its location and the buildings it is comprised of. It is temporally limited to telling the history 
of Yugoslavia, it is next to Tito’s (and later Milošević’s) old residence, and the buildings were 
built with the specific purpose of legitimising Tito's power. 
The Old Museum and House of Flowers offer an image of Tito as a cult leader, one admired by 
locals and internationals. The Old Museum showcases many gifts that Tito received. Spread 
across seven rooms, the objects came from all over the world and are an indication of “the 
taste of gift givers” (Panić 2014, 46). It suggests that Tito was praised so highly that locals and 
heads of states gave him the best gifts they could. The aim here would have been to prove that 
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Tito was adored, legitimising his position as a charismatic leader. The House of Flowers is a 
mausoleum and monument to Tito, therefore the space is limited in the amount of objectivity 
and critique it can offer. It is a space for respect to be paid to Tito. The surrounding exhibits 
also show a positive side of him. Again, this is where many gifts are on display and images 
depict a curious and talented Tito with a high standing in the world. A photo of Tito’s funeral 
guests is one of the first displays at the House of Flowers. This event in Tito’s chronology is an 
infamous claim to his popularity, as allegedly more foreign governments and state officials 
attended his funeral than the funeral of any other leader. 
   
The two buildings described above offer an impressive image  of Tito, where the exhibits are to 
remind visitors of the adoration he received. The grounds of the MIJ, on the other hand, make 
Yugoslavia just a distant, irrelevant memory (an Other). They are lush green and well-kept, 
13. Greek Goddess 
A sculpture of a goddess on the grounds 
of the Museum of Yugoslav History. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
 
12. Carrying the wounded 
Sculpture by Antun Augustinčić on the 
grounds of the Museum of Yugoslav History 
in the Belgrade suburb of Dedinje. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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but the statues scattered across them seem accidental: random pieces26 left over from a now 
defunct regime. They show socialism as bits and pieces that do not form a coherent whole, as 
a past that is gone and a memory that is irrelevant to today. This fits what Šakaja and Stanić 
(2011) describe as characteristics of ‘Otherness’ in space, characteristics that do not belong 
with the auto-representation of the subject. Viewers can relish in nostalgic memories when 
they are inside the buildings, but outside they are reminded that the time of Yugoslavia has 
long past. Yugoslavia as an Other was also reflected in a story that curator Panić, one of my 
interviewees, told of the infamous Tito statues (such as those in the Military Museum and on 
the MIJ grounds). She described how, after the fall of Milošević, there was an attempt to clean 
the country of socialist references. The museum was handed an abundant number of 
materials, especially statues of Tito. The items were no longer useful for the state as it did not 
suit the new state discourse of ethno-nationalism. Being the Museum of Yugoslav History, the 
MIJ seemed as the most appropriate home for these items. The items are now in storage or 
scatted around the museum. Panić told me that, since then, the government has had little 
interest, and therefore input, into the museum. 
However, the MIJ served a useful purpose for the current Serbian government when they 
needed to farewell a Yugoslav figure: Jovanka Broz, Tito’s widow. The state’s incoherent 
identification with Yugoslavia was awkwardly articulated once Jovanka died in October 2013. 
The event caused a stir in the Serbian public discourse, and there was debate about how the 
post-Yugoslav state treated her (“Tito’s Widow to Be Buried Next to Husband” 2013). Some 
called her a ‘poor woman’ who lost all possessions when Tito died as they technically belonged 
to the state. Others claimed that she lived a very comfortable life and deserved no sympathy. 
There was also debate about where she should be ‘rightfully’ buried. Aware that some 
remember the Broz family fondly, the government appeared to take care in not dismissing her 
death as irrelevant. Yet the anti-Yugoslavian sentiments that exist would have also cautioned 
the government from celebrating her life either. The government decided to bury her in the 
House of Flowers alongside Tito. Curator Panić noted in her interview that Jovanka’s burial 
was one of the rare occasions of state intervention in the institution. She recalls how the MIJ 
was left without a choice and had to make space for her. 
By having the burial ceremony at the Museum of Yugoslav History, the government was able 
to confine the memory of Jovanka to a place that is ideologically separate from the 
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 The statues include, but are not limited to: a large Tito statue, a deer, a nude athlete, soldiers assisting 
an injured comrade, a Greek goddess, and one of four women representing the four nations holding a 
large vase in sisterhood and unity. 
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contemporary state. That is, all things Yugoslavian are appropriate at the MIJ. Jovanka became 
an archaic object on display, part of a different and Other time. This way the political elite did 
not deny Yugoslav memory; they managed to acknowledge its existence and simultaneously 
keep it separate from their own regime. Such a decision was reminiscent of displaying 
Milošević’s dead body at the MIJ in 2006, where “Milošević finally and literally became an 
artefact exhibited in a museum dedicated to socialist Yugoslavia” (Manojlović-Pintar and 
Ignjatović 2011, 786). 
 
Jovanka Broz’ tombstone is visibly awkward and uneven in comparison to Tito’s. Tito’s marble 
tombstone27 is in the centre of the building and a pathway surrounded by plants leads to it. 
Jovanka’s new grave is off to the side and approximately a third of the height of Tito’s 
tombstone. I personally did not notice the addition of her grave when I first entered the 
mausoleum in 2014, despite it not being there in the year prior. Ultimately it is clear that the 
structure was built for Tito alone and she, like the statues in the garden, was an afterthought. 
The symbolism here does fit Yugoslavia’s state narrative of Tito as the sole grand leader. He 
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 During his life Tito had requested that his tombstone resemble US president Roosevelt’s tombstone. 
14. The House of Flowers 
The graves of Jovanka Broz and Tito at the Museum of Yugoslav History’s House of Flowers. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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was the centre of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the way that the event was handled also 
suggests that the now by-gone regime is not a priority of the current dominant ideology. 
It is important to note that some MIJ temporary exhibitions do attempt to critically engage in 
the politics of Yugoslavia. A 2014 exhibition titled ‘Art and authority: landscapes from the 
collection of Josip Broz Tito’ (Panić 2014) did just this. Curator Panić argued that the 
exhibition demonstrated that Tito as a personality cult was constructed through public 
discourses and displays controlled by the state. The exhibition explored what kind of paintings 
were used by the regime for this purpose. For example, Panić argues that the function of art 
was to create an image of Tito as a ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ Yugoslav man who was born poor, 
understood the working class, but made something of himself. The exhibition was advertised 
across popular media and the majority of reports was the typical reiteration of the museum’s 
press release (“Izložba ‘Umetnost i vlast - pejzaži iz Titove zbirke’” 2014; “Kako se kroz 
umetnost gradio kult Josipa Broza Tita?” 2014; “Umetnost i vlast: Pejzaži iz Titove zbirke od 4. 
septembra u Muzeju 25. maj” 2014). Večernje Novosti did release a negative review, with the 
author’s key argument being that many of the artworks included in the exhibition were 
created before Tito’s rise to the power (Popović 2014). According to him, then, they have little 
to do with his regime. The Večernje Novosti journalist, however, appeared to overlook Panić’s 
rationale; she argued that even existing artworks were used deliberately by the regime. For 
example, art portraying the countryside served to remind citizens of Yugoslavia’s peasant 
‘roots’. The journalist’s critique thus seemed ill-informed and defensive. What the 'art and 
authority' exhibition did was to give us a glimpse into moments of critique of the socialist 
regime and the building of an identity by those in power. 
Yugoslavia was also the focus of a 2013 private exhibition held in the popular Knez Mihailova 
Street. In it, the socialist life was portrayed as the ‘good life’. Unlike the MIJ’s exhibition, there 
was no critique of the regime and nostalgia was encouraged. Titled ‘Long live life!’, it tells the 
story of ‘the common man’, the typical Yugoslav. The description on the exhibition flyer states: 
‘Živeo Život’ (‘Long Live Life’) is an exhibition that shows what life was like in Yugoslavia 
from 1950 and 1990 through the everyday life of the ‘common man’: ‘The common man’ got 
up at 6 am, brushed his teeth with homemade tooth paste, he used ‘Pitralon’ lotion, and his 
apartment smelled of warm milk. ‘The common man’ drove the new ‘Fićo’, red [sic] the 
‘Start’ magazine, listened to Ivo Robić and The Silhouettes. 
The ‘common man’ is meant to represent an ‘ordinary’ person, a member of the masses. He 
was allegedly a Yugoslav citizen, was of any ethnicity, had the same rights as all other citizens, 
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and experienced a typical life in the federation. The exhibition suggests that the Yugoslav 
faced no ethnic discrimination, saw no bourgeoisie, nor did he experience poverty. Rather, he 
had the opportunity to realise his potential like everybody else. The Yugoslav’s life was simple 
but fulfilling. The times that brought him happiness were showcased in the exhibition; the 
‘red passport’, the Young Partisan song lyrics, tents from organised scout camps, popular food, 
the currency, and so on. It was precisely these items—and the memories associated with 
them—that drew out nostalgic reactions from visitors. The audience saw items from their 
childhood and were reminded of the fun they had. The fact that the events they remembered 
were carefully orchestrated by the regime was not discussed; the times that people had during 
them was enjoyable, which are fulfilling enough memories. The visitors’ reactions that I 
observed reminded me of the process of linking small, private narratives to the larger 
narratives of museum exhibitions (Rowe, Wertsch, and Kosyaeva 2002). By doing this, visitors 
make sense of the larger narratives based on their own personal experiences. The ‘Long live 
life!’ exhibition essentially legitimised visitors’ nostalgia, as the larger ‘official’ interpretation of 
the exhibition showcased the memories in a nostalgic manner too. 
One conversation that I had with MIJ curator Panić during our interview stuck out; in it she 
expressed the concern that Yugoslav ‘nostalgics’ would not be open to critique of the ‘good 
life’. She told me how people’s relationship with the MIJ depends on their perception of 
Yugoslavia. Some citizens choose to never go as they do not want to pay tribute to Tito, while 
others cannot accept that their sense of Yugoslav identity was created for them. Perhaps this is 
why the one negative review of the ‘Art and authority’ exhibition was attempting to deny any 
metamessage being sent by Tito’s regime through art. If one is to understand that their ‘good 
life’ was a construct, then the memories they feel are their happy ones may seem as a lie. 
What’s more, alongside remembering is forgetting (Ramet 2013) and the abundant positive 
memories may very well be selective. However, it may be that perhaps some people do not 
mind the state’s involvement in constructing the identity; if the Yugoslav identity was a good 
one and brought happiness, then it may not matter that it was made. What Panić’s story tells 
us, nevertheless, is that personal memories and experiences do affect the image of the nation. 
And, by way of experiences such as the Military Museum and ‘Long live life!’ exhibition, these 
personal memories are legitimised. 
My own interview participants spoke fondly of Yugoslavia as well, particularly the souvenir 
vendors. For example, leather goods seller Dragana told me about her ability to travel during 
Yugoslavia. She spoke about school excursions across the territory and visiting her friends in 
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other republics. Another stall worker, Jelena, also mentioned having travelled more before. Yet 
when I probed and asked where she travelled to, she wasn’t able to come up with an answer. 
Snježana reminisced about growing up in a Bosnian town in which she was friends with both 
Croats and Bosniaks. She told me how they all celebrated each other’s religious holidays and 
“it was so nice”. Vendor Maja argued that she was raised in “a different system, one that was 
more humane than the one we have now”. She found the communist system was more in line 
with her spiritual beliefs than the current one. 
These vendors clearly had fond memories of Yugoslavia, but it is important to understand that 
they told me these stories when talking about their lives today. My participants simply told 
nostalgic stories in an attempt to highlight a time ‘different’ and ‘better’ to that of today and 
the 1990s. For example, Dragana and Jelena were discussing how they do not have the finances 
to travel today and visas are too difficult to obtain. Snježana was saying that people have lived 
in tension with one another since the fall of socialism, while Maja believes that democracy and 
capitalism are cut-throat systems that favour the selfish. The vendors were all ultimately 
comparing their current situation to their younger years. As Spasić (2012) observed of her own 
participants describing Yugoslavia as a ‘normal time’, my participants predominantly 
remembered their younger years when they would have lived with family. Today they are 
independent or have their own family to provide for. Rather than considering the changes in 
their own personal experiences, the key changes that the vendors seem to have noticed is that 
socialism was replaced with war and capitalism. Out of the three groups that I interviewed, 
the vendors may also struggle the most financially. The contemporary times may thus seem 
unfair to them and hence the tendency to remember socialism nostalgically. I delve into these 
memories of Yugoslavia further in Chapter Seven as much of the conversation on socialism 
emerged when my participants spoke about their current situations. How they remember 
Yugoslavia is situated in their experiences of today, and the discussion is therefore best suited 
when exploring perceptions of contemporary Serbia. 
 
Contest without context 
Personal narratives are also abundant in the ways that the Yugoslav civil wars are 
remembered. There is yet no consensus on how the wars are to be remembered. There are 
attempts to make sense of why they occurred, with both nationalist and alternative answers 
offered. 
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I begin this second half of the chapter by discussing the teaching of the wars in the eighth 
grade history textbooks. The general narrative in them is of Serb fear, Albanian and Croat 
nationalism, and international intervention. Both textbooks offer their own reason for why the 
wars occurred. The ‘Office for Textbooks’ publication argues that destabilisation of Yugoslavia 
began in Kosovo in 1981 with nationalist and separatist demonstrations by Albanians who 
“killed because of national hatred” (Đurić and Pavlović 2010, 184). Serbs were thus victims of 
nationalism exuded by other groups. They were forced to engage in conflict. The ‘Klett’ 
publication instead points to the 1974 constitution as the beginning of uneven political power 
amongst the republics and nations. Some republics wanted to secede, while Serbs desperately 
attempted to keep unity amongst all involved. Again, Serbs were forced into conflict with the 
other republics. And again, they were victims of events outside of their control. Both 
textbooks further portray Serbs as victims by detailing ethnic cleansing in Croatia and the 
NATO ‘aggression’. The ‘Office for Textbooks’ provides detailed statistics of the NATO 
bombings that aided “Albanian terrorists” (Đurić and Pavlović 2010, 187), providing the 
economic costs and death tolls, including that of civilians. Although neither of the textbooks 
necessarily discuss invasion of sovereignty by foreign powers, there were constant references 
to Serb victimhood and the shedding of responsibility. 
The few references to crimes committed by Serbs in the textbooks are either belittled, or Serbs 
from Bosnia are accused of committing them. The ‘Office for Textbooks’ does teach about the 
Srebrenica genocide but labels it a ‘massacre’, and specifically blames the Republic of Serbia 
Army and paramilitary formations for it. The textbook states that the massacre constituted 
genocide under international law, but that Serbia wasn’t implicated. ‘Klett’, on the other hand, 
only refers to Srebrenica when listing a number of towns in which ethnic cleansing occurred. 
The only reference to genocide is in a list of charges that Milošević faced at the ICTY. There is 
no mention of Ratko Mladić or Radovan Karadžić in ‘Klett’. The publication does clarify that 
Serbia aided Serbs in the other republics, unlike the ‘Office for Textbooks’ publication that 
separates Serbs from Serbia, and Serbs from Bosnia. 
Through the two publications, students are taught that Serbs were not at fault and that they 
did not wish for conflict. They are offered an image of positivity to identify with. They may be 
left with the impression that other groups (such as Albanians) are homogenous groups who 
have a dislike for Serbs, which Stojanović (2004; 2012) has shown to be a problem in Serbia’s 
history education curriculum since the 1990s. Such classifications of 'good' Us and 'evil' Them 
can leave Serb students with a justification for an exclusive national identity, as the textbooks 
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suggest that they should be cautious of other groups' selfish (and violent) ways. The history 
told in these textbooks is certainly offering Serb students a narrative that is different to that of 
other groups’ learning. These students may therefore be less likely to understand a different 
telling of history and may be more likely to defend the history that they have been taught. 
Subotić (2013) argues that different teachings can create fundamentally different 
understandings of history, and thus prevent useful dialogue between the group members.  
Selective remembering of the civil wars is also visible in public space and state institutions. 
Most significantly, they offer the observer a good/evil dichotomy of Balkan ethno-national 
groups. Starting with the Military Museum, the institution has added displays to a room that 
seems to not have been part of the museum’s original design. After the visitor descends from 
the grand ‘Tito room’ and before they exit to the museum foyer, they go through a small space 
filled with displays of more recent military history. The displays in this newer section break 
the narrative of the remainder of the museum, both in their content and aesthetic. The design 
is different to the rest of the museum and there is no reference to brotherhood and unity.  
The first part of this newer section is dedicated to depicting Serbia’s involvement in UN peace-
keeping missions. Relying on images and short texts, Serbs are presented as participants in 
global peace missions. The second part is dedicated to the telling of the civil wars and the 
NATO bombings. Serbs here are portrayed as victims of oppression by Croats, Kosovo 
Albanians and the West. Written information is limited; there is minimum information to 
provide context: displays instead rely on ethno-national objects and symbols to provide 
meaning. Familiar religious, ethnic and national insignia are used to categorise the following 
groups: Serbs, Croats, Kosovo Albanians and the West. These groups’ state flags, coat of arms 
or religious texts are visible on weapons or military uniforms. Croatian army weapons and 
uniforms are identified by the šahovnica28 symbol. Kosovo Albanian forces are identified by 
the black two-headed eagle on a red background and a small book with the Arabic script, 
presumably the Quran. The West’s displays are tagged by the US flag or NATO sign. These 
symbols already have meaning in the Serbian national imaginary and the Military Museum 
displays are to be interpreted through those meanings. Interestingly there are no Bosniak or 
Bosnia and Herzegovina markers, and the history between Serbs and the Muslim population is 
thus completely absent here. 
                                                     
28
 The šahovnica is the red and white check Croatian Coat of Arms, and has become a symbol of the 
Croatian state. 
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The Military Museum displays suggest that Serbs were protecting themselves from violent 
aggressors. The first part depicts Serbs as protectors and keepers of the peace, while violence 
dominates the rest. The violence is depicted through the showcasing of weapons, images, a 
tally and scarce descriptions. There are weapons belonging to the Serbian army, showing the 
museum viewer the strength of Serbs. However, the displayed power of the many enemies 
puts the Serb army at an unfair disadvantage. The combined weapons of the aggressor groups 
are large and the West’s weapons are sophisticated. A downed US plane is on display, 
remnants of a ‘radioactive’ weapon sit in a glass cage in the middle of the room, and graphic 
images of Serb corpses and pools of blood hang on the side. The limited signage provides little 
15. The black eagle and the šahovnica 
Religious and national symbols used to 
mark Serb ‘enemies’ at the Military 
Museum. 
Photos by A. Samardzija 
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context, such as US displays described as “arms and equipment of the American captured 
soldiers”. It doesn’t provide elaboration or contextualisation of why American soldiers were 
involved. A tally on the exit door compares the size and strength of NATO alliance forces and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It includes figures for the number of soldiers, tanks, 
artillery, helicopters and aircrafts on each side. Unsurprisingly, the NATO troops vastly 
outnumber the Yugoslavian army. Serbs were seemingly fighting an unfair battle. 
A small sign amongst the Croatian artillery reads: “Weapons confiscated from Croatian illegal 
army formations”. Through this the museum is projecting moral claims, portraying Serbs as 
protectors of the confederation. Labelling Croats as ‘illegal’ returns to the rhetoric of the 1990s 
where Croats were presented as rebels who began the war by wanting independence. 
Depicting Serbs as fighting against ‘illegal army formations’ suggests that the Serbs were doing 
the ‘lawful’ and ‘right’ thing by keeping the law. This rhetoric present in the Military Museum 
certainly suits that of the history told by the aforementioned textbooks: Serbs were forced into 
conflict and only wanted to keep Yugoslavia together. They were allegedly retaliating against 
aggression, which was also a key theme in the WWI-specific exhibitions discussed in Chapter 
Four.  
A small but similar remembering of the civil wars is visible in other Belgradian public spaces. 
The public memorialisation of the wars is relatively silent with only a small number of 
memorials. Two monuments in Tašmajdan Park were dedicated to victims of the wars, 
however, and are analysed here. Both monuments are Serb-centric, one ambiguously. The first 
is the ‘We were just children’ monument in the park’s centre, dedicated to children who died 
during the NATO bombing of Serbia. The national television station, RTS, was located beside 
the Park and was one of the structures bombed. The monument was raised by Večernje 
Novosti, the Serbian newspaper under analysis in this thesis. Under the large title is the 
following inscription: 
‘Dedicated to the children killed in NATO aggression 
1999. 
Večernje Novosti and its readers’ 
The inscription has both Serbian Cyrillic and English. The already tragic event of children 
dying is further deepened by calling them ‘just children’ and that they were killed by ‘NATO 
aggression’. It highlights their innocence and civilian standing attacked by sinful aggressors 
who lacked morals. Saint Mark’s Church looms behind this monument and serves as an 
emotive pull to the Orthodox faith. As such, the pull is also towards the Serb nation. The sense 
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that Serb children were not spared can 
obstruct possible empathy for non-Serb 
victims, as NATO seemingly did not care 
about the collateral damage they caused. 
Even in the textbooks analysed above, the 
killing of civilians by NATO is detailed, 
while there is no mention of Serbs killing 
non-Serb civilians. Furthermore, while 
‘We were just children’ mourns a larger 
group of children without specifying their 
nationality, its place in Serbia’s capital 
suggests that the majority of the victims 
would have been Serb children. 
Tašmajdan’s second monument 
commemorating the 1990s is a large stone 
and black plaque saying: 
‘In memory of the Serbian victims killed in 
the wars of the years 1991-2000 on the 
territory of former Yugoslavia’ 
It is important to note that it was erected by an association of missing persons’ families. Their 
motivation would have been very personal and emotive, especially if they do not know where 
the victims’ bodies lie. Nevertheless, the monument specifies that it was erected in the 
memory of Serbian victims. They may not have been from the Serbian state, but they were 
Serbs nonetheless. It is their identity that connects them, an identity that crosses state 
borders. There is no mention of non-Serb victims, despite including all of the former Yugoslav 
territory. The perpetrators of the crimes are ambiguous; but since the monument is dedicated 
to all across the former Yugoslav territory, we can assume that it accuses all non-Serb ethno-
religious groups in the region. 
There are another group of monuments to the civil wars that lie in Belgrade’s cityscape, 
standing tall. They are the former government buildings bombed by NATO in 1999. The main 
buildings stand along King Milan Street in Belgrade, exposed to the elements ever since the 
bombardments. It is visible where bombs hit, exposing storeys within the structure. Trees are 
16. We were just children 
Monument dedicated to the children bombed in 
the NATO bombing of Tašmajdan Park, Belgrade. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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overgrown around the buildings and sometimes even within. They stand on main roads, along 
popular transport routes and near currently used government buildings. The ruins, nicknamed 
Generalštab, have become a normal sight and are included in tourist guides. The Generalštab 
was heritage listed in 2005: it can be sold and renovated, but its façade must be kept 
(Milošević 2015). Public debate continues around why the buildings have remained untouched 
and what their future is (Bobic 2012; Cabric 2013). The discourse surrounding it is ambiguous 
at the best of times, and there is little research that shows what it means to Serb citizens. 
Rather than offering an argument as to why the buildings remain, I instead read the building 
in the context of my other research data, and from that I argue that the 'aggression' of NATO 
is clear in these Generalštab memorials. These were elite government buildings that were 
hollowed by NATO bombs. This is symbolic as the events had put a dent in Milošević’s regime 
overall. It all also occurred relatively recently and many citizens would personally remember 
it. The buildings can therefore serve as a reminder of how Serbs felt during the bombardment.  
 
What these monuments can do is further perpetuate the ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ group dichotomy. 
Combined with the history textbooks and Military Museum displays, citizens are exposed to 
17. Generalštab 
A former government building stands untouched since the NATO bombing. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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the idea that Serbs are victims of immoral enemies. Even the exhibitions held in 
commemoration of WWI (discussed in Chapter Four) suggested that Serbs were attempting to 
‘do the good’ amidst the self-interest of foreign powers; the memorials analysed here add to 
that discourse. Subotić (2013) argues that such memorialisation processes push the national 
groups in the region further apart, as members are taught fundamentally different 
understandings of the wars that prevent potential reconciliation debates. The memorialisation 
process described in this thesis so far suggests that Serbs are being taught a certain imaginary, 
one in which their neighbours—precisely those with whom they are expected to reconcile—
are defined as enemies. Further, Serbs’ relationship with NATO deems the organisation part of 
an anti-Serb agenda, which can only perpetuate an already fragile support of ‘Western’ 
organisations such as NATO and the ICTY (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2011). 
 
A time of regret 
Not all ways of remembering the civil wars were as ambiguous, or as Serb-centric, however. 
There were pockets of alternate remembering in my data, with an emphasis on recognising 
crimes committed by Serbs and the manipulation of national sentiments by those in power. 
These understandings of the wars were mainly restricted to my interviews, private 
conversations with members of the public, and limited public exhibitions. The scarcity of such 
memories of the conflicts is unsurprising, as such discourses have most often been expressed 
by non-state actors and civil society groups (Bilić 2012), some of which are academics whose 
works I’ve used in this thesis (Čolović 2002; Pešić 2000; Stojanović 2004). Such views 
nonetheless tells us that alternatives to dominant discourses are available to Serb citizens 
(Gordy 1999). My evidence consequently supports the theoretical framework underpinning 
this thesis; we see that a national identity secured through nationalism can be questioned and 
reconfigured as it comes into contact with the lived experiences of citizens. 
I begin this part of my analysis by referencing one small private exhibition in Belgrade. The 
2014 exhibition was held at Mikser House, a ‘hybrid concept space’. The space includes a bar 
and restaurant, a music venue, a store selling locally-designed items. The exhibition was 
authored and designed by Croatian artist Bojan Krištofić. It was titled ‘Aesthetics of 
nationalism: design for turbofolk’ and held for a week in Belgrade during a tour of the former 
Yugoslav republic capitals. It wasn't a highly conceptual exhibition, it was simply a timeline of 
music and political events set in chronological order. In the exhibition Krištofić argues that 
turbofolk was developed alongside the politicisation of all social and public life. Songs sent 
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political messages and 
artists used the public 
space for political 
mobilisation. For example, 
there were images of 
popular Serb turbofolk 
singer Ceca singing to 
troops and marrying war 
criminal Arkan. The 
exhibition also mentioned 
songs that were sung about 
war and conflict, such as 
Željko Šašić’s ‘the sea is 
burning, the mountains are 
melting’ (‘gori more, tope 
se planine’) lyrics. 
Krištofić’s overall 
argument was that politics 
and music were dialectic 
processes in the political 
and public spheres. 
‘Aesthetics of nationalism’ 
was one of the rare 
moments in my research 
where ethno-national 
mobilisation in popular culture was critiqued in a space open to the public. The arguments 
made by Krištofić are certainly supported by scholarly research available on the use of music 
for political mobilisation in former Yugoslavia (Hudson 2003; Volčič and Erjavec 2010; Žanić 
2007). The Mikser House exhibition is therefore not a fundamentally 'new' insight, but it 
shows an awareness of the political power of popular culture. In particular, Krištofić used the 
exhibition to explain that the relationship between politics and music is not isolated to the 
past, but continues to be the case in the contemporary Balkans. For example, he writes that 
Serbian pop star Jelena Karleuša uses her current popularity to advocate for LGBT rights. 
Importantly, Krištofić's critique was also general and familiar. The artists and events described 
18. Rokeri S Moravu 
Records on display at the Mikser House exhibition on turbofolk 
music and nationalism. The two records in the foreground fit the 
nationalist discourse: ‘Rockers from Morava’ wear their trademark 
šajkača caps, while Rambo Amadeus’ record is titled ‘We want 
gusle!’. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
 
   
97 
were recent, and some artists remain popular today. The exhibition thus touched on parts of 
people's personal memories (both recent and old), offering viewers a chance to connect the 
wider narrative of the exhibition to their own personal ones (Rowe, Wertsch, and Kosyaeva 
2002). As such, the viewers' interpretation of the exhibition narrative may very well depend on 
their personal memories. Their experiences may make them question the dominant historical 
narrative, or it may even make them cautious of Krištofić's argument. 
Moving on to my interviews, I begin by analysing my participants’ perception of the civil wars. 
The academics that I interviewed mostly talked about the nationalist political climate that 
remains and the hardships that people face as a result. Of the artists, four described the 
conflicts as “horrible”, “terrible”, “insane” or “the worst years”. Of the three other artists, one 
museum curator called the 1990s political climate “schizophrenic”, suggesting that ideologies 
moved from one extreme to the other. Another curator, Snežana, could not understand why 
people adored Ceca, the turbofolk singer I mentioned in Chapter Four. Snežana spoke about 
the free concert that Ceca held on Saint Vitus Day in 2013, and wondered how people accepted 
that she had been married to a war criminal. Artist Goran held the same sentiments, but 
specifically said that he was shocked that “intelligent” people seemed to value Ceca. He went 
as far as to call the moral compass of Serbs dysfunctional, to say that they have been unable to 
make informed moral judgements since the wars. 
The souvenir vendors used similar adjectives to describe the wars, labelling them as “madness” 
or “terrible” years. Some avoided having to refer to the conflicts, instead saying “all of ‘that’ 
happened”; we held a shared understanding of what ‘that’ meant without having to explicitly 
refer to the memories. One vendor, Ivana L, spoke about this at length. She made similar 
arguments to artist Goran and curator Snežana. Her opinion emerged when I asked about 
whether she believed that she was selling national ‘symbols’. After referring to her own items 
as being merely ‘ethnic motifs’, she began to show discomfort for the sale of ultra-nationalist 
symbols. To return to the introduction of this chapter, cultural stalls in Belgrade sell the 
šajkača with the Četnik logo and items with images of Serb army leader Ratko Mladić who has 
been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY. When I interviewed a man who sells such items at 
the large stall in the middle of Knez Mihailova Street—one in which seemingly contradictory 
“masonries of memory” (Todorova 2004, 158) were depicted on items—I asked him too if he 
believed that he sold Serbian symbols. He pointed to the šajkača cap and told me: “Of course 
they’re Serbian symbols. History proves that they are Serbian symbols”. For him, he was 
simply selling a symbol of national history. Ivana L, on the hand, felt uncomfortable with such 
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items being sold. She especially considered the popularity of figures such as Mladić as 
problematic; she believed that it was either a result of people unfortunately agreeing with 
Mladić’s behaviour, or because people were not fully informed about his role in war crimes. 
That latter reason she believes exists partly due to history teaching by state education. She 
believes that textbooks teach a selective history and lie. “It has nothing to do with history”, she 
told me. 
I suggested that perhaps people feel that acknowledgement of crimes may mean a betrayal of 
their own nation. She said to me: 
Well that can happen. But I think the bigger problem is that some people don’t see it as 
being wrong. As though this wasn’t wrong at all. As though it is normal to go and commit 
genocide… The civilian deaths in question are huge. Destroying, stealing, profiteering…and 
that’s a problem because it has entered those channels. And to someone, even if they know 
the truth, is in support because they profited in the war or something like that. Others 
won’t, not because they don’t want to admit what happened, but because they feel as 
though they bear no responsibility. And that, that is the scariest of it all. 
Ivana L is therefore worried about people agreeing with ultra-nationalism; they may accept 
that non-Serbs were killed in the name of the nation, but believe that it was the right thing. 
She wants these individuals to be held accountable for such views, but in particular for war 
criminals to bear the consequences of their actions. She specifies individuals as criminals, not 
wanting to be part of a people, a nation, who committed those crimes. She said to me: “I don’t 
want them to be hiding behind my national identity”. With this comment, Ivana L showed me 
that people do see a meaning in the civil wars, one that connects to their national community. 
 
Forging a forgetting 
By discussing the teaching of history, Ivana L pointed to the process of memory-making that is 
central to this chapter. Besides profiteering from the conflicts, she believes that people may 
have ultra-nationalist sentiments because they were taught it. Her argument therefore 
corresponds to my approach to memory-making as a process led by those in power. State 
education, in this instance, holds a position of authority and it teaches the majority of the 
population. What is taught by history textbooks can be accepted as fact, and it is therefore 
vital that we know the history that is being taught. I demonstrated a selective history taught 
by primary school textbooks with Serbs as victims of nationalism by other groups. Some 
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crimes are silenced while others are highlighted. A similar situation was evident in public 
spaces, such as in Tašmajdan Park and at the Military Museum. In these, Serbs were mourned 
while the crimes committed by them silenced. If anything, their involvement in the conflicts is 
represented as an act of retaliation. 
In spite of all this, there were moments in the public space and in my interviews that did not 
look back on the conflicts as a source of national pride. Instead, there are exhibitions that are 
beginning to critique the ethno-nationalism of the 1990s. There are also members of the Serb 
population—my interviewees—who describe the wars as “‘horrific” and are concerned about 
the morals of Serbs today.  
The memories and experiences of citizens are therefore affected by the many discourses that 
are controlled by those who have power over them (Billig 1995; Hearn 2006; van Dijk 2001). 
The meaning of national memories can certainly be reproduced through the repetition of a 
constant narrative. However, the evidence in this chapter suggests that the civil wars—as well 
as former Yugoslavia—are not remembered so consistently. There are indeed multiple 
discourses that are controlled by different actors (who have different messages to send). This 
tells us that Serbs’ images of these events are shaped by personal memories and their lived 
experiences. As I demonstrated, in particular, memories tend to be consequently remembered 
in the contemporary context (in which current lived experiences occur). What we saw in the 
chapter was that perceptions of former Yugoslavia and the civil wars are responses to the 
harsh realities of contemporary life and the experiences of the conflicts. And that was the 
purpose of this chapter: to demonstrate how national memories give meaning to a national 
identity, and how that national identity is questioned as it comes into contact with the lived 
experiences of citizens. 
I explore this further in the next chapter; in Chapter Six, I situate some of the Serb national 
history in the contemporary context of EU accession. I demonstrate a dialectical relationship 
between the contemporary context and imaginary: historic events are interpreted from a 
contemporary understanding of the world, while an understanding of history can shape 
contemporary thought and interpretation of events.  
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6. The European Union for a better Serbia 
I began Chapter Four with the story of Saint Vitus Day (Vidovdan) in Belgrade in 2013. I 
described how that was the day that the Serbian government was to receive confirmation that 
they were going to begin official negotiations for EU accession. The event was dubbed 'the 
green light', the go-ahead for progress. It being on Vidovdan was an omen; the outcome was 
part of an inevitable fate for Serbs. 
In this chapter I expand on the discourses surrounding Serbia’s EU membership process 
further, offering a concerned analysis of the Serbian national imaginary in the EU context. My 
approach is to first explain why membership is a focus in this thesis and why it is related to 
the image of the nation. I then explore the dominant image of the EU, and the most common 
perceptions of its 'substantive content'. Those that emerged, and which I detail in this chapter, 
are that of self-interest, power and modernity. I then position these perceptions alongside the 
dominant image of the Serb nation, exploring what they mean for the Serbian nationalism. 
 
Why the EU? 
EU membership has been a goal for the Serbian government for over a decade now. Initially, 
Serbian citizens were eager to join the Union after the ousting of Milošević and during Zoran 
Đinđić’s time as prime minister. It seemed, for many Serbs, that a brighter future was ahead; 
by integrating with the other EU member states, they would finally see the end to the 
conflicts. Joining Brussels was also a major incentive for the democratisation process, as it 
offered an alternative wealthier future for Serb citizens (Džihić, Segert, and Wieser 2012). 
However, Đinđić’s assassination reminded the Serb community that some problems were 
cyclical and had infiltrated large parts of society. The integration process itself has been slow, 
many concessions are required, and citizens have seen little positive meaningful change. 
These have all led to a decline in enthusiasm and a view of the EU as a plethora of empty 
promises. BCBP’s (2012) survey results showed 47% of their respondents supported EU 
integration, while 35% opposed it. The number of those against accession had grown since the 
previous year and young people were most against integration. The higher level of education 
obtained, the more likely the respondent would support membership. However, the higher 
level of education obtained, the smaller the pool of respondents. 
Some have questioned the Serbian governments' dedication to integration, given that reform 
has been slow, corruption has remained high and EU ‘standards’ are still to be met. Subotić 
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(2010) argues that the Serbian political elite has been doing only what deemed necessary for 
their own personal benefit, rather than truthfully wanting to integrate. Džihić and Segert 
(2012) suggest the same, arguing that the Serbian political elite who have ‘captured’ power rely 
on the status quo to keep it. For many citizens and politicians too, the criteria set up for 
integration has seemed drastic at times, especially the acknowledgement of genocide and the 
prosecution of war criminals (Stojić 2006; Subotić 2014). Proponents of this view see the 
concessions as a blow to national dignity, where the EU strives to limit Serbia’s sovereignty 
and culture (Koštunica 2013; Samardzija and Robertson 2012). 
Some argue that a supposed lack of European identity is the reason for the Serbian slow 
integration process (Subotić 2011). A relationship with Western Europe therefore indicates a 
relationship with the EU, as the EU is the institutionalisation of Western European values and 
interests. Subotić (2011) argues that an understanding of the former Yugoslav republics' 
relationship with Western Europe explains their subsequent EU membership progress. For 
example, Croatia's and Slovenia's identification with Western Europe led to a committed goal 
for membership after their respective declarations of independence. Serbia, on the other hand, 
had no long-standing relationship with the West and was perceived as more ‘backward’. Serbs 
had Eastern Ottoman influence, they were considered ‘wild’ and were economically dependent 
on the ‘Western’ republics (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992). For Subotić 
(2011), the lack of a European legacy means that the independent Serbian government was not 
eager to join the EU geo-politically. 
It seems that Serbs are cautious about this East-West divide, though. Aware of the negative 
connotations associated with being ‘backward’ and ‘exotic’, Serbs have attempted to distance 
themselves from their Ottoman heritage (Todorova 2009). Turkish rule is seen as a time of 
stagnation for them, not a history to embrace. Yet not being completely part of Europe either, 
leaves Serbs seemingly 'stuck' between two identities. Volčič (2005) has discussed how the 
Balkans were always ‘besides’ Europe in a cultural, political and economic sense. For Serbs, 
they have had a most ambiguous relationship with the West; her interview participants were 
confused about belonging to Europe. They saw themselves as part of a wild Serbia, what seems 
to be an internalisation of being exotic and barbaric. In contrast, they viewed Europe as 
powerful and wealthy, which are seemingly more positive characteristics.  
Nevertheless, EU membership continues to be a dominant theme in the discourse of Serbian 
identity and, as such, deserves careful attention. To return to the theory underpinning this 
thesis, I discussed how a strong national identity can lead to legitimizing a nation-state 
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(Hearn 2006). Researchers have demonstrated how ethno-nationalist rhetoric was used to 
make an ethno-nationalist state for Serbs seem necessary (Gordy 1999; Oberschall 2000; Pešić 
2000). This suggests to me that the elite—the agents of meaning-making—were aware of the 
potential gain from strong national cohesion. In turn, this leads me back to Hearn's emphasis 
on the claims to identity, legislature and territory being made by a small group of people who 
are aware of the 'packaging' of these claims in order for nationalism to 'work'. Thus, a 
theoretical aim in this chapter is to see whether the current elite are attempting to foster a 
European identity amongst Serbs in order to gain support of their alleged EU goals. If there is 
an ambiguous identification with Europe, then citizens are less likely to support a geo-political 
integration with the European Union. However, if the elite are committed to becoming a 
member state, then they may be spreading an image of a European Serbia in an attempt to 
encourage attachment to it. 
 
The West as a self-interested power 
Exploring the dominant perception of the EU is not only the analysis of images of the EU 
institution, but also of Western 
Europe and of ‘the West’. As 
mentioned above, the EU is 
essentially the institutional 
embodiment of Western 
European values (Subotić 2011). 
Save for a small number of 
political elites who make the 
distinction between ‘Europe’ and 
the ‘EU’, the dominant view of the 
two entities is that they share the 
same ‘substantive content’. While 
smaller non-Western states such 
as Hungary and Bulgaria may be 
members, it is the Western 
members that hold the most 
power. They are also the ones that 
appear most successful and 
19. The scramble for Belgrade 
Image of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a September 2014 
issue of the Politika newspaper (Stevanović 2014a). 
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prosperous. Some argue that Germany is the sole leader of the EU and that decisions made by 
the institution serve to benefit Berlin (Beck and Livingstone 2013). Indeed, the image of 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel dominated EU-related material in the media29. Her image 
embodied leadership of the Union in reporting. Consequently, the powerful member states (if 
not exclusively Germany) are the ones that symbolise what it means to be European. As such, I 
argue that it is an entity; it is a ‘real’ community that is imagined and exists in a geo-political 
sense. We can thus talk about perceived dominant characteristics and values of the EU, 
Europe and the West. In this section I discusses perceptions of the West (often embodied in 
the now-prosperous Western European states). The following section narrows down the 
narrative to that of the EU specifically. 
 
The dominant image of Western Europe in Serbia was one of a self-interested power. This 
image emerged not only in the public spaces and the media, but also in my interviews. To 
begin, I discuss how museums and public spaces in Belgrade offer a dominant narrative of 
now-EU member states as powerful, often aggressive. Each museum and space varies in how 
they do this; the narrative is highly dependent on the function of the space. The two WWI-
specific exhibitions explicitly negated the West, by which the ‘West’ was embodied by the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Both of the exhibitions formed a narrative of an oppressed but 
brave Serbs against an imperialist Austria-Hungary. The National Museum’s ‘Light in the 
                                                     
29
 Such as the two images accompanying newspaper titles ‘The scramble for Belgrade’ (Stevanović 2014a) 
and ‘The Balkans without tariff’ (“Balkan da ruši carine” 2014). 
Image from the front page of an August 2014 issue of Večernje Novosti. It depicts Serbian 
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (“Balkan da ruši 
carine” 2014, 1). 
20. The Balkans without tariffs 
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darkness of WWI’ described Serbs as ‘forced’ into war by the ‘economically powerful state’. 
The empire is labelled as ‘evil’, ‘inhumane’, ‘selfish’ and having ‘colonial aspirations’. The 
second exhibition, ‘Serbia 1914’, was held in conjunction with the Military Museum and told 
the story of WWI through battles. In it Austria-Hungary is described as cunning, well-
equipped and merciless. The Empire allegedly blocked Serbia from achieving sovereignty 
through economic sanctions and military manoeuvres. Serb civilians also suffered at the hands 
of their troops, with war crimes committed by Austria-Hungary detailed and graphic images 
used. This section on war crimes focused on those committed by Austro-Hungarian troops 
only. It completely omitted crimes committed by Bulgarian forces, despite their actions being 
of a more ‘genocidal nature’ (Scianna 2012). The selective memory-making here reinforces 
Austro-Hungarian as Serbia’s sole WWI enemy. 
Such a classification suggests that Western Europe is not part of ‘us’, that it is not a region that 
Serbs are encouraged to identify with. What this means for nationalism is that the identity 
that is to be secured through legislature is a non-European one. This can consequently create 
tension within the EU context, where a sense of a regional community is reinforced through 
renegotiated borders and laws of member states. 
The two WWI exhibitions also put emphasis on historical continuation. ‘Light in the darkness 
of WWI’ equates the Empire’s ‘aggression’ as the continuation of ‘enslavement’ that began 
with the Ottomans. Curator Miljković here alleges that Western Europe of 1914 had the same 
goal that the Ottomans had for centuries before it, evoking a fear of ‘backwardness’, 
subjugation and stasis for Serbs. Miljković almost warns viewers and readers to be wary of 
‘fake’, righteous claims by powerful forces. She writes that the impressionist artists—the 
protagonists of the exhibition—were politically active and she portrays them as a glimmer of 
hope at a time of despair, a metaphor for the ‘light’ in their impressionist works. They were 
able to see 'the truth' behind claims made by Austria-Hungary, based on what great 
oppressors had done in the past. The exhibition therefore served as a 'cautionary reminder' of 
what hegemonic aggression can lead to30. Even ‘Serbia 1914’s’ focus on history through battles 
makes conflict inevitable. For a community that values history—as the past allegedly gives 
direction for contemporary Serb behaviour—then this particular history selects Western states 
as perpetrators of Serb oppression and warns of history repeating itself. 
                                                     
30
 The subtitle for the exhibition is: In honour of the 170th anniversary of the foundation of the National 
Museum in Belgrade: a cautionary reminder of 100 years since the outbreak of World War One 
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The focus on Austria-Hungary can influence current perceptions of contemporary Europe. 
Žanić (2007) argues that by placing contemporary events in a ‘traditional’ framework, their 
meanings are made from an already established point of view. As such, a 'historic' negative 
image of Austria can be extended to an image of the EU. Or at least, the ‘imperial’ behaviour of 
Austria-Hungary can be recognised in contemporary member states and the EU as an entity. 
The Austro-Hungarian Empire was the Balkans’ closest Western European neighbour, with 
European influence perceived as having arrived from Austria (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992; 
Todorova 2009). Today, Austria is a ‘successful’ European country and is an established EU 
member. It is heavily tied to Germany, which is seen as the leader of the EU movement today. 
The characteristics of the Empire described in the exhibitions can also be interpreted as the 
characteristics of the EU. For example, Austria-Hungary is illustrated as economically and 
militarily powerful, but also greedy by wishing to expand. The EU is economically and 
militarily powerful today, and also expanding. It is powerful enough to pressure future 
members to adopt many new laws, policies and systematic reforms. For some, the criteria 
imposed threatens Serbian national sovereignty, just as the exhibitions argue that Austria-
Hungary wanted the Serbian territory under its rule. To repeat, ‘Light in the darkness of WWI’ 
was a 'cautionary reminder' to Serb citizens, implying that there may be hidden selfish 
agendas behind the EU's claims.  
Similarly, perceptions of 'aggressors' from WWII and the Yugoslav civil wars can also affect 
perceptions of the EU. The EU and the United States are both prominent Western ‘cultures’, 
they share values, and are politically, militarily and economically powerful. The Military 
Museum's permanent exhibitions paint a negative image of the West. As I wrote in Chapter 
Four, the function of that museum was to tell the story of the National Liberation Movement 
and Tito ‘liberating’ Southern Slavs. The story has a clear anti-fascist narrative, with which the 
Germans and Italians were synonymous. In this history telling, the aggressors are again 
contemporary European states. In particular, one of the aggressors is the unofficial leader of 
the EU: Germany. In the newer displays depicting the Yugoslav civil wars, the West is 
portrayed as an enemy alongside Croats and Albanians. ‘The West’ here is embodied in NATO 
and the United States as the leader. Their artillery is identified by the US flag and the NATO 
symbol. Their weapons are large and powerful, and the statistical table shows that they far 
outnumbered Serbs. Put alongside the Croatian and Albanian displays, the West is part of the 
group that attacked Serbs. 
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To reiterate from the last chapter once more, the West’s alleged anti-Serb agenda is visible 
through NATO ‘aggression’ in the Generalštab and ‘We were only children’ memorials. The 
power of the weapons used is evident and the bombings weakened Milošević’s regime, which 
quickly led to an end of waging war in Kosovo. These memorial structures can serve as a 
reminder of that time and what the West has the capacity to do to a weaker state such as 
Serbia. It is a similar story with the school history textbooks analysed; they focus on a history 
of conflict where Serbs are always oppressed, but perpetrators change. According to the 
publications, oppressors were the Ottomans over a few hundred years, then the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in WWI. In WWII, fascists and Nazis attacked Serbs and massacred 
civilians. In the descriptions of the Serb genocide in Jasenovac, the Croatian Ustaše were the 
perpetrators, while the killing of Jews was attributed to the German occupation. The telling of 
the Yugoslav civil wars, as discussed in the previous chapter, is blamed on the nationalism and 
‘hatred’ of other groups. The West—specifically NATO—helped these groups and killed many 
Serb civilians during the bombardment. Current member states and ‘the West’ are thus 
presented as cruel and anti-Serb, and historical continuation is implied. 
Aggression by the West as a continuity in Serbian history was also the topic of an open-air 
exhibition at Kalemegdan Fortress. Titled ‘Gazed into the sky’, the exhibition was based on the 
WWII diaries of celebrated laureate Ivo Andrić (Beogradska Tvrdjava 2014). It was held in 
conjunction with the Military Museum. The exhibition boards followed Andrić’s diary entries, 
with images accompanying his quotes. At times the death toll or number of missiles dropped 
on that day is included. As with the WWI exhibitions from the National Museum and IMS, 
‘Gazed into the sky’ points to a history of Serbia as one of conflict and suffering. The 
introductory board states: 
During the twentieth century Belgrade has been repeatedly bombed and almost completely 
destroyed. It was bombed by the enemy, but also by the Allies in the war. History of 
Belgrade during the past hundred years is written with lost lives and demolished buildings 
which disappeared in devastating missile explosions. 
One poster in particular is a section of a 1941 German newspaper article on the bombing of 
Belgrade. The image includes the German term for ‘Criminal’, a death toll of 2,500 casualties, 
an aerial view of the bombing, and the years that Belgrade was bombed (1914, 1915, 1941, 1944 
and 1999). The year 1941, the focus of the exhibition, is highlighted in red. The description 
specifies that it wasn't only the Axis powers that bombed them, but also the Allies who are 
meant to be aiding Serb citizens. The board indicates repeated bombings, supporting the 
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exhibit’s introduction of Belgrade’s history which “during the past hundred years is written 
with lost lives and demolished buildings”. By including 1999 as a year suggests that NATO’s 
bombing that year was of a similar nature to those in WWI and WWII. It suggests that the 
consequences and feelings presented by Andrić in WWII would have been experienced during 
the other bombardments. 
 
The images used in ‘Gazed into the sky’ also encourage viewers to connect their personal 
narratives to the larger narrative of WWII (Rowe, Wertsch, and Kosyaeva 2002). Many images 
depicted are ruins of familiar parts of Belgrade, including Kalemegdan, the national museum, 
the old location of the military museum, the old national library and some familiar streets. 
There are images of people hiding during emergency sirens, or lining up for food. There is 
even the aerial view of bombs dropped from war planes mentioned above. The images used 
are powerful and confronting, often graphic. The familiarity of the places depicted allows the 
viewer to imagine spaces they recognise in a state of ruin, filled with desperate and fearful 
people. Unlike the WWI exhibitions focusing on ‘timeless’ virtues to connect contemporary 
Serbs to the past events, the urban setting of ‘Gazed into the sky’ is situated in familiar and 
21. Gazed into the sky 
A poster from a 2014 Kalemegdan exhibition based on Ivo Andrić’s WWII diaries. It was organised 
by ‘Belgrade Fortress’, the Belgrade City Museum and the Military Museum in Belgrade. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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popular locations. This exhibition has the advantage of space, and need not rely solely on 
national myths to evoke meaning and emotion. 
An interesting point that is to be made from these exhibitions is that they recognise the power 
of ‘the West’, which is a tendency that Volčič (2005) documented in her own interviews with 
young Serb intellectuals. The power referred to in my data was framed in a negative way, 
attributed to colonising aspirations and violent behaviour. The West allegedly had no respect 
for Serbs as a people or their right to sovereignty. Serbian national history consequently 
suggests that Serbs as a people, and Serbia as state, have had an unfair relationship with great 
powers. According to the memories of conflict mentioned here, great powers suppressed 
Serbs, were exploitative and did not allow them to fulfil their sovereign potential. In the 
process of creating the image of a victim Serbia, the narratives simultaneously point to a 
powerful West that is able to inflict that oppression. A significant point is that the narratives 
do not indicate that the power and resources necessarily led to 'colonial aspirations'; instead, 
the West had hegemonic aims and thus inflicted oppression and suffering on to weaker 
peoples. As such, if Serbia was to have the same amount of power and resources, they could 
use it for 'good' due to their moral worldview: they could use it for achieving and protecting 
their right to sovereignty, with which they would allegedly be satisfied. 
Furthermore, the grouping of Western states and cultures as one (and alongside the enemies 
of Serbs) needs to be considered in light of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and what it can do for debates on nationalism. The ICTY is seen as a 
Western court and cooperation was a requirement for EU membership. If the West—and its 
members—are considered to be anti-Serb, then its institutions may be interpreted in the same 
way. The court is accusing now national heroes as war criminals (Čolović 2007), suggesting 
that the Serbian nation-state has criminal foundations. Such suggestions can therefore make 
one question the legitimacy of the Serbian government and what moral claims it stands for. As 
such, processes such as the ICTY can be interpreted as an attempt to weaken the Serbian state 
and humiliate Serbs as a nation. The consequences of such sentiments can further halt the 
possibility of justice and reconciliation; a perception of the ICTY as ‘anti-Serb’ can deem 
claims of war crimes and genocide as inaccurate and subsequently denied. Such rhetoric is 
already visible amongst ultra-nationalist groups who tend to refuse to accept the power of the 
ICTY, stating that it is anti-Serb and part of a Western hegemonic plan (Samardzija and 
Robertson 2012; Subotić 2014). What’s more, some argue that cooperation with the ICTY as a 
prerequisite for EU membership undermines claims to justice and reconciliation by the court; 
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Dragović-Soso and Gordy write that the institution is part of many international ones that 
“operate with a distance and opacity that affords them little genuine authority in the region” 
and appears to have a “superficial” interest in the question of reconciliation (2011, 208). 
Consequences of such sentiments can be the denial of war crimes and an encouragement of 
ultra-nationalist interpretations of events. 
 
The EU as a tool 
There was also a tendency to see the EU as a powerful tool that may bring ‘order’ to Serbia. In 
these discourses, Brussels (even if self-interested) was the symbol of modernity and progress 
whose power can be useful for Serb citizens. This view emerged most in my interviews and the 
media, as well as partly in the school history textbooks. 
I begin by highlighting that the history textbooks point to Western culture as modernisation. 
They portray the Slav conversion to Christianity as a significant turning point. One textbook 
labelled the Slav adoption of Christianity as the beginning of civilisation: accepting 
Christianity meant “entry into the Christian world, belonging to the civilised world and 
gaining international recognition” (Šuica and Radić 2012, 62). The publications therefore treat 
this period as the beginning of humanity as we know it, as that was when Serbs began to form 
their cohesive community. In the texts, communities of the Middle Ages seem not too 
dissimilar to those of today in terms of their cultural ‘substance’; the cultural customs, religion 
and language that Serbs use today are supposedly inherited from their medieval ancestors. 
The acceptance of literacy and the Cyrillic alphabet by Slavs is depicted as an integral part of 
culture and progress. This was allegedly when they began to lay the foundations of the 
modern Serb civilisation. Such comments actually situate the narrative in a Balkanist 
framework: the Christian (Western) world is deemed civilised, as opposed to the barbaric 
pagans. The textbooks therefore do portray a type of connection between Serbs and Western 
Europe. However, this connection only goes as far as to separate Serbs from the Eastern and 
Orient, which I will speak to later in the thesis. 
Moving on to the media first, there was a tendency to portray the EU as a place of modernity 
and future for Serbs. This was evident in the Politika and Večernje Novosti newspapers when 
reporting on EU negotiations. In them, Prime Minister Vučić is depicted as discussing future 
projects with Merkel and other delegates. It is as though it is up to the Union to provide the 
funds for reforms. The EU as a symbol of modernity was also particularly highlighted in the 
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Danas newspaper series ‘Why does Serbia need the EU?’. Of the nine articles analysed in this 
series, all authors discussed the need for changes in values, spirit and the mind amongst Serbs. 
They did not agree on the solution for how this was to be done: seven authors suggested that 
Brussels would be the driver, while two argued for internal reforms. The seven authors who 
supported EU accession expressed the institution as the embodiment of the desired values. 
The SPS’s Ivica Dačić (2013) and Liberal Democratic Party’s Čedomir Jovanović (2013) both 
wanted Serbia to become a modern state and society. For them, to be like Europe is to be 
progressive, modern and hopefully 'successful'. Dačić (2013) urged Serbs to modernise by 
adopting a ‘European’ mentally, while Jovanović argued that Serb citizens: 
are exhausted. A broken country needs a trigger for engagement, learning and 
advancement. This is the meaning of modernization. This change of mind in Serbia can 
only be triggered by access to the European court. (Č. Jovanović 2013, para. 1) 
For Jovanović, Serbs need the EU as it is the only way that they can modernize. Other authors 
made claims to potential social, economic and political progress through integration, such as 
‘development’ and ‘normality’ (Miščević 2013), state and elite accountability (Bobić 2013), 
higher unemployment and an end to corruption (Svilanović 2013), and even peace and 
prosperity (Tabaković 2013). By saying that the Serbian state will see these changes as a result 
of integration suggests Serbia is none of these things, but can become so by joining an entity 
that is those things. The Balkanist perception of the West as successful, progressive and 
modern is evident amongst the majority of the series’ authors by making such arguments. We 
consequently do not see an attempt by these authors to make Europe part of the Serbian 
national imaginary as it stands. Instead, we see Serbs being told that they are in need of the 
EU. That is, Serbs need to make change and make sacrifices in order to become what Europe 
is: modern, progressive and functioning. 
My interviewees also suggested that the EU can be the driver of change. Even though many 
considered the institution to be self-interested, they still saw potential in it as a tool for 
reform. Support for integration came from the two groups with relatively higher education 
and status: the academics and artists. The academics mostly spoke about the discourses 
surrounding membership. While expressing that they thought it would be a positive thing, 
they saw the agenda falsely advertised as a solution to all problems. They saw the EU as a 
potential tool for reform, but insisted that the reforms needed to occur internally. Nebojša, a 
political scientist, expressed concern that concessions were too high. He suggested that 
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Serbian integration should be made available without so many obstacles. For him, the EU was 
exercising unfair power over the Serbian state. 
The artists echoed Nebojša’s sentiments in terms of seeing the EU as exercising its power. 
Even more so, they tended to see the EU as a self-interested power. Yet the artists were also 
predominantly pro-EU. They were suspicious of the EU’s ‘real’ intentions and were concerned 
of the power it has had over other small states, but still believed that the cost was worth the 
possible outcomes. The cost was a loss of complete sovereignty (as the EU wanted a type of 
hegemony), but the benefits would be meaningful reforms. The reforms that the artists 
discussed were that of the arts sectors specifically, or of Serbian society as a whole. Two 
participants, art gallery workers Ana C and Davor, saw potential benefits in funding from the 
EU. They saw the Serbian arts scene in need of financial support, but a government with little 
money to spare. The EU could thus provide those funds. However, Ana C and Davor believed 
that those funds would be a way for the institution to exercise power, as galleries would be 
limited to abide by EU interests. To them, this was no different to the current Serbian 
government distributing funding based on its own interests. Ana C and Davor were two 
members from the group who did not explicitly express support or oppose integration, they 
simply could not see how membership would necessarily solve Serbia’s problems, a concern 
expressed by the academics. 
Two musicians at the Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra had similar views but supported 
integration. Clarinet player Aleksandar P made similar remarks to the two gallery workers, but 
on a broader scale. He believed that the integration process was exploitation of smaller 
countries. He said to me: 
From what I hear from other countries and people who live there – Hungarians, I don’t 
know, these smaller Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union – 
that is all theft. It means, the European Union comes in, takes all that it needs. It gives you 
the Euro, it gives you rights and, I don’t know, movement, and so on. But that is why you 
are financially tied to the European Union. 
Reminiscent of the exploitative aggressor rhetoric of the Belgrade museums, Aleksandar P saw 
this as a ‘negative’ of the EU: it was an institution that expands for self-benefit and makes 
weak countries heavily dependent on it. However, this concern was outweighed by the 
potential benefits of membership. He specifically wished to see Serbia ‘cleaned up’ and to 
function, ‘da bude reda’ (‘for there to be order’). For Aleksandar P, the EU could potentially 
force those reforms in Serbia as the Union supposedly functions better. His colleague and 
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fellow musician, Jovan, was specific in discussing integration when I interviewed him: he was 
‘pro-EU’ but strictly ‘anti-globalisation’. He was against globalisation that came with the EU as 
it made ‘everyone the same’. Yet he wanted Serbia to join the organisation as it may bring 
about a functioning system.  Jovan thus specified an acceptance of a system but not of a 
culture31. 
Some of this rhetoric was echoed by interview participant Branislav, a popular Serbian art 
critic. He talked about how the EU’s agenda was obvious but not clearly stated by them: 
With the EU you are lost…they are just constantly making controversial claims…they don’t 
know what they really want to do. Because [the] European Union always has to, have to put 
this interest of theirs in some kind [of], I don’t know, humanitarian logic? Human rights 
logic? Some kind of ideological blander? But then at the end you know that is just a sheer 
interest. 
Branislav believes that the EU’s agenda always stems from self-interest but that they are 
dishonest about it. He compares the institution to the United States who is "clear" with its 
aims and has a "dedicated policy". He praises the US for its confidence and honesty, despite 
disagreeing with their policies. Branislav appears to accept a country’s or entity's self-interest 
as a given, but would like that to be made clear. Like Aleksandar P mentioned above, he sees 
the EU as a self-interested power and expansion only happens for its own benefit. At the same 
time, Branislav also believes that the potential benefits outweigh the negatives. He sees the EU 
as having the power to create functioning state institutions and reduce corruption.  
Of the souvenir vendors, two supported accession, four were against and one did not state it. 
The four who opposed it saw the Union as false and exploitative. This emerged most when 
they discussed their experiences of democracy and capitalism. Talking from their 
contemporary personal experiences, the vendors viewed Westernisation in Serbia through 
democratisation and the transition to a market economy. Democracy was promised as the 
solution to the authoritative power of elites, while capitalism was to bring economic 
prosperity to them. However, democracy to them has not curtailed corruption, and 'the same 
people' remain in power. Similarly, the capitalism they know is negative and associated with 
power relations between countries or people. For the capitalism that they have seen so far, 
they have been the losers and feel hard done by. They see a world where money and 
corruption brings power and success, but money they do not have. In short, they cannot 
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 A system as culture in relation to Jovan’s statement is discussed later in the chapter in the section 
‘Protecting culture’. 
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participate in a capitalist society as they do not have the economic capital that will give them 
power. Economically, politically and socially on the margins, the vendors have seen empty 
promises before and the EU may well be another. 
Thus, the EU would not serve theirs or Serbia’s interests. Maja saw the EU as a strictly 
economic corporation that was immoral and a bully. For Serbia to accept the concessions 
would be humiliation. When I asked how she feels when politicians say that Serbia needs the 
EU, she responded with: 
Silly of course. I feel silly. There is no need, especially when they humiliate us. There is no 
reason for any of us to let somebody humiliate us, especially in the name of a failed, failed 
thing. It is an economic company, the European Union. As long as it is financially stable 
and of benefit to them, it exists. If it is no good for them, it falls apart. 
Maja clearly does not believe in the claims to unity that the institution makes, seeing the 
individual states as self-interested. Another participant, Dragana, saw no benefit of joining the 
EU and the Schengen Zone when she has no money to travel. She does not believe that joining 
would be of benefit to Serbs either. These participants saw no benefits come from Brussels yet, 
and saw no reason to expect any on the future. 
Two other vendors, on the other hand, agreed that accession was the right direction for Serbs. 
Seeming that the West is a place of order and has functioning state apparatuses, they hoped 
that a strong relationship with the EU would influence Serbia positively. They, Jovana and 
Ivana L, were proponents of accession and saw membership as a future of progress. Jovana 
wished for integration in order for Serbia to “become part of civilisation”. She spoke of Europe 
in the Balkanist framework that I’ve discussed so far, where the West is modern and civilised. 
She sees Western states as functioning and progressive, unlike corrupt and degrading Serbia. 
Jovana even expressed concern of Serbs ceasing to exist, she was afraid that they were in 
decline as a people. She hoped that joining Europe would allow them to fulfil the next 
evolutionary step. However, just like the artists, she spoke negatively of the EU’s power as 
well, citing the EU causing humiliation for Serbs with its visa restrictions. As for young Ivana 
L, she strictly supported EU integration and was not suspicious of it. She based her support on 
experience in Serbia and on her perception of the EU as a powerful and functioning entity. 
Ivana L told me: "I would love to [join]. The EU means something to me. In this sense, I think 
it is of value…it will clean up society. For there to be fair play and for it to function…whatever 
the cost for that would be". Ivana L said this in the context of describing Serbia as a corrupt 
place where merit does not lead to success, hoping for a fairer system. 
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It was clear that Ivana L thought the nation’s future prospects poor too if it did not open its 
doors to others. She perceived the EU to be offering the necessary opportunities for a better 
life. The West is her goal. Interestingly, she even saw the capitalism and democracy in the 
West a ‘better’ version than that in Serbia. She differentiated between ‘our capitalism’ and ‘EU 
capitalism’, with the latter being 'better'. Ivana L clearly has a perception of the EU as a place 
with values, morals, progression and simply a place that ‘works’. Her emphasis on merit and 
equal opportunity are modern liberal principles that are not experienced in Serbia, but she 
seems to believe them possible. Her perception of the hardships in Serbia is similar to that of 
the souvenir vendors who oppose integration, yet her solution is different. The remainder of 
the vendors expressed a need for change in Serbia, but were pessimistic about Brussels’ 
potential power over their country. Ivana L and Jovana instead saw hope in membership. 
Interestingly, the wish for an authoritative leader was common amongst the artists and the 
souvenir vendors. Those who supported integration did not explicitly state an appreciation for 
such a central power, but they did seem to suggest that an institution as powerful as the EU 
would force the necessary reforms. There was the perception that the EU will have enough 
authority over the Serbian government to make those changes. In some ways, such a high level 
of authority means completely overhauling a system and giving immense power to Brussels. It 
would mean allowing the institution to act on its self-interest and to be exploitative. Yet this 
cost seemed worth the benefits to these interviewees. Such a tension is understandable for 
citizens who see ongoing dysfunction in the state system and want order once and for all. The 
vendors who opposed EU accession did not see the Union as an answer, but they did suggest 
that major reforms were necessary. They certainly accused all governments of being corrupt, 
but their hope was in a strong and better government one day in the future. However, the 
concerns that these participants expressed to me were what Džihić and Segert would attribute 
to the “authoritative islands” (2012, 243) in the Serbian government; although the issues cited 
were a result of authoritarianism, my participants indicated that they wanted a type of 
authoritarian power nonetheless. 
 
Between the East and West 
The discourses on European identification perpetuates an East-West distinction, and the 
debate on where Serbia sits between the two. From what we saw in chapters four and five, 
Serbia’s national substance makes the nation distinctive. The distinctiveness separates them 
from Western Europe; Serbia and the other ‘Eastern’ republics of Yugoslavia are not the 
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cosmopolitan, capitalist democracies that Western European states are. Serbia has no 
economic ties to the Western countries and allegedly no tradition of a relationship with it. 
Under the East-West dichotomy, Serb national markers place the community closer to the 
Eastern European imaginary. This includes Russia, Serbia’s ‘older brother’ and the most 
powerful of the Eastern European region. Without them, Serbia would be isolated. Yet, to 
return to the political, social and economic difficulties that Serbs are facing, the government 
cannot rely on isolation. It needs economic aid and political allies. EU membership offers 
prospects of reform and aid, and has been presented as a positive future. To have the EU as an 
ally, though, Serbia needs to join the institution. If Serbs are to join, then identity politics 
suggests that they need to distance themselves from the ‘substance’ that they have supposedly 
inherited. That is, their traditional customs are not encouraged, nor is their religion. If the EU 
is the embodiment of 'modern' values, then the institution may secure a modern identity 
through legislation enforced on member states. A Serb national imaginary of a traditional 
community therefore seems to be at odds with Serb citizens' understanding of what it means 
to live in the cosmopolitan and orderly West. What we will see later is that this question is at 
times framed as one of national integrity, where Serbia being 'stuck' between an East and West 
identity has implications for the political programme component of nationalism. 
What may play into this perception is that Western Europe is no longer seen as the place of 
Christianity, but as a place of secularisation instead. Taylor (2004) speaks of secularism as a 
key part of a Western imaginary. It appears that Western society has left Christianity behind 
and secular values have become dominant. Above I described how my participants describe 
the West as modern and cite a number of values that are supposedly absent in the West. 
These absent values, as discussed in Chapter Four, tend to be based on religion, which 
Westerners have seemingly left behind.  
What is important to understand here is that there remains a rejection of a specific ‘Eastern’ 
identity: the Orient (or in this case the Ottoman). I do not say this lightly. Todorova (2009) 
has explained this in detail, arguing that the label ‘Balkan’ implies a sense of backwardness 
and exoticism. Aware of the negative connotations of this, many peoples in the region have 
attempted to reject the label. They would prefer not to be a people who have ‘stagnated’ 
besides an ever successful West. To speak to this, I must point to a temporary exhibition held 
at the Historical Museum of Serbia (IMS). Titled ‘Imagining the Balkans: identities and 
memory in the long 19th century’—and based on Todorova’s book by the same name—it was 
organised by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
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and part of an International Council of Museums (ICOM) initiative (ICOM 2013; Ilie et al. 2013; 
UNESCO 2013). A key message in it was that ‘the Balkans’ are full of similar people with similar 
customs. Similarities amongst groups were emphasised in the exhibits, suggesting that Serbs 
have much in common with their Albanian and Croatian counterparts. The exhibits also 
showed the construction and normalisation of differences through official institutions, 
demonstrating the ways that the ‘nation’ is practiced en masse. It therefore showed identity as 
constructed and national ‘substance’ as overlapping between groups. 
This exhibition was very different to others held at the IMS. Besides the aforementioned 
'Serbia 1914' exhibition, the museum was opened in 2013 with an exhibition on the 
Karađorđević and Obrenović families, the royal Serb dynasties. President Tomislav Nikolić 
held a speech at the opening ceremony, reportedly stating that the Museum’s task was to 
“preserve the memory of the people” no matter what “the temptations are from globalisation 
and its attempts to erase all ethnic heritage and characteristics” (“Nikolić otvorio obnovljeni 
Istorijski muzej Srbije” 2013, para. 1). We therefore see the Serbian president officially 
supporting an institution that celebrates Serb culture and independence. ‘Imagining the 
Balkans’, on the other hand, was indeed an exhibition that was essentially critical of the 
national identity narratives usually presented by the IMS. Perhaps it is therefore unsurprising 
that the media and political elite showed little interest in it. Despite the Ministry of Culture 
officially supporting it, the exhibition received little attention in the media and there was no 
noticeable advertising for it. Despite ‘Imagining the Balkans’ suggesting that there is little 
European legacy for Serbs—which corresponds with some of the narratives I have mentioned 
so far in this chapter—there seems to have been little interest by SNS state officials in 
identifying with the Balkan region either. 
It is thus important to note that the East-West dichotomy in contemporary Serbian identity 
discourses is based on the understanding of the East as Orthodox (rather Balkan meaning 
Ottoman). Such an image was referenced to in the frequent reporting of EU accession in the 
Politika and Večernje Novosti newspapers. I begin with political cartoons published in 
Politika. Petričić’s cartoons in the newspaper illustrate the push and pull factors of each side, 
particularly his cartoons from August 2014. The cartoon from early August is titled ‘Foreign 
affairs’ (Petričić 2014a). In it we can see a ‘traditional’ Serb—a man wearing the šajkača cap 
and traditional dress—being pulled by the magnetic fields of the West (the US and the EU) 
and the East (Russia). Both are equally as strong. It gives the man pain and leaves him 
confused. It is clear with this that the cartoonist, and essentially the newspaper, are aware of 
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the identity politics for Serbia and 
how it is articulated by the 
government. The man’s costume 
points to the peasant Serb, the 
epitome of the traditional national 
icon. He is the embodiment of the 
nation, and it is implied that his 
national identity is important to his 
own self-identity. The cartoon also 
categorises the West and Russia 
separately, two communities poles 
apart and unable to be grouped 
together. 
Another cartoon published a few 
weeks later depicts a shirtless Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić taking on 
the ‘ice bucket challenge’32 (Petričić 
2014b). The buckets are coming from 
both sides; the left is of the EU flag 
and flung by Merkel, while the 
Russian-flagged bucket is flung by 
Putin. Vučić looks unenthusiastic 
and cold, but he is reluctantly 
accepting it. As with the first image, this one shows the pressure that is felt from both sides 
and the unpleasant experiences Serbs are having because of it; one Serb is left with a 
headache, another left out in the cold. Merkel and Putin are also pitted against one another in 
the ‘Ice bucket challenge’ cartoon, both vying for Serbia’s attention. This type of group 
dichotomy makes it appear as though there is no possibility of the two working together and 
that Serbia is to choose between the two. This framework is unhelpful as it can paralyse 
identity and the lived experience of people. If one is to choose between modernity and the 
national imaginary, then to choose the former is a betrayal of the latter. For those where 
                                                     
32
 ‘The Ice Bucket Challenge’ is the name of an activity that involves dumping a bucket of ice and water 
on to someone’s head. It was done to promote awareness and raise funds for research on the disease 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) (also known as motor neurone disease) (The ALS Association 
2016).  
22. Foreign affairs 
Political cartoon titled ‘Foreign affairs’ from the Sunday 
10 August 2014 paper from Politika (Petričić 2014a). 
   
118 
nationhood is a key part of the self—at least, if nationhood gives meaning to behaviours and 
customs—losing the national identity would be losing a large part of themselves and how they 
view their world.  
 
The East-West divide was referred to in other reporting of EU accession negotiations, as well 
in reports of the Serbian government forming relationships with other nations. EU 
negotiations were covered extensively in the August and September issues of Politika and 
Večernje Novosti. There was coverage of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s meetings with 
Angela Merkel and other EU delegates, as well as the plans leading up to the meetings. The 
articles offer three key claims: that reform was dependent on Serbia’s government forming 
relationships with foreign entities; that the Serb political elite were efficient; and that they 
were protecting national integrity by making demands in the national interest. To begin, 
Politika and Večernje Novosti newspapers reported on the potential benefits of Serbia joining 
Brussels. For example, Prime Minister Vučić reportedly presented EU delegates with a plan to 
improve trade and transport routes in and out of Serbia. The potential of improving 
infrastructure would thus only come with future membership, where the EU is presented as 
23. Ice Bucket Challenge 
A Politika cartoon depicting Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić taking on the ‘ice bucket challenge’ 
from Merkel and Putin (Petričić 2014b). 
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the driver for necessary changes. Amongst this the media also reproduced an image of the 
Serbian political elite making progress and demands based on national interests; although 
they were dependent on the EU for changes, they also portrayed efficiency and confidence. 
One particular article used by both Politika and Večernje Novosti was prior to the meeting 
where Vučić pointedly sent a message to Brussels: “We respect the EU but will still export to 
Russia” (Čekerevac 2014; “Poštujemo preporuku EU, ali izvozimo u Rusiju!” 2014). Here Vučić 
was ‘telling’ the EU that they will stick to their decision to keep trading with Russia despite 
pressure to sanction them. The ‘telling’ by Vučić was an attempt to make the state’s leaders 
appear as powerful agents in the 
EU-accession negotiations, so as not 
to look as puppets of the West. The 
article in Politika was even under a 
separate section titled ‘Serbia 
between the EU and Russia’, once 
again presenting Serbia’s future as 
one stuck between the East-West 
debate. These articles are an 
indication of what EU accession 
may mean for nationalism. That is, 
the political elite want to leave an 
impression of themselves as 
protectors of Serb (political and 
economic) integrity when there is a 
potential of their legislative power 
being compromised with EU 
membership. 
Both of the above articles included an image of Vučić at a podium, navy curtains behind him 
and an image of the Serbian national parliament building on the curtains. If we look closely, 
we can see that this press room resembles the United States’ White House Press Briefing 
Room. I suggest that this is another ode to the West's power and the Serbian government's 
claim to democracy. If we consider the argument made in the Danas articles by members of 
the current government, they argue for a modern, successful, democratic Serbian state. The 
United States has been the embodiment of many of these ideologies and using such a press 
room backdrop suggests that Serbia may possess the same power (or may wish to one day).  
24. Vučić 'telling' the EU 
An image from the front page of a Politika article in 
August 2014. Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is 
pictured under the headline “We respect the EU but will 
still export to Russia” (Čekerevac 2014, 1). Večernje 
Novosti used a similar image and headline on the same 
day. 
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In the same period, however, there 
were also reports of Serbia 
strengthening relations with non-
EU states. The two articles 
mentioned above demonstrate 
Serbia wanting to continue 
economic trade with Russia while 
the EU sanctioned the Russian 
government. A September 4 
Politika article also presented ‘The 
scramble for Belgrade’ stating that 
the EU had expressed concern over 
Serbia’s potential siding with Russia 
(Stevanović 2014a). Both 
newspapers also reported that 
Putin was coming to the Belgrade 
Military Parade to commemorate 
WWII. Both publications used images of military manoeuvres practising ahead of his visit 
(Dragović 2014b; “Putin na paradi 16. oktobra” 2014; “Putin stiže na paradu” 2014). Other 
articles reported on Serbia’s relations with Chinese or Middle Eastern investors, such as China 
buying textile factories (Rabrenović 2014; P. Vasiljević 2014; “Vučić i Li dogovorili samit u 
Beogradu” 2014) or a United Arab Emirates sheik funding the ‘Belgrade on the Water’ project33 
(“Arapi spremaju nova ulaganja” 2014; “’Beograd na vodi’ menja imidž Srbije” 2014; “Emirati će 
nastaviti i dalje da investiraju” 2014). These articles not only discussed economic 
improvement, but also of improving Serbia's image. By doing the latter, the international 
community may see Serbs in a positive light and a state with which to do business with. The 
portrayal of the EU reproduced by the newspapers here may be one of European power, but 
not one where they possess hegemony. One Politika article even asked: “Is this the end of US 
hegemony?” implying that China and the Middle East are rising powers (Stevanović 2014b). 
This article was accompanied by a number of others that fell under the section ‘The New 
World Order’. While the Serbian government is wishing to make progress with EU 
                                                     
33
 The ‘Belgrade on the Water’ project (also called ‘Belgrade Waterfront’) is the name of a plan to 
construct an exclusive waterfront development along Belgrade’s Sava River (Belgrade Waterfront 2016). 
Financed by a United Arab Emirates firm, it is to hold residential and office buildings, a shopping mall, 
hotel, opera house and a skyscraper. 
25. Putin is coming 
From a Večernje Novosti article describing the 
preparations from the 2014 WWII commemoration and 
the Belgrade military parade which Putin was to attend 
(Putin stiže na paradu 2014, 1). 
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negotiations, they also appear to want to show their own strength and sovereignty, as well as 
justify befriending other nations. In the world of national homelands, this means that the Serb 
government may be seen as having sovereignty over its territory, and leverage in international 
politics. 
 
 
Protecting culture 
Joining the EU can be perceived by some as a threat to modern national sovereignty. Some are 
willing to accept losing a level of autonomy in exchange for a powerful authority that can 
enforce systematic reform. For others, however, national integrity is to be protected first and 
foremost. In the Danas series of articles ‘Why does Serbia need the EU?’, former president 
Vojislav Koštunica (2013) expressed concern that accepting European rules would impede 
Serbia’s national integrity. He sees the EU as an institution that strives for hegemony in the 
region. Although Brussels promises prosperity for future member states, Koštunica believes 
that smaller countries become powerless once they become members. He uses the loss of 
Kosovo—the territory’s ‘fake’ declaration of independence—as an example of Serbia losing 
sovereignty over its territory. For him, losing Kosovo was part of the West weakening Serbia. 
Joining the EU would only perpetuate this loss of autonomy. Koštunica wishes for Serbs to be 
‘confident’ in their ability to govern themselves and to prosper on their own. He writes: 
26. Aleksandar and Li 
Image from the Politika newspaper of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and Li Keqiang, Premier of 
the State Council of the Republic of China (“Vučić i Li dogovorili samit u Beogradu” 2014). This was 
one of the many articles detailing negotiations with Asian countries. 
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When Serbia became an independent country after almost a century as part of various 
national federations, it has not seized the opportunity to start a civil life that relies solely 
on the Serbian state and national interests represented by the political and military 
neutrality. (Koštunica 2013, para. 1) 
What we can ultimately see from Koštunica’s argument is that he values national sovereignty 
in the way that Hearn (2006) talks about nationalism. That is, he sees the modern nation-state 
system as the ultimate goal for a nation, and one goal which Serbs have fought for over 
centuries. With sovereignty over a territory, a unique national identity can be secured. Thus, 
any limit to jurisdiction or territory can hinder identity. We can see by his arguments that 
Koštunica has framed his understanding of geo-politics relating to the modern state system, 
but relies on traditional claims to form the basis of a collective national community. He treats 
national self-determination as a historic goal for national communities. 
Koštunica’s suggestion of political and military neutrality suggests that Serb nationalism need 
not choose 'sides'. Reminiscent of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned position, this view suggests that 
the state can hold an important position and gain from it. He was not the only one to propose 
this. For example, in the aforementioned articles Vučić is suggesting that Serbs can have a 
relationship with both Russia and the European Union. In the Danas series ‘Why does Serbia 
need the date?’, the Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council, Goran Svilanović 
(2013), saw EU membership as a way to enforce the importance of Serbia’s position. For him, 
the Serbian state can be an important geo-political player by being the ‘link’ between North 
and South, and East and West. Although Svilanović supported EU accession, he alludes to a 
time when Yugoslavia was in the perceived privileged neutral position and received financial 
aid from the West. Another way that this can be interpreted is that there seems to be a 
suggestion that Serbs can take a middle ground. Rather than choosing between East and West, 
perhaps they can be the ‘bridge’ between the two. 
The necessity of being a ‘bridge’ is part of the common attitude that something needs to be 
done in Serbia. Some are attempting to find the best solution, at times relying on the identity 
framework. A research project on national identity led by the University of Niš suggested just 
this. The publications released from the project debate modernisation and tradition. One of 
the project’s publications, an edited volume, argue for ways that Serbia can modernise without 
losing its important cultural characteristics (L. Mitrović and Stojić 2012). The authors pinpoint 
Japanese culture as the perfect example of a culture that has modernised but kept its 
traditional norms. They point out technological advancement, but heralded the ‘protection’ of 
   
123 
culture such as customs and language. Two other publications (Petković 2007; 2011) from the 
same research project argue that nations should preserve their ‘own national and cultural 
specificity’ and respect the uniqueness of other cultures. The author argues that cultural 
relativism will lead to tolerance, while an expectation of all to give in to globalisation would be 
‘cultural homogenisation’. The authors from the project treat cultures as distinct—and 
clashing—and in need of being preserved as such. Simultaneously they also show respect and 
a desire for modernity as a means of progress. Importantly, the University of Niš researchers 
appear to give importance to all three claims that make up nationalism: claims to identity, 
jurisdiction and territory. Unlike Jovan, they are concerned that weakened claims to 
jurisdiction and territory may lead to a weakened identity. 
Musician Jovan, an interview participant, spoke directly to this. He was ‘against globalisation’ 
for precisely the reason of ‘cultural homogenisation’. He sees the EU as an economic and 
political institution, and is willing to join. It is as though he does not see politics and the 
economy as ideologies that are based on values. Globalisation, on the other hand, is a set of 
values for him and he wants to keep his distance. He believes that globalisation standardises 
everything, including personalities and national identities. Jovan told me that national identity 
is about inheritance and territory; with inheritance came family roots, a sense of being, and 
knowledge of how to live their life. It is those elements that make somebody unique. With 
globalisation, he anticipated the loss of uniqueness and subsequently the loss of national 
identity. Now, there is a contradiction in Jovan’s argument: to have a nation—in this case the 
Serb nation—is to have a general sense of what being Serb is. This means that members share 
thoughts and behaviours, have commonalities. The community are thus a group of people 
who agree on ideas of shared characteristics. This is not individualism. Jovan argues that 
shared markers make a person unique. What we can decipher from his opinion nonetheless, 
and that of the aforementioned studies, is that culture is clearly valued. Serb culture is what 
seemingly gives the Serb community meaning and it is vital for it to remain central to society. 
It is also specifically a Western culture and lifestyle that they are weary of. Jovan was thus 
treating ‘culture’ as separate from economic and political practice, despite a political system 
being a form of culture nonetheless. 
Although we cannot generate overarching generalisations from the sample of interviews and 
publications discussed above, we can read them as suggestive of shared understandings of 
nationalism. In terms of identity, we see an emphasis on attachment to culture, specifically 
traditions and a sense of inheritance. If one’s sense of being is understood through such 
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attachments, then culture (and national identity, in this context) may be considered to be key 
to the citizens' imaginaries. Using Hearn's theory of nationalism, then, this imaginary is to be 
secured through a legislature that allows, encourages and reproduces the culture. However, 
the potential of EU accession would mean that power over the legislature and territory is to be 
shared with Brussels. As such, the imaginary can theoretically be changed as Serb culture is 
not central to the Union's values. Now, Jovan suggests that this need not happen; he sees a 
possible separation between economic/political connections and cultural ones. As for the 
University of Niš authors cited above, they suggest that Serbs can build economic prosperity 
and political power through embracing tenants of modernisation. For them, Serb culture 
cannot survive in an institution such as the EU. They are instead to encourage modernisation 
internally, but keeping it related to culture. 
What this discussion exposes is the complexity of a national imaginary. That is, we see citizens 
(including academics) attempting to articulate a society that does not fit a traditional 
framework. We can see them attempting to understand what modernity and capitalism may 
look like in a national imaginary that is framed by ethno-traditionalism. Interviewee Jovan, for 
example, wants to accept changes he sees as either positive or inevitable. At the same time, he 
wants to conserve the 'substantial content' that he has formed attachments to (and identifies 
with). Again, national identity and a national territory (a place where his community has 
'roots') gives him meaning. Political and economic changes offered by EU accession may offer 
his community and territory the changes that they are in dire need of. Similarly, the authors of 
the aforementioned publications are negotiating between modernity and tradition. While they 
are concerned with national sovereignty, they are also attempting to incorporate what they 
may also see as necessary or inevitable changes. 
 
Negotiating Serbia’s relationships 
Ultimately, and to answer the theoretical question I began this chapter with, we do not see an 
attempt to make Serbs see themselves as belonging to Europe. Serbs certainly do not appear to 
identify with Europe: the Western European community is differentiated from them. It 
appears that the East-West dichotomy has been accepted and membership can consequently 
be perceived as a threat to that identity. The legislative power that Brussels would have over 
the Serbian state can also indicate that a Serb identity—one in which attachment to tradition 
is central—may not be secured. Theory would suggest that an identification with Europe, or 
EU accession, may lead a threat to nationalism overall. 
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A sense of need for EU integration emerged nonetheless. This was particularly evident when 
discussing the difficult living conditions in Serbia today, where EU membership was a 
response to citizens’ disenchantment with politics and discontent with corruption. It appears 
that Serbs are ready for a powerful entity to make the necessary reforms and some are willing 
to make concessions in order to allow the EU to be that power. They saw the EU as an 
embodiment of a functioning system, in which they could possibly obtain better lives. In these 
discussions, an image of Europe as modern, progressive and even ‘civilised’ emerged—an 
image that is reinforced by Western European members (Todorova 2009)—exposing a 
Balkanist interpretation of ‘the West’. As for those who were ‘anti-EU’, the majority also 
suggested that Serbia needed to change. Even for them, it appears that Serbia is a place of 
corruption and disorder, but that integrating with Europe is not the answer. 
These discussions reminded me of Jansen’s (2009) study of the lived geopolitics of people in 
Serbia and Bosnia; he found that waiting in queues to obtain EU visas caused humiliation and 
entrapment, which led to an opinion of the EU in general. It was the personal experience of 
‘ordinary people’ that shaped geopolitics, rather than solely being a product of it; peoples’ 
lived experienced affected opinion and behaviour, ultimately affecting political direction. The 
national imaginary was thus able to change, depending on the various ways that a person’s 
imagining, experience and expression were affected. The lived experiences of my participants 
had similar effects on their opinions of the EU. They experienced the harshness of transition 
and were suspicious of an institution with which they’ve allegedly been exploited by before. 
Simultaneously, however, citizens also experienced constant government failure and were 
beginning to be disenchanted with Serbian politics. This seemed fuelled by apathy and 
scepticism, sentiments so easily observed during my fieldwork in Serbia. The apathy and 
scepticism seem to culminate in feelings of disappointment. That disappointment is both in 
the nation and the state, and is drawn out by what is learnt and what is experienced. 
Disappointment is thus the focus of the next chapter. 
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7. Disappointment 
In this last discussion chapter, I focus on perceptions of national self-identity and what it 
means for the Serb national imaginary. One cannot understand the Serb imaginary without 
the sense of disappointment that is so readily noticeable in my research. Here I return to the 
vic (joke) recounted in the thesis’ introduction. Being a ‘typical’ Balkan cynical joke, it 
suggested that even the Global Financial Crisis (called simply ‘the crisis’) was out of its depth 
in Serbia; “The crisis came to Serbia. It stopped, looked around and said ‘oh hell, I’ve already 
been here!’ And so it went on its way”. I am accustomed to black humour and bitter sweet 
jokes; they are accepted as part of Serbian culture. Yet this vic attracted my attention more so 
than the others I had heard while undertaking fieldwork in Serbia. It was told by a group of 
friends hanging around outside their apartment blocks off Jewish Street in the old suburb of 
Dorćol. As with many Serbs, they were interested in life in Australia and what my thoughts of 
Serbia were. They wanted to know what I thought of the dysfunctional state and the stories of 
Serb irrationality and wildness. Typically, the group of friends laughed at the shambles that 
frames contemporary Serbian life. They live in a place of disorder. In fact, what is seen as 
disorder, or in this sense a crisis, is the norm for Serb citizens. In a way, the vic is a bitter 
acceptance of that, an attempt to lighten the otherwise harsh reality. It is also an indication of 
how Serbs perceive themselves, their country, and their position in the global world. 
This vic encompasses perceptions of Serbs as victims, as corrupt and as wild; images that came 
up so often throughout my research. These common themes lay compacted in this one joke, 
hence my attraction to it. The themes also bring out the sense of disappointment that ran 
across most narratives in my research. Victimhood, corruption and wildness will therefore be 
key points of discussion in this chapter. The themes emerged in museum exhibitions and in 
the writings of political elites in the media. They were also evident in my interviews. Serbs 
were assumed to have a type of certain character and to do things a certain way. Predominant 
was the perception that culture makes Serbs act in a negative manner; a perspective that 
invoked the context and experiences shaping Serbs (the national imaginary). As such, Serbs 
were portrayed as rational and fundamentally ‘good’ people. 
 
Betrayal by foreign powers and cultures 
I begin with an analysis of victimhood and how it appears to draw out perceived Serb 
characteristics. Throughout my research victimhood was expressed as a history of betrayal in 
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state museum exhibitions, or through the bitter disappointment with contemporary 
government expressed in the media and by my interviewees. The betrayal is seen through an 
alleged ongoing oppression of the Serb people and the Serbian state. More often than not, this 
oppression is seen to be the work of great powers; as I discussed in chapters five and six. What 
you will see here is that Serbs are also victims of their own state and community. I will expand 
on these observations in the coming two sections, especially in relation to how victimhood 
draws out perceived characteristics of patriotism and bravery. I will also delve into perceptions 
of Serbs as victims of the Serbian state and of modernity, which allegedly makes them act 
unethically. This latter type of victimhood is evident in the vic above, where Serbs perceive 
themselves as victims of the Serbian state itself, as well as larger ideological movements. 
In the previous chapter I discussed the perception of the EU as a great power and a Serbian 
national history of tense relationships with perceived overlords. In these histories, Serbs have 
been betrayed by the Ottomans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and even NATO. However, 
Serbs have also been patriotic and brave in those moments, qualities that allow them to 
survive their oppression. To begin, the history textbooks analysed in previous chapters depict 
the Serb nation as victims of brutal and nationalist oppression throughout history. Belgrade 
museums repeated these themes as well, especially in the Military Museum’s permanent 
exhibition and the two WWI-specific exhibitions. In the WWI-specific exhibitions, Serbs are 
portrayed as victims of the immoral, greedy and self-interested Austro-Hungary. The Serbian 
state was provoked and Serb people were enslaved. Despite being victims, however, their love 
for their country prevailed. Their patriotism gave them the strength and bravery to fight for 
their right to freedom and sovereignty. Those who resisted the oppressive great powers were 
fighting for their emancipation and they were “volunteers in the wars that Serbia was forced to 
wage” (Miljković 2014, 15). The curator here ‘reminds’ citizens that their patriotism and 
bravery are key should they ever be provoked again. 
The permanent exhibition of the Military Museum sent a similar message of patriotism and 
bravery, but the good/evil dichotomy was categorised differently. Rather than ethno-national 
group dichotomies, the ‘good’ ideology of socialism saved people from ‘evil’ fascism and 
Nazism. Tito and his Partisans essentially liberated the victims of fascism, sourcing their 
bravery from socialist principles. Although Serbs were oppressed along with other ethnic 
groups, this exhibition still contributes to a history of victimhood for the Serb nation in 
particular. Their place as victims in WWII is just another moment in a long history of 
oppression. What’s more, the exhibition tells of the camps run in Croatia that killed many 
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Slavs, especially Serbs. This history telling can ‘remind’ people of their ancestors being victims 
of Croat hatred, a memory that was emphasised during the Yugoslav civil wars (Byford 2007). 
The more recently-built section of the museum, however, provides a Serb-centric view of 
conflict. The first part of this section shows Serbs as selfless peace keepers of the UN, 
participants of global missions. In the second section they are targets for the United States, 
NATO, Albania and Croatia. These powerful ‘illegal’ and ‘terrorist’ groups forced them fight an 
unfair battle. Yet again, Serbia is betrayed by its neighbours and great powers, despite their 
wish to keep the peace. 
My interview participants indeed suggested potential victimhood at the hands of powerful and 
self-interested Western Europe. They were suspicious of the aims and integrity of entities such 
as the EU. In Chapter Six I explained how my participants were concerned about potential 
exploitation from membership. Many of them, though, seemed to feel that Serbs were in a 
desperate enough situation that exploitation by the EU may be an improvement to their 
situation. Another important focus in the interviews was of Serbs as victims of modernity. 
Often tied to the EU, the ‘western’ ideologies of modernity, democracy and capitalism are new 
and different cultures entering Serbia. And according to my interviewees, these cultures are 
changing Serbs who are otherwise essentially ‘good’ people. 
The souvenir vendors spoke about economic hardships more so than other groups and 
insisted that capitalism has treated Serbs poorly. This treatment of them has allegedly forced 
Serbs to act negatively, further causing hardship amongst those who have remained ‘good’. 
The vendors spoke of the difficulties of obtaining stalls and the unreasonable raising of fees 
imposed by the council that provide permits. The vendors described how wealthy ‘tycoons’ 
price them out of the capitalist system and see themselves as victims of the unfair process. The 
profit that they are able to muster largely depends on tourist seasons and the wealth of the 
local population. Any decline of living conditions in Serbia means that their potential profit is 
reduced. As such, Serbs struggle to make their ends meet and make selfish decisions from 
desperation. Maja who sells wooden objects on Kalemegdan Fortress spoke about the Serb 
nation and that the community has become immoral and selfish. She believes that Serbs are 
fundamentally good people and she attributes that goodness to religion. The negative 
behaviour towards one another that she sees is therefore a result of a perceived distancing 
from religion. She goes on to say that the nation: 
has lost its spiritual teachings, their connection with our past, with our religion, with our 
real values. That is what we lost. We have had some material values imposed on us instead. 
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Money and the damn race for money has been imposed on us. With that we have lost our 
souls. Not just me, but everyone… and that’s why we’re unhappy. 
One of the last things that Maja said to me was: “We all now worship the God of Profit”. The 
Serb character is thus seen to be inherently good here, but the culture of capitalism has made 
people otherwise. They are victims of these larger ideologies that are ‘imposed’ on them by 
capitalist power blocs. Maja is somebody who believes that faith can give people moral 
grounding, to give people direction for thought and behaviour. Modernity confuses that 
worldview, pressuring her to revert to what she has become comfortable with. 
A tense relationship with modernity was also visible amongst the artists. They were concerned 
about the pressures of capitalism, yet the majority wished Serbia to become functional and 
‘efficient’. The members of the arts community spoke of capitalism and the push for the arts 
sector to be profitable. As a consequence, many observed, artists are pressured to make their 
products commercial or to work in their own time for a greater profit. The arts sector was 
becoming difficult for artists and the public was seemingly losing interest in culture, as the 
arts sector does not always pander to popular tastes. Musician Aleksandar P compared the 
Northern American arts scene to the European one34. He stressed how America and Canada 
are “all about entertainment”, commercialised music. In Europe, on the other hand, there 
remained a passion for classical music. Yet at the same time, this was a man who wanted 
Serbia to become a functional state like the Canada he spent many years in. Four other 
members of this interview group had similar views. While they were concerned about the lack 
of support for the arts sector, the majority also wished for reforms characteristic of modernity. 
The interviewees seemed unaware that their lived experiences challenged their identification 
with certain values. They also wished for EU membership, which is a capitalist institution and 
one that was founded on modern economic terms. 
 
Victims of our own leaders 
There were also instances where Serbs were presented as victims of their own state. Aspects of 
my data focused on betrayal by the Milošević regime specifically. In one private exhibition 
held at Mikser House, ‘The aesthetics of nationalism: design for turbofolk’, there was a move 
to criticise the regimes of the 1980s and 1990s. Looking at how music and politics became 
intertwined, the exhibition attempted to demonstrate the way that popular music was used to 
                                                     
34
 Aleksandar P specifically distinguished between Europe and North America here, and didn’t 
categorize them as one Western entity. 
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facilitate nationalist agendas. The exhibition narrative demonstrated how citizens were 
subject to manipulation by popular music by their own governments, once again victims of 
those in powerful positions. In the Danas newspaper series ‘Why does Serbia need the EU?’, 
the Milošević regime is also presented as an oppressor of Serbs, but in a more accusatory way. 
Dragan Đilas, then leader of the Democratic Party (DS), blames Milošević’s government for 
the current hardships: 
Unfortunately, we have had an insane regime that just would not let us be what we are. 
That is, part of Europe and the world. If it wasn’t for Milošević and his followers, Serbia 
would already be a part of the EU, we would be living in a country where wages are three 
times higher, we would not be talking about the values we lost in the worst phase of 
Serbian history...it is time to put the ten darkest years of Serbian history behind us, to 
remember all the victims that we gave away, looking to the future. (Đilas 2013, para. 2) 
Đilas is evoking a narrative of conflict here, encouraging contemporary Serbs to be brave and 
make the leap to EU membership. He sees Serbs as victims of poor leadership, generalizing 
Milošević’s government to those that came after him. In the way that history seems to be 
taught, those events stand in a long history of Serbs as victims of larger powers, whether the 
powers are their own government elites or foreign regimes. What such rhetoric produces is an 
attempt to use national history to provide direction for contemporary dilemmas. What we see 
here is an attempt to reproduce a certain national imaginary: by understanding one’s past as 
one of victimhood, history should also provide citizens suggestions of how to behave in 
contemporary times. 
There was also much discussion of constant political failures and a lack of change in my 
interviews and in media articles. In these discourses, Serbs were victims of their own state’s 
failure to meet their promises. In the Danas series of articles, all authors spoke of changes 
needed. Of them, Koštunica (2013) claims that Serbs are victims of great powers but that they 
are also betrayed by the current regime who is feeding ‘propaganda’ to Serbs about the EU. He 
argues that the current government needs to change its tactic and be confident in keeping its 
sovereignty. He is afraid that the popular SNS and their followers will make the mistake of 
handing autonomy over to foreigners, impeding on Serbia’s national sovereignty. Five other 
authors from the Danas series agree with Koštunica to the extent that they accuse the current 
government of allowing Serb citizens to experience the hardships they do. These writers, 
however, are not ‘anti-EU’. They instead suggest that EU integration may lead to positive 
government and system reforms. These authors suggest that through successful European 
leadership, Serb citizens will no longer suffer from corruption by their own government. 
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My analysis of the Politika and Večernje 
Novosti newspapers found reports of a 
number of government failures as well, 
but tended to shift blame away from 
political elites in power. The articles 
reported on a number of institutional 
deficiencies, from decreasing pension 
benefits to issues caused by poor 
infrastructure. Others referred to elites 
abusing their power or being at fault of 
inefficient state apparatuses. Through 
such reporting, the newspapers could 
encourage readers to question the level of 
support government institutions offer 
Serb citizens. Many of the articles, 
however, tended to put blame on non-
government groups or individuals. For 
example, Večernje Novosti reported that 
trade unions together form the “biggest 
boss in the country” (Skenderija and 
Crnjanski-Spasojević 2014, 1), while 
solicitors and barristers who had gone on 
strike are presented as the cause of 
criminals not going on trial (Crnjanski-Spasojević 2014). It was not the government or the 
political elite at fault, but individuals and non-governmental elites. Upon close analysis, 
Politika did not scrutinise the government—the political elites in power, to be specific—
extensively either. While one front page detailed the declining popularity of Tomislav Nikolić 
(Baković 2014), the newspaper produced a constant positive image of Prime Minister 
Aleksandar Vučić. Even when discussing issues that Serb citizens were facing, Vučić would be 
portrayed as having a solution. This was evident in the reporting of EU negotiations and in 
Vučić negotiating treaties with Middle Eastern or Chinese governments (as discussed in the 
previous chapter). He was also portrayed as helpful when arguing that hard measures—such 
as the decrease in pension benefits mentioned above—were necessary for prosperity. The 
reporting of issues citizens face may perpetuate the sense of constant failures in Serbia, but 
27. Nikolić on the decline? 
Polling suggesting a decline in the popularity 
and trust in President Tomislav Nikolić in the 
Politika newspaper (Baković 2014). 
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the newspapers (in particular Politika) appear to be making a strong effort in not placing the 
government as the source of the hardships. 
My interview participants discussed such government failures and expressed disappointment 
in them. They also tended to be cynical towards potential meaningful reforms. They seemed 
disappointed and sometimes bitter by the failed promises they feel are constant. For example, 
alleged reforms to curb corruption were seen as being of no avail and the slow road to EU 
membership offered no positive changes thus far. Disappointment amongst artists emerged 
when speaking about the treatment of the cultural and arts sector. They cited disrespect by 
the political elite and dysfunction of the state as the root causes. Curator Panić told of a lack of 
interest in the Museum by the government, while musicians at the Philharmonic Orchestra 
were concerned about the minimal funding that the arts sector received. Artist Goran argued 
that the state encouraged citizens to value mainstream ‘cheap’ entertainment. He argued that 
culture is not nurtured and therefore not celebrated: 
Well if we talk about Paris and its story of art, that story is long and, what is very 
important, they are a wealthy nation…And that wealth, it gives you a sense of 
importance…Nobody is stopping a poor man or a rich man from entering a gallery. We 
have to be talking about a conscience—if there is any conscience here—and how that 
system of values has fallen apart here. They are some grotesque folk singers, politicians, 
and other. They completely devastated everything. 
Goran was arguing that the level of wealth should not dictate somebody’s interest in arts, 
seeming as much of his own happiness is sourced from the industry. He does point out that 
wealth can provide the substance that citizens can have pride in. He instead blames a corrupt 
and immoral state—and its elite—for allowing and encouraging the popularity of ‘grotesque’ 
arts, of not nurturing the substantial art that exists. Using the example of Ceca’s concert on 
Vidovdan in 2013, he was not only concerned that the government allowed her to perform, but 
more so that thousands of people attended. He thus sees a government as the source of 
spreading unethical attitudes and the encouragement of talentless entertainment. Goran’s 
concerns demonstrate his awareness of the political elites’ ability to influence public 
sentiments. He appears to believe that individuals with power can reproduce a certain 
acceptance of behaviour; if singers such as Ceca are allowed to be the centre of large scale 
events, then citizens experience it and are encouraged to participate in such behaviour. 
Ultimately, what we see Goran discussing here is a national imaginary. 
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The artists I interviewed also appeared cynical about whether change would ever come to 
Serbia. Musician Aleksandar P said to me:  
There were some changes while I was away [in Canada]. I heard about what Đinđić did. 
Now those were big changes for this region. But now, now it is completely the same to be 
honest… They say one thing during elections but when they come to power, nothing. That’s 
it. It no longer matters.  
For Aleksandar P, the Đinđić government was a moment in Serbian history where positive 
reform occurred. However, it was cut short with his assassination and the politics reverted to 
what it had been so far. He makes a generalisation of all governments before and after Đinđić, 
arguing that they were all the same. He makes no distinction between the Milošević regime 
and those who followed Đinđić’s presidency. This time Serbs are victims of the state, victims 
of the poor, self-interested choices that their governments make. It is because of this situation 
that Aleksandar P is disenchanted with politics and prospects of change. Yet, as did three 
others from his interview group, he still had some hope of reform through their wish for EU 
integration; Serbs were in a desperate enough situation that these interviewees appeared to 
believe that only this foreign, Western power bloc could have positive influence. 
The souvenir vendors were also quick to negate the current government and spoke of constant 
failure by political elites. Jovana was concerned about the future of Serbs, afraid that the 
nation would disappear. She talked to me about how Serbia as a state and people need to 
change, but that it should begin with the state. She said: 
Politicians need to change first. But I really don’t have the key to how to change the 
politicians… I supported the removal of Milošević, I was against [him]. And I really believed 
in Koštunica and Đinđić, in all of the Democrats. But they all failed us. They failed me. I 
don’t believe anyone anymore. And I really don’t know how to change politicians since 
they’re all the same…And because of that I think that Serbia will come to ruin… Maybe if 
God sends us somebody who isn’t selfish, who doesn’t think of themselves only, of their 
own pockets, someone who steals when they come [to power]. They all say one thing 
before they come to power. When they come to power, they just begin to thinking of 
themselves. Of their pockets. They steal and lie and that is horrible. 
Jovana’s opinion here was similar to musician Aleksandar P's and was a common one amongst 
the vendors. They, too, were tired of the constant disappointments. The enthusiasm following 
Milošević’s ousting was subdued with the assassination of their new president, reverting back 
to the behaviour of the previous regime. It reminded citizens that corruption was entrenched 
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and that any leader who attempts to make major reforms may pay with his or her own life. 
Thus, attempts by the government and media at portraying the political elite as powerful 
agents in economic negotiations (as discussed in chapter Six), may be in vain. Such images 
may not be enough to convince citizens of potential meaningful change. This can 
understandably encourage disenchantment amongst Serb citizens. 
Serbs as victims of the state were also discussed by academics. Political scientist Zoran 
specifically discussed the notion of ‘disappointment’ with the state by Serb citizens. He argues 
that this is a result of a socialist legacy and “no tradition of self-organisation”. He sees Serbs as 
dependent on the state and their disappointment is only caused by high expectations. 
Nebojša, another political scientist, believes that citizens are disappointed with life in Serbia 
as they compare it to life in other ‘better’ and ‘normal’ countries. Specifically, these countries 
tend to be wealthy EU member states. The academic argues that Serbs have been exposed to 
an image of a ‘successful’ West for a long time, where it is presented as an alliance of civil and 
functioning states. The image is ideal and can also set high expectations. Nebojša sees this 
particular kind of comparison unfair. He would like citizens to understand that there are 
countries in which living conditions are much worse than in Serbia. The other academics also 
spoke of a discrepancy between citizen expectations and what they receive. Aleksandar B 
suggested that expectations may be too high, that the wishes of citizens may be too 
unreasonable or that the government is not willing to do what it is asked. This may go with 
Zoran’s argument that Serb citizens expect too much from the state. 
Sociologist Dragica, on the other hand, argued that citizens’ expectations are modest and 
minimal and that their wish for a functioning non-corrupt state is entirely appropriate. Only 
Dragica noted that it is the state’s role to provide adequately to its citizens, but that it is failing 
at it. Overall, it appears that my academic interviewees had their own expectations of the 
Serbian state’s capabilities and willingness, or perhaps had particular views about the role of 
the state.  
Džihić and Segert (2012) can be useful in discussing disappointment that was most prevalent 
in my interviews with the artists and souvenir vendors. The Serbian state does not fit the 
authors’ understanding of a functioning democracy as the state is unable to adequately 
distribute social and economic goods to its citizenry. They in fact describe Serbia as having 
“authoritarian islands” in a “sea of democracy” (Džihić and Segert 2012, 243). By this they mean 
that the government is run by a small group of political elites who ‘captured’ the state and 
have no desire for substantial social or economic changes. They rely on low participation in 
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politics by the citizenry as it consolidates their power. Interview participants such as Jovana 
and Aleksandar P mentioned earlier show an awareness of elite state ‘capture’ that Džihić and 
Segert discuss. They see government decisions made by a small group of elites whose 
‘connections’ are just like them. Jovana and Aleksandar P have been disappointment by false 
promises so many times that they no longer fully participate in political action. After all, 
Jovana stated that she tries to have as little dealings with state institutions as possible, while 
Aleksandar P claimed that politics do not interest him any longer. If Džihić and Segert’s 
argument is correct, then my participants’ disenchantment only perpetuates the stagnation 
that they are concerned about. The political awareness thus only goes to a certain extent; 
whilst citizens are aware of state ‘capture’, they do not appear to realise that their disinterest 
pushes them in to a cycle of disappointment even further. 
Gordy (1999) is certainly useful here too. Before Milošević’s ousting he asked why the Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS) was able to remain in power despite seeming to lack popular support. 
Analysing the lived experience of Serbs at the time, he found that citizens did not have the 
option of alternatives. That is, their only seeming option was the status quo, accepting it as a 
bleak reality. We can argue that Džihić and Segert’s (2012) findings years later support this 
argument; the political apathy amongst the Serbian citizenry may be a result of not just 
constant failures, but also a lack of envisioned alternatives. Although it has been a number of 
years since Gordy (1999) published his piece, Džihić and Segert’s (2012) research demonstrates 
that the Serbian state has been ‘captured’ by a small elite, and show how citizens are apathetic 
with the little choice that they are offered. My own data supports Gordy’s argument; Serbs see 
themselves as being victims of repeated government failures and elites who are ‘all the same’. 
It is an expression of what seems to be the perception that there are no alternatives. In turn, 
this perpetuates the apathy that consolidates the power of the corrupt elites. 
 
Corruption 
Serbia and Serbs as ‘corrupt’ was also a recurring theme throughout my research. Importantly, 
my evidence suggests that corruption is perceived to be a key part of the national imaginary. 
Political elites are seen as self-interested, connected to criminals and prone to briberies. State 
institutions are no exception, and neither are Serbs as a people. Indeed, the Serbian nation 
and people are perceived as positively mired in a culture of corruption. Corruption, then, is 
perceived to have infiltrated Serbian culture. In turn, that culture is drawing out a corrupt 
character amongst Serbs as a people. 
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Pešić (2007) wrote on widespread corruption and ‘state capture’ by criminals in Serbia. She 
explains how criminals finance political parties and ultimately influence government decision-
making. Pešić’s respondents largely perceive the government, political elites and state 
institutions as corrupt. Three quarters of her respondents believed that political parties, 
medical doctors and tax administrators were the most corrupt groups in the country. More 
recent surveys indicate that little has changed (CeSID 2012a; CeSID 2012b; Gallup 2010; 
UNODC 2011). These surveys all found that corruption is high on the list of concerns for 
Serbian citizens. In them we can see a lack of faith in public administration, perceptions of 
institutional deficiencies, as well as perceptions of money and gift giving as the norm. The 
political sphere, judiciary and health sector were perceived as prone to regular corruption, but 
the health sector, public administration and the police were most corrupt through 
respondents’ experiences. There was therefore a discrepancy in perceptions and experience, 
perhaps suggesting that personal experiences are considered to be exceptions in discussions 
on corruption. 
Most importantly, the respondents who reported experience of corruption also stated that 
they were the first to offer bribes rather than wait and be asked for them (UNODC 2011). This 
indicates a common belief that bribes speed up processes or improve quality of service. Thus, 
a perception of the culture as corrupt appears here to lead to Serbs behaving as such; drawing 
people into a vicious circle. 
This narrative of a culture of corruption actually ‘drawing out’ an embedded corrupt character 
emerged in my interviews and I focus on them in this section of the chapter. There was a 
tendency to refer to Serbs as becoming irrevocably corrupt or pokvareni. In this latter sense, 
there is more to it than unethical behaviour for personal gain, it is also about having become 
tainted or foul. Of the artists, some spoke of hardship and declining living conditions pushing 
people to corruption. They understand that for the citizens who work many hours for little 
pay, it is cheaper and less time consuming to obtain a favour from an acquaintance rather 
than go through a state institution. Of the six souvenir vendors, five spoke about corrupted 
morals and values amongst Serbs. Maja said the following: 
Our people have become pokvareni… Our people are not as good as they used to be. And 
they are unhappy because of it. It is not in our essence. It is in our essence to help one 
another, to be good, to learn to appreciate life. 
Maja, the woman mentioned earlier, valued religion; she believed that a decline in the 
Orthodox belief has led Serbs to become pokvareni. Ivana L, who sold souvenirs on Knez 
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Mihailova, expressed her disappointment over a perceived lack of morals and values too. She 
didn’t find that Serbian society valued honesty and merit. Unfortunately, she told me, honest 
and friendly people ended up seeming ‘naïve’ in Serbia. She spoke of how it must be difficult 
for parents to raise their children today; if children are raised with the ‘right’ values, they may 
not be able to cope with the way Serbian society functions. 
Ivana L’s opinion of honesty and merit equating to naivety resonated with me. I received 
multiple comments about how I would “not be able to survive in Serbia” because I was ‘honest’ 
and ‘did the right thing’. I would not become successful (wealthy) if I want to do things the 
‘right’ way. My fondness of order did not suit the Serbia they thought was in shambles. 
Spasić’s (2005) research speaks precisely to this. She ran focus group amongst Serbian adults 
and found similar dilemmas; her participants wished for their children to have moral and 
ethical qualities, while at the same time believing that these qualities do not promise success 
in Serbia. Again, we see a perceived negative culture forcing people to behave negatively. The 
culture is used as a justification for bad behaviour, as the system is essentially out of citizens’ 
hands. Yet while Spasić’s respondents wished their children a good future, they were allegedly 
teaching ‘moral’ values that can otherwise allegedly lead to failure. In turn, this indicates that 
perhaps they did not believe in negative culture infiltrating society completely, or that they 
chose to remain the ‘good’ people. 
The discussion above points to both national identity and the national imaginary. On the one 
hand, citizens seemed to identify with ‘their people’ being ‘good’. They felt attachment to 
values that fair and positive people may possess. On the other hand, the world they perceived 
as unfair and corrupt reduced these ‘good’ people to act in a negative way, which is the 
imaginary at play. Consequently, Serbs have become corrupt. As such, their national 
imaginaries may begin to affect what they perceive as markers of their imagined national 
community. On the other hand, this interpretation offered in my evidence may be that some 
citizens are attempting to make sense of their beliefs and their social realities. That is, they are 
offering reasons for why Serbs—their co-nationals—are simultaneously both 'good' and 'bad'. 
For a society that is perceived to be mired in corruption, social capital is consequently seen as 
a key to success. One’s social network is considered to lead to economic and cultural gain; the 
larger and more important someone’s network, the more potential economic and cultural gain 
they have. My interviewees spoke of this unevenly, with the souvenir vendors most convinced 
of the importance of social capital. There was a perception amongst them that that ‘having 
connections’ is a key to ‘getting on’. They seemed to have an image of a Serbia in which jobs 
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were obtained and health sector queues skipped with the ‘right connections’. They did not see 
social capital as a benefit for their own personal experiences, but also amongst the political 
elite they deemed corrupt. For example, Jovana was not just convinced that all politicians got 
into power through connections alone, she was also speaking from experience. After all, 
Jovana was employed at the stall through ‘connections’ herself. Three other vendors were 
women who sold objects made by themselves or their families, therefore also being employed 
through their social connections. For example, Dragana sold leather opanke that her 
husband’s family has been making for years. Snježana sold souvenirs with images that she and 
her daughter created using computer software, while Maja’s items were wooden objects made 
by herself and her husband. These workers were therefore part of a family business, in which 
family networks are central. 
As for the artists that I interviewed, they appeared less convinced that ‘connections’ were a 
major key to success. One musician joked with me, “Everyone talks about these ‘connections’! 
Where are all these connections coming from? Where do I find them?”. He clearly did not see 
merit in putting so much weight on social capital in their personal lives. It may be that the 
perception of corruption may be higher than the experience, as the surveys already cited 
suggest. 
The artists did, however, speak about political connections as a specific form of social capital. 
This emerged when discussing corruption on the government level, specifically about funding 
the arts and cultural sector. In 2013 I observed a rally in Belgrade’s Republic Square in which 
the culture and arts community held a silent protest over their concerns about a lack of 
funding to the sector (“Protest umetnika pod sloganom ‘Stop uništavanju kulture!’ održan na 
Trgu Republike” 2013; “Umetnici protiv uništvanja kulture” 2013). They asked for the 
resignation of the current Minster of Culture believing that he was a root cause for the lack of 
funding. Popular artists attended and the protest was reported widely in the media. Of my 
interviewees, only the art critic Branislav attended. He did not see the protest as successful, 
but did see the need for it, as the arts was of a low priority for the government. He was 
confident that the government only funded projects that were in its own interests. For 
instance, he accused the Historical Museum of Serbia being a project of Prime Minister “Vučić 
and his people”. Other participants from this interview group also referred to funding for the 
sector. Svetlana, curator at the Ethnographic Museum, spoke of the state being merely 
interested in the cost of exhibitions rather than the content. However, she did mention that 
the changing of a Museum director can lead to changes in the content itself. MIJ curator Panić 
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named the intervention of the government for Jovanka Broz’s funeral as the rare occasion 
where the museum suited the dominant political ideology. She also indicated that the 
museum faced closure in the 1990s when socialism no longer suited the ultra-nationalism 
ideology of the time. 
 
Artist Goran accused a Belgrade museum of reducing his exhibition timeframe due to the 
changing of directors. He went as far as arguing that museum employment was based on 
nepotism. He said to me: 
28. Culture is a way of life 
Flyers from a 2013 protest held at Republic Square by members of the Serbian cultural and arts 
community (“Protest umetnika pod sloganom ‘Stop uništavanju kulture!’ održan na Trgu 
Republike” 2013). The messages on the black background read: “Culture gives a community 
uniqueness”, “Stop destroying culture!” and “Culture is a way of life”. The fourth is an image of Vuk 
Karadžić with the slogan “Another four reality TV series this year!”, referring to a perceived 
obsession with mainstream entertainment over a culture that values education and history. 
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The system is wrong. The buildings are no good, the people who work there are quite often 
employed through some connections, through some system that seems to have been going 
on for a long time in this country… these kumovske
35
 and other primitive system variants. 
And then you have these people who don’t understand art. 
Goran believes that such forms of employment have caused dysfunction in the sector. He 
alleges that the industry employs incompetent and disinterested people who can destroy an 
already struggling sector. Musician Aleksandar P spoke of a lack of interest and understanding 
of arts by ministers, which leads to no funding. His colleague Jovan agreed, but he also stated 
that he wants the arts to remain exclusive, as ‘mainstream tastes’ are no good. Two gallery 
workers, Ana C and Davor, also believed that funding changed according to the funding body 
and its minister. However, they see the funding as limited and stretched, as many sectors vie 
for the little money available. Davor specifically saw funding based on invested interest as a 
given; he expected any EU funding that may come with membership to be given with certain 
conditions. All of these interview respondents did see arts sector funding as an exchange for 
something else. Or, at least, they believed that the state did not fund the arts sector if the 
industry did not have anything useful to offer in exchange for the funding. 
The government’s selective support of museums suggests that ‘political connections’ and 
selective funding may well be the case. As MIJ curator Panić said, the political elite 
participated in the burial of Jovanka Broz at the museum’s House of Flowers, a rare moment 
for the Serbian government to be involved in that museum. The government did the same 
years earlier when they decided to put Milošević body on display at the MIJ after his death 
(Manojlović-Pintar and Ignjatović 2011). The current political elite instead tend to participate 
in exhibitions held at the Historical Museum of Serbia. For starters, president Tomislav 
Nikolić was the key speaker at the museum’s IMS’ official opening (“Nikolić otvorio obnovljeni 
Istorijski muzej Srbije” 2013). In his speech he praised the now permanent exhibition on the 
royal Serb dynasties, clearly supporting an institution that celebrated Serb culture and 
autonomy. Furthermore, Chief-of-Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces Ljubiša Diković opened 
‘Serbia 1914’, the IMS exhibition held in conjunction with the Military Museum (“Diković 
otvorio izložbu ‘Srbija 1914’ u Istorijskom muzeju” 2014). Of all five temporary exhibitions that 
I analysed, the three that had the Ministry of Culture and Information’s logo under 
‘supporters’ were: the IMS’ ‘Serbia 1914’, the National Museum’s ‘Light in the darkness of 
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 Kum best translates to godfather. The best man and maid of honour at a wedding become a kum and 
kuma to the bride and groom respectively, often being the godparents to the newlywed’s future 
children. It is considered to be a strong family-like connection and unique to Serb Orthodox culture. 
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World War One’ and the Ethnographic Museum’s exhibition on the gusle. All three of these 
exhibitions were ones that reproduced a primordialist image of the Serb nation (which I 
described in chapters four and five), suggesting support from the current SNS government 
where the exhibition serves such narratives. As such, government members are securing an 
exclusive national identity through legislature 
(in this case, in the form of museum 
exhibitions). Citizens are shown tangible 
cultural items and provided with a history that 
gives meaning to those items. As the items are 
presented as part of the citizens’ being, so does 
history give meaning to that being.  
To return to perceptions of corruption, 
academics only referred to small personal 
experiences of connections obtaining goals. 
These were often ‘extras’ in life—such as having 
skipped a queue at the doctor once—as 
opposed to essentials. For example, Ivana S spoke of having received gifts from a student’s 
parents at graduation or of being offered by a school principal (who was a former classmate of 
hers) options of what classes her children would be put in. She indicated that such gifts and 
offers were unnecessary and a privilege that she did not abuse. In terms of possible corruption 
in the field of education though, only one academic spoke precisely to this. Political scientist 
Nemanja noted that his brightest students don’t tend to fill high political positions in Serbia. 
Instead, it is the students with poorer grades who do so. My interviewee believed that this was 
a result of having joined the political party in power. Sociologist Dragica, on the other hand, 
was confident that her psychology students would obtain the jobs they deserve. She was also 
adamant that the students believed in it too; they had “no complex” believing that their 
knowledge and effort would lead them to successful future careers. 
It is important to note that my discussion with Nemanja and other academics was months 
after corruption in public and private education was exposed in the media. There were a 
number of reports accusing government officials of plagiarising their doctoral theses and of 
private Megatrend University’s rector doing the same36 (Grušić, Radeljić, and Tomić 2014; 
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 Interior Minister Nebojša Stefanović was accused of plagiarising his doctorate from Megatrend 
University (Grušić, Radeljić, and Tomić 2014). His supervisor and rector of the university came under 
scrutiny as well (Radivojević and Milanović 2014). After an investigation by the Serbian Education 
29. Coronation crown 
Display of King Peter I Karađorđević’s 
coronation crown at the Historical 
Museum of Serbia’s exhibition on the 
Karađorđević and Obrenović dynasties. 
Photo by A. Samardzija 
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Radivojević and Milanović 2014; Suvakovic 2014). Nemanja’s observation of his ‘weaker 
students’ obtaining high-profile government positions fits such reports on corruption. Such 
‘scandals’ may contribute to his and other citizens’ perceptions of the education sector—and 
subsequently the employment market—as corrupt. Nemanja’s observations are not isolated 
either. There is research to suggest that young Serb citizens are cynical of the value of 
education in general. Mojić (2012) found that young Serb students perceived wealthy origin 
and political connections to be the best “means of getting ahead”, as opposed to merit and 
effort. While they prefer education and hard work, they appear to concede to the perception 
that it is more about ‘who you know’. It is not their fault, nor is it their wish, but they feel 
pressured to value connections as that is how they perceive their world to be. The perception 
of social capital as the key to gaining powerful institutional positions existed during 
Milošević’s regime too, even amongst citizens who had little reverence for the institutions 
(Gordy 1999). From my interviews and the work of Spasić (2005) discussed above, these 
perceptions seem to persist.  
The discrepancies between my three interview groups regarding corruption need to be taken 
into account here. Academics on a whole have higher levels of education which provides them 
with more employment options and more comfortable salaries. Some of the artists have the 
opportunities to take their work overseas and work in a sector that is usually connected to 
wealthier classes with higher cultural capital. As for the souvenir vendors, they are 
economically and politically on the margins. They cannot afford skipping queues and have 
little leverage when dealing with political institutions. They struggle in the capitalist system 
and see those with wealth and large social networks as more successful. Snježana, for example, 
spoke of how difficult it was to obtain small selling spaces in Belgrade as wealthy ‘moguls’ 
leased all those on the market and pushed smaller businesses out. She did not have the money 
to participate in the market economy and so had to rely on her networks. Snježana ultimately 
saw those who had wealth succeed in a capitalist system that was very difficult on her and her 
family. We therefore see that the life experiences of the interviewees do provide an insight 
into why they have the perceptions that they have of corruption, and consequently their 
nation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ministry, the rector resigned and the university was recommended to make serious reforms regarding 
research integrity. Megatrend University has since changed its name to John Neisbitt University, the 
author of ‘Megatrends’. In July of 2014, president of the Municipality of New Belgrade, Aleksandar Sapić, 
was accused of plagiarism at the Union University in Belgrade, as was Belgrade Mayor Siniša Mali for his 
thesis from the University of Belgrade (Suvakovic 2014). 
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The reliance on social capital seen amongst Serbs may be a legacy of Yugoslavia’s socialism. 
This is where Petrović’s (2012) discussion of the socialist system remaining entrenched in Serb 
society is relevant. Serbia was part of the socialist system for decades, ruled by a regime that 
controlled all aspects of life, and in which a sense of community was encouraged. While there 
are positive aspects of social capital, such as community and employment, it can also lead to 
corrupt communities. In Yugoslavia it led to exchanges of goods and services parallel to the 
official system. Luthar (2010) analysed consumption in former Yugoslavia and the regime’s 
strict control over consumer participation37. A shadow or ‘second’ economy that relied on 
social networks was established instead. Luthar writes that 
the gray economy and informalization of the economy, accompanied by a reciprocal 
exchange of favors, information and goods unavailable on the market, instrumentalization 
of sociability, clientelistic and patron-client relations – all these resulted in particularism 
and in a culture of privatism that were constituent parts of social integration in socialism. 
(Luthar 2010, 351) 
Luthar goes on: 
In practice, official and formal rules were in such contradiction to the informal behaviour 
that they did not operate at all. The roots of the informal system were therefore embedded 
in the formal organization itself and nurtured by the formality of its arrangements. (Luthar 
2010, 357) 
I suggest that the reliance on social ties evident in my own research is a remnant of the 
socialist system. Or, at least, of the ‘second’ culture that existed in the socialist system. While 
social capital does influence one’s success in life, there appears to be a disproportionate 
reliance on it in former Yugoslavia and also amongst one group of interviewees. Although 
Luthar’s work relies on material consumerism, she does discuss an informal system of 
exchange. My participants spoke about obtaining favours or employment through networks, 
an informal system that is nurtured by formal arrangements. We can consider the corruption 
survey discussed above: respondents who participated in corruption were more often than not 
the first to offer the bribes. We see a normalisation of bribery and gift giving as the means of 
obtaining their wants and needs. The formalisation of such exchanges perpetuates the 
behaviour, making it appear as entrenched and ‘normal’. 
                                                     
37
 Citizens often crossed Yugoslavia’s borders to buy goods that were unavailable locally, such as 
travelling to Italy’s city of Trieste for a day of shopping. Mikula (2010) writes of it as part of attaining the 
‘Yugoslav Dream’, and Luthar (2010) explains how calculated the shopping trips were in an attempt to 
reach that ultimate dream. 
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Wildness and irrationality 
Having described Serbs as corrupt or tainted – as pokvareni – above leads me to discuss 
perceptions of national characteristics. Even before my fieldwork people would often call 
themselves ‘crazy Serbs’ when speaking to me. Aware that I am an outsider, and apparently 
‘liked rules’, they seem to believe that I found them undisciplined and hard to follow. Serbs 
were apparently not ‘normal’. In fact, being not normal was the norm. If there is something 
odd in Serbia, the explanation is reduced to ‘only in Serbia’, as though it is justification for odd 
or bad behaviour. These perceptions of national self-identity go beyond a Balkanist 
framework, where Serbs are ‘less European’ than their Croat and Slovene counterparts (Bakić-
Hayden 1995; Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992; Todorova 2009). The ‘less European’ image 
seems to have instead been internalised by Serbs. Volčič (2005) noted this in her interviews 
with young Serb intellectuals; they appeared to internalise an image prescribed by the West 
and ‘sold’ it back to them in the form of art. My own data suggests a common Balkanist 
national self-perception, where Serbs were self-described as wild and irrational. Unlike Volčič, 
however, my data did not point to the ‘selling’ of that internalised image. What is interesting 
in my research instead is that the predominant views attribute such ‘wild’ and ‘irrational’ 
behaviour to culture that made Serbs so. 
First I must point out instances where negative traits and behaviours were seen as 
characteristics of the Serb as a people. There were moments where the Serb national character 
was described as wild and irrational. This national self-identity was discussed as though that 
was the nature of Serbs, inciting descriptions of civilisation and primitivism. This was most 
evident in the media and my interviews. In the ‘Why does Serbia need the EU?’ series of article 
in the Danas newspaper, the authors discuss and encourage EU integration through a 
Balkanist rhetoric. The simple use of words such as ‘jungle’, ‘undeveloped’, and ‘backward’ to 
describe Serbia implies a sense of primitivism. Serbs and Serbia were encouraged to 
‘modernize’ in the articles, to ‘become European’. Dačić  wrote that Europe needs to be 
introduced “into every pore of Serbian society, in its every organ, every bone and every 
thought” (2013, para. 15). Miščević another author, called integration the “most important 
process for Serbia in the 21st century…And more importantly, it would be a process of the 
largest, most extensive and serious reforms in our country, which should make of Serbia a 
normal, developed, European country” (2013, para. 1). 
   
145 
These examples are self-prescriptions of the Balkanist discourse, as ‘undeveloped’ Serbs are 
compared to a civilised Europe. A small number of my interview participants made similar 
remarks. Art critic Branislav called Serbia a “crazy country” and surely one that the EU 
wouldn’t want as a member state (unless it was for the EU’s self-interest). Already cited 
Goran’s description of nepotism in Belgrade museums as “kumovske and other primitive 
system variants” also suggests that Serbs are a lesser form of civilisation. He decides to name 
kum relations, a celebrated part of Serb culture, akin to primitivism. The vendors also 
described a society with a lack of morals and values. Only Jovana used a Balkanist framework 
though: 
In principle, for me, the EU is civilization. And Serbia really needs to follow civilization. But 
I suspect that…how they tell us what we need to do. I don’t know, the EU told us to do this, 
to do that. As if it is imposing. But that is not imposing at all. Serbia must, how should I say 
it, must rise to a higher level. Must change itself. 
Like Goran, Jovana refers to Serbs being less than a civilisation. This all suggests that Serbs 
need to evolve into a civilised society. Branislav, Goran and Jovana ultimately see themselves 
as part of a backward society, behaving in a way that shows their failure to progress and 
modernise. My data here provides similar insights of the dominant image internalised by 
Volčič’s participants, where they have accepted the power of the West and see themselves as 
part of a wild and irrational society. Through such a framework we see a claim that Serbs need 
to change. The change cannot happen on its own, however. Instead, it can only happen 
through becoming like Europe, to think and behave like Europeans do. Serbs are essentially 
incapable—or unwilling—to make these changes on their own. 
A national self-identity of wildness and irrationality emerged amongst other interviews as 
well. However, these tended to refer to a culture that made them so. And as I will show, such a 
position actually renders the thoughts and behaviours of Serbs as rational rather than 
irrational; one sees the world a certain way with certain ways of behaviour: the social 
imaginary. 
The national self-ascriptions were visible in my participants’ narratives of the Yugoslav civil 
wars, evidently driving a sense of disappointment. In my interviews I rarely asked directly 
about the conflicts, but my participants often brought it up of their own accord. The wars 
were described as “horrible times” and as moments of madness or insanity (ludilo). They were 
also seen as irrational. My participants could not seem to comprehend why or how it 
happened. Of the artists and cultural participants, most referred to the 1990s as a terrible 
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period. While this was a time of changes in arts culture in other parts of the world, for Serbia 
it was a time of war. Aforementioned artist Goran observed that there has been a “whole 
different system of values” since then, a dysfunctional moral compass. 
Of the souvenir vendors, the perception of irrationality appeared mostly when comparing 
contemporary Serbia to Yugoslavia. The key reasoning that emerged here was that the 
communist regime, however flawed, seems better than the regimes today. Maja called the 
Yugoslavian system “more humane”, saying: 
I really don’t know what was wrong with communism, socialism – nothing was missing. 
This political free – well, I mean, we now have political freedom. You can take a photo with 
it. What good is political freedom when you cannot do anything. We know who holds the 
power. 
To remind you, Maja strongly opposed capitalism and its “God of profit”. She not only believed 
that she grew up in a “system that was more humane”, but one with which the Yugoslav 
people should have been satisfied with. 
Snježana also attempted to make rational behaviour out of perceived irrationality, comparing 
Yugoslavia with contemporary Serbia as well. She grew up in a town in Bosnia and moved to 
Serbia in the 1980s, and spoke of life before the civil wars fondly: 
We lived in a mixed area. There were many children from Croatian Dubica
38
 and Dubica is 
also a town with many Muslims...I never put much thought into the differences, and my 
family didn’t teach me to either. We all got along normally. But my family, my mother for 
instance, was not a communist. She went to church, celebrated all of the Saints Days, 
Christmas, Easter. And when those celebrations were on at my house, my friends came 
over. Just as I went to theirs when they celebrated Ramadan or Bajram. I also went to 
Catholic Christmas…And it was so nice. Never in our dreams, not even in our wildest 
dreams, did we foresee what was going to happen. And when all of that evil started, all that 
madness, we were thrown into that cycle. 
Snježana here could not see the rationale behind leaving a ‘normal’ and ‘nice’ life and turning 
towards ‘madness’. She attempted to make sense of it through reading about it and the most 
convincing explanation for her was that ‘negative vibrations’ consumed the Balkan peoples. 
                                                     
38
 Croatian Dubica and Kozarska Dubica are both towns on the river that borders Croatia and Bosnia. 
There are a number of towns that are separated by a border and therefore the name given refers to the 
republic/country that each ‘side’ is on. 
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Snježana’s interpretation is that 
a culture of ‘negative vibrations’ 
influenced people to do the 
unimaginable. They were 
pressured by their surroundings; 
it wasn’t in their ‘nature’ to do 
it. She therefore appears to 
believe that Balkans peoples—
those she grew up with in 
particular—are fundamentally 
‘good’ people who enjoyed living 
together. By being ‘good’ in 
nature, turning ‘evil’ and ‘wild’ 
was irrational. Snježana 
therefore sees irrationality in 
both what the aims of the wars 
were (destroying a perfectly 
content life) and in people 
acting against their nature. Yet 
by blaming ‘negative vibrations’, 
she is suggesting that Serbs were 
rational in that they behaved 
according to how the surrounding culture made them behave. Furthermore, even her 
memories of a ‘nice’ life and friendships with non-Serbs are questionable. She does not take 
into account the group differentiation she speaks about. She highlights having lived among 
‘many Muslims’ and having gone to ‘Catholic Christmas’. Like for many who reminisce having 
childhood friends outside of their own national group, these friends are categorised ethno-
nationally. The categorisation—and their labelling—suggest that the group distinctions 
existed and people were aware of group markers. 
Part of the seeming irrationality of giving up socialism is that it appears to be a better 
alternative to the hardships of today. Serbs had gone through a bloody war in the name of 
ethno-national sovereignty and anti-socialism, only to be met with even more difficult living 
conditions. This may ultimately lead them to question why the break-up of Yugoslavia 
happened. The civil wars have caused enough disappointment that the communist regime 
30. Long Live Life! 
Scan of the front cover of the ‘special edition’ of Nin 
magazine, the guidebook for the Živeo život! (‘Long live 
life!’) exhibition at the Belgrade Cultural Centre in 2013 that 
took on a nostalgic narrative of Yugoslavia. 
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seems as a better alternative. Although details of oppression and crimes by Tito’s regime are 
slowly spreading (Šakaja and Stanić 2011), it seems that people still perceive it better than 
living in Serbia today. Academic Dragica spoke about Serb ‘Yugo-nostalgia’ and said that 
“People don’t necessarily want Tito. It isn’t about Tito”. Instead, it is about living a ‘normal’ life 
and asking their government to provide necessities. Dragica therefore sees a rationality in 
people’s nostalgia, especially after discussing the hardships that people live in today. 
Furthermore, the civil wars were made to seem ‘rational’ for some. Džihić and Segert (2012) are 
useful once again. They explain how ethno-nationalist parties were legitimately elected in the 
former Yugoslav states. This happened because national identity had such a heavy meaning for 
Yugoslav citizens that it meant a right to life in many cases. A sovereign nation-state was 
presented as a solution to the existing problems. Being left in a state where the elected power 
was of a different national group would mean low access to resources, or at times even access 
to life. It was thus ‘rational’ to elect those who would allow them access to resources and allow 
them to live. Rather than innate character, here we see people’s environment directing their 
decisions. We can tie this back to the preceding section on corruption; in it Serbs were corrupt 
because a culture of corruption made them so. If Serbs were to be successful in life, they 
needed to be self-interested and corrupt. To rely on honesty and merit would have led to 
failure and abuse. Therefore, if succeeding is one’s end goal, then achieving it through the 
required means (corruption) is the ‘rational’ response. 
 
Anything is better 
The opinion that socialism was better than today was not isolated to my interviews. I heard a 
similar sentiment from another young Serb citizen, Jelena. She was a guide on an 
‘underground’ walking tour in Belgrade’s city centre that included seeing bunkers built by 
Tito’s regime on Kalemegdan Fortress. Jelena is too young to have experienced Yugoslav 
socialism, but had passionate views about it. While in Tito’s Kalemegdan bunker, she was 
asked about her views on the former leader. Aware of the polarisation in the discourse, she 
first said that people were either strictly ‘pro’ or ‘against’ Tito. She was in the former camp. She 
explained that even though there were crimes committed during and by Tito’s regime, he was 
still able to ‘keep the peace’. For Jelena, ‘peace’ was simply the absence of war and its 
consequences. Neighbours did not turn on one another and there was no genocide. Perhaps, 
for Jelena, the pressure exerted by Tito’s regime was better than what followed. Such views are 
problematic as they legitimise ideological violence on the basis that it occurred less than the 
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subsequent ethnic violence. It is also problematic in that it is a selective remembering of 
history; we see Jelena forging a ‘forgetting’ of the hardships of living in socialist Yugoslavia 
(Ramet 2013). 
What Jelena does remind us of is that she views, understands and experiences the world 
through her own imaginary. It is her lived experience that affects her opinion and can have 
wider geo-political consequences, which was a major point in this chapter. The purpose was to 
show the national imaginary at work: citizens’ experiences led to perceptions of their world, 
which influenced their behaviour, and subsequently characteristics that they identified with.  
Through my exploration of how Serbs tend to see themselves, their nation and their position 
in the world, we can see disappointment in this. We can see disappointment in the dominant 
ethno-national identity and the realisation that it may not be enough for a ‘normal’ life. I 
discussed just above that my participants were questioning the rationality and purpose of 
Yugoslavia’s break-up when it has caused such dysfunction and hardship. They are 
disappointed that people were caught up in a moral crisis, and they are disappointed in years 
of government failings. They are especially disappointed for having lost the lives they 
remember fondly. They are instead offered hardship, corruption and instability. They do not 
trust the government or the system, afraid that it will take advantage of their vulnerability. It 
is evident that people in Serbia have become tired of ongoing problems and failed promises. 
They have become disenchanted with politics. 
Ultimately we see the Serb national imaginary negotiating cultural changes, time spans and 
even changing geopolitics. Members of the nation are attempting to make sense of these 
changes and make it fit their image of that nation. 
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8. Conclusion: At a crossroad? 
Throughout this thesis I have analysed the dimensions and dynamics of a Serbian national 
imaginary. I explored the attachments to national identity and traditions that were dominant 
in my data, and the ways it is secured to achieve nationalism. I began with Hearn’s (2006) 
definition of nationalism. He defines nationalism as a claim to identity, jurisdiction and 
territory. A claim to identity is the categorisation of a nation and the characteristics that give 
it substance. That substance is made ‘real’ through the jurisdiction that formalises it. Territory 
is the physical space where that jurisdiction can take place. All claims are relevant and 
important, but they are not equal. The focus depends on the context and the research. My 
own research for this thesis focused on the identity component. Though, considering the 
dialectical nature of the claims, the discussion on identity did not go without references to 
jurisdiction and territory. 
My use of Hearn certainly needs to be understood with the works of Anderson (2006) and 
Taylor (2004). This is where clarity about, ‘national identity’, nationalism and the ‘national 
imaginary’ are made; my thesis discussed all three. Anderson writes that the ‘nation’ is a 
political community in which members believe they belong with others who they share 
characteristics with. That community is ‘imagined’, the members have an image of what it is 
and what it means. Members identify with that image; they form attachments to the identity 
and the traditions that associate with it (as traditions can be the materialisation of a culture). 
The identity (and its tangible materialisation) is secured through a legislature in a given 
territory (Hearn 2006). Members understand their imagined nation, they experience it and 
express it. These processes ultimately make the national imaginary; a national community is 
understood in a certain way, it is experienced, and then it is expressed. I came to this 
conclusion after taking Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary and applying it to the ‘nation’ 
as the form of society. Nationalism is what secures the national imaginary, what enables it to 
stay ‘real’. 
Taylor (2004) argues that the imagining of a society (in this case, the nation) is carried 
through images, stories and legends. They give substance to the community, providing it with 
more than just a category or name. That is, these images, stories and legends seemingly set the 
community apart from other nations and explain how they have come to be. They also direct 
behaviour, as an imaginary limits what the acceptable forms of expression are. I used Billig 
(1995) to help us understand the specifics of those images, stories and legends in the Serbian 
context. He refers to the articulation of them in national markers that have become banal, 
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ranging from the use of flags to the singing of national anthems. The markers tend to be so 
normal and familiar that they are accepted as ‘natural’. At times of political mobilisation, the 
national markers are reproduced, reminding the citizenry of their duty to their nation. 
What Billig’s description of banal nationalism also suggests is that there are people behind its 
reproduction (a flag does not fly itself, nor does an anthem write its own lyrics). These people 
have the power over state institutions that reproduce national markers and thus reproduce the 
national imaginary. They are also the small group of individuals that Hearn (2006) argues 
make claims to nationalism—claims to identity, jurisdiction and territory—on behalf of a 
population. In the Serbian context, they are the elite. Such individuals understand and exploit 
the packaging of the claims to nationalism. They are also the key for realising that power is a 
major component of the national imaginary; they have the knowledge and resources to make 
their image of the nation spread and understood. They have the power to make it ‘real’. 
What I attempted to do in this thesis is to explain the national imaginary in contemporary 
Serbia. I analysed the dominant image of the Serb nation, exploring the markers—symbols, 
events or characteristics—understood to be representative of the community. My key aims 
were to also analyse the meanings behind the markers, how they are experienced by Serbs 
today, and how these meanings and experiences are secured. In this conclusion I do not 
reiterate the specifics of the markers or their meanings. I instead focus on what they may 
mean for the national future of Serbs. 
 
Approach taken 
In order to explore the Serbian national imaginary, I first set out to understand what the 
current dominant image of the Serb nation is. In order to do this, I asked the simple question: 
what makes Serbs Serb?  That is, what is it in/of a person that makes them a member of the 
Serbian national imaginary? When I asked my interview participants what it means to be Serb, 
very few had an answer. Musician Jovan, one of the few who had a response, told me it was 
“inheritance and territory” that made a Serb ‘Serb’. Most of my other interviewees, however, 
stopped short in their answers. They were quick to ascribe corruption, self-interest and 
helplessness to Serbs. Some even argued that Serbs were fundamentally ‘good people’. Yet 
when asked directly about what makes somebody ‘Serb’, it was, for the most, a very difficult 
question to answer. This is unsurprising, as national identity is treated as inherent and 
natural, as something that ‘just is’. Members of a nation certainly feel and live it. Yet it is 
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difficult to articulate. Asking my participants such a question may have been somewhat unfair 
and unwise in hindsight, as it inevitably led to a blank response. 
I have had trouble answering such a question myself. From early on I could not understand 
what the differences between my mother and father were. I could not understand how they 
(or we) were different from the Croats in our old hometown either. The main difference 
appeared to be religion: my mother came from a Muslim family and is therefore a Muslim, and 
the same was with my father and Serbian Orthodoxy. Despite neither of them practising a 
religion, they were assigned one and categorised into a nationality by it. To me this suggested 
that religion, and thus nationality, are inherited. As such, I wondered whether that meant that 
one half of me was Orthodox and the other Muslim. I didn’t ascribe to either religion, though, 
nor did I ‘feel’ Serb or Bosnian. The idea of inherited religion or nationality did not convince 
me. Yet wars were being waged on supposed national differences. Having completed this 
thesis and the research for it, I am now open to the idea that perhaps I would have practised a 
religion, or ‘felt’ a nationality, had I been surrounded by it. After all, I was not exposed to an 
ethno-nationalist image by my family, nor did I experience it to the extent that many people 
did (I was too young to understand our situation at the time). I was not surrounded by it at 
school or in friendship groups. My lifestyle on the opposite side of the world pushed me away 
from a ‘Serb’ identity. 
I do of course have my own imaginary; I see a world a certain way, I experience it and I express 
it back. I understand that my worldview can change, as can my experience of the world and 
my behaviour in it. It is similar for Serbs, a group of individuals who see themselves as 
belonging to a particular community. The modern political formations reiterate that 
belonging, with Serbs and Serbia existing among other nations and states. Within their nation, 
their belonging is secured by nationalism and the small group of individuals who have power 
to make that so. This small group ultimately has power over how individuals see themselves, 
their experience in the world and how they express themselves.  
I therefore approached answering the question ‘What makes a Serb ‘Serb’?’ by analysing the 
dominant image of Serbs. This included examining what is perceived to be Serb, and the ways 
that Serbs are portrayed and spoken about. This meant not only looking for descriptions of 
Serbs in my interviews, or how my participants described their belonging to the nation. It also 
meant analysing what was being presented and taught as being ‘Serb’. As I moved through the 
thesis chapters analysing the ‘substantive content’ of the nation, I discussed the dominant 
image that was being reproduced in my data. By dominant I mean the discourses that were in 
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the public space, available for popular consumption. I have, of course, explored only a fraction 
of the ways that the national identity is articulated in Serbia. I analysed the way it is enacted 
across a spectrum of Serb society, through utilising media analysis, observational work in 
museums and public spaces, analysis of history textbooks, as well as interviewing key 
participants in the field of the arts and academia. I also interviewed vendors at the cultural 
stalls in Belgrade’s city centre as they largely sell, quite literally, the commodification of 
national identity markers. Through my data collection and analysis, I began to recognise 
common themes across different modes of national identity expression. 
Where I have described what the image of the Serb nation is, I have also analysed why it is 
seen as such. This is where I employ the national imaginary framework; the imaginary is not 
just an image of a society, but an understanding of it. The ‘why’ is the understanding of what 
being Serb means. So while I analysed an image presented in a certain museum, for example, I 
also analysed the meaning of it (both what it means in the existing imaginary and how it may 
alter that imaginary). In simple terms, what does religion do for the Serb imaginary? What do 
the opanke shoes mean for a Serb besides protecting the feet? Why is language so sacred? 
There are understandings of what these national markers mean, and of what they do for 
society. Even when my interview participants spoke about Serb behaviour, they always offered 
their understanding of why this was so. 
 
Key features of identity 
Throughout this thesis, you read about a national identity in which ethnic and traditional 
‘substance’ is valued. This image is not identical to the one of the 1990s, however; Kosovo is no 
longer the clear dominant centre of this discourse and Serb nationalism is no longer in its 
‘resurrection’ stage: a moment in which the Serb people have allegedly been reborn (Morus 
2007). So even if some markers have remained—particularly those that make claims to 
primordialism—they are articulated and reproduced in a different setting. Today a sovereign 
Serb nation-state exists compared to Serbia fighting to ‘keep Yugoslavia together’ or wanting 
to establish a state for all ethnic Serbs in the 1990s. The community has already achieved its 
ultimate goal of national self-determination. The community markers now serve to maintain 
that power and can lead to many different geopolitical outcomes. 
If claims to primordialism are deemed important, then political relationships with nations that 
Serbs share markers with ‘make sense’. For example, Serbs and other Orthodox nations are 
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categorised based on their members allegedly sharing a common moral grounding. The 
members understand God’s work and articulate His message. We saw that the Russian-Serbian 
relationship was being nurtured based on these concepts. By stressing a connection with 
Russians, stronger political and/or economic relations with Russia may thus seem more 
inevitable. Better yet, it may seem as a more ‘natural’ relationship. As such, there is a 
meaningful alternative to EU accession, which I expand on below. 
Historical consciousness also certainly has a key role in suggesting who citizens should form 
relationships with. As I discussed in chapter Five, history is cast as giving meaning to the 
contemporary national imaginary. For example, victimhood was a common theme of 
memorialisation processes, and Serbs were victims in a number of ways: ranging from victims 
of Albanian nationalism to Yugoslavia’s political system, from Milošević’s hunger for power to 
the teaching of a selective history. For a national history that tells of constant oppression, 
NATO and the West are yet another group of aggressors who wish to take sovereignty away 
from Serbs. And if history is to repeat itself, then these aggressors may potentially attempt to 
oppress Serb culture in the future, or even eradicate them as a people. Such a stance can affect 
Serbs’ contemporary relationships with other nations, especially their neighbours and 
‘Western-led’ institutions, such as the ICTY. The memories indicate how Serbs relate to other 
communities, with justice and reconciliation processes consequently remaining secondary to 
protecting national integrity (Subotić 2013). 
In the fifth chapter, I also demonstrated how the Yugoslavian system is yet another ‘aggressor’ 
in Serb history. I explained how contemporary memories of anti-fascism and socialism lead to 
paradoxes and tensions. The paradox emerges when celebrating Serbs’ involvement in anti-
fascism. The WWII fight against fascism is a rare historic moment that Serbs share with 
Western countries, where they were on the ‘right’ side of history. Yet the anti-fascist fight in 
Yugoslavia was led by Tito and his Partisans, precisely the regime that state institutions had 
been attempting to negate. Anti-fascist pride is therefore tainted with anti-socialist 
sentiments. I have shown how this paradox has resulted in an incoherent and contradictory 
discourse by state institutions through the numerous exhibitions and events. 
What’s more, the anti-socialist narrative exists in a society where Yugoslavia is remembered 
fondly by many. The sentiments that we see in the mounting literature on Yugoslav nostalgia 
(Luthar 2006; Spasić 2012; Velikonja 2010; Volčič 2011) were evident in my own thesis. Citizens 
weren’t necessarily longing for socialism, they longed for the lives they believe they had in it. 
What I have stressed throughout the thesis is that the longing emerged when comparing life 
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to today. My interview participants spoke of the ‘better life’ in the socialist regime, which leads 
them to question why Yugoslavia ever came to an end. For them there appears to be no 
reasonable explanation for this, except that perhaps self-interested elites orchestrated the 
state’s end. The promises of nationalism—where Serbs’ future was seemingly in collective self-
determination—have failed. 
Instead, Serbia remains a difficult place to live in today. Both the system and society are 
perceived as corrupt. Living conditions are worsening and job security low. Mobility is 
restricted for citizens due to low income and visa schemes. Ethnic tensions also persist in the 
region. It seems that the deaths, displacement and ‘madness’ that people experienced in the 
1990s only led to the hardships of today. The citizens I interviewed are consequently 
suspicious of the current political elite, unable to separate them from the politicians who have 
failed to make true their promises of nationalism. The wars also allegedly altered Serbs’ moral 
compasses, while cut-throat capitalism and a fake democracy have since brought on an 
unhealthy environment. That modern environment, filled with a negative culture, in turn 
pushes Serbs to continue to behave negatively. The perceived years of hardship seemingly 
began as soon as Yugoslavia ended. Yugo-nostalgia appears to offer a visualisation of an 
alternative reality, one in which ethics persists and merit is valued. 
A discussion on contemporary hardships leads me back to the vic (joke) from the introduction 
and Chapter Seven: “The crisis came to Serbia. It stopped, looked around and said ‘oh hell, I’ve 
already been here!’ And so it went on its way”. From this vic, we see Serbs in a situation that is 
atypical for others. For them, being amongst chaos, and at the bottom of the pile, is the norm. 
So while Serbs may be unique based on their ‘substantive content’, they are also seemingly in a 
unique situation. And from this, I was able to discern a justification offered for Serb behaviour: 
Serbs appear to argue that living in a country (one that is in a permanent sense of crisis) is 
what conditions them to act a certain way. In this way, my evidence leaves us with a textured 
portrait of common assumptions and perceptions underlying the contemporary Serb national 
imaginary. 
I spoke to this predominantly in Chapters Six and Seven, where I focused on negative 
perceptions of national self-identity. In the chapters, I demonstrated how negative traits such 
as ‘backward’, ‘corrupt’ and ‘irrational’ were prescribed to the Serb people and to the Serbian 
state. At first, this appeared to be an internalisation of a Balkanist self-identity, something 
peculiar that Volčič (2005) noticed in her own research. Examining it further, however, I found 
references to Serbs as fundamentally ‘good’ people. In this essentialism was an abundance of 
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justifications for why they may be backward, corrupt or irrational. Specifically, the self-
prescribed negative traits of Serbs were being attributed to the culture around them. For 
example, a culture of corruption allegedly drew out corrupt and self-interested behaviour in 
the Serb people. They are pressured to value social and economic capital, as these are 
perceived to be currency in a corrupt world. Serbs are therefore fundamentally good people, 
but, in some ways, they must behave negatively in order to survive.  
It is useful to briefly return to the research on corruption mentioned throughout the thesis 
(CeSID 2012a; Pešić 2007; UNODC 2011). In them, we saw that respondents viewed their state 
institutions as corrupt and inefficient. They did not trust their political leaders either. Of the 
respondents who had experienced corruption, more often than not, they had offered the bribe 
first. We therefore see bribery as an accepted token of exchange. What these results also tell 
us is that the respondents’ view of Serbian state institutions as corrupt directs their behaviour 
to be corrupt. In short, we see an imaginary at play. 
Importantly, ideas of ‘essentialism’ and ‘rationality’ emerge in this imaginary. That is, in the 
discourses analysed, Serbs are seen as essentially good people who find themselves in a unique 
situation, and must act accordingly in order to succeed. The Serbian community therefore has 
an understanding of how the world works (mired in corruption) and the way to act in that 
world is to work within that corrupt system. If one remains ethical—which is what Serbs 
prefer—then they will not be successful in life. Not only would they be unsuccessful, they 
would have difficulty making ends meet. To act ethically would therefore be an irrational way 
of obtaining one’s goal of having a satisfying life. As such, Serbs are described as rational. 
What I was subsequently able to discern, is a justification for the Serbs who have strayed from 
their apparent goodness. 
Interestingly, I also noticed a contradiction in this; differentiation was made between citizens 
and the government in these situations. In them, the political elite were accused of doing the 
conditioning, rather than being pressured to act corrupt in a corrupt environment. That is, the 
politicians were not excused as ‘rational’ in this way, they were only seen as people who forced 
ordinary Serbs to act in a negative manner. 
 
A European Serbia? 
The national self-ascriptions of corrupt, backward and wild mentioned above fit the Balkanist 
dichotomy of ‘Balkan’ and ‘West’. Explained by Todorova (2009), Balkanism is a framework 
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which refers to the ‘Ottoman legacy’ in the region. With the term comes an image of a wild 
and exotic (non-European) people, stagnating besides a succeeding West. Yet Serbs have been 
rejecting their Ottoman heritage too. Depicted as a time of oppression, the image of Serbs as 
part of the Ottoman Empire is one that they do not accept. Such tension in Serb national self-
identity was most common in my research amidst discussions surrounding the European 
Union. 
Serbia’s potential accession into the institution dominated the media during my fieldwork. 
Political elites continue to claim that membership is a major goal for the government, and my 
interview participants discussed it. In fact, it was the debates on EU accession and the 
changing geopolitical climate that sparked my initial interest in analysing the Serb national 
imaginary. If the Serbian government really was striving for EU membership, then perhaps I 
was going to find an attempt to promote a positive image of Western Europe amongst Serbs. 
In Hearn’s (2006) theory on nationalism, a national identity can be secured as a political 
reality. Even though he specifically refers to the nation-state as the reality, his theory would 
suggest that even a strong identification with Western Europe may potentially lead to a 
political claim of European membership. In this case, identifying with Western Europe may 
lead to accession into the European Union. 
The reason that identification with Western Europe may lead to EU membership, I argue, is 
because the EU is seen as the embodiment of Western values. This image of the EU first needs 
to be understood in the Balkanist framework, though; Serbs have generally been perceived as 
being connected to its Eastern European and Orthodox counterparts, with heavy Ottoman 
influence from centuries of rule by the Turks. Serbs have therefore been considered as 
‘backward’ in opposition to ‘successful’ European nations. The European states deemed most 
‘successful’ are the Western ones, being economically most prosperous. The likes of Germany, 
Austria, France and the United Kingdom are seen as having the most power, and the most 
leverage in the EU institution. They are therefore considered to be the leaders of the Union, 
with policies made for their benefit. As I pointed out in my thesis, the EU tended to be 
represented by German Chancellor Merkel in the media, pointing to the Union being a 
German institution. What’s more, the ‘Western’ component meant that these countries 
tended to be grouped with the United States and NATO (Western states or Western-led 
organisations). As such, if the Serbian elite wished to engage its citizens with EU membership 
discourses, then they would perhaps be attempting to create a desirable image of the West. 
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Having read this thesis, however, you would have seen that my data showed no attempt by the 
political elite to create an image of a European Serbia. Europe did not fit the Serbian national 
imaginary. The two actually seem incompatible. An understanding of what it means to be Serb 
is at odds with what is seen as the EU; a common understanding of Serbdom thrives in an 
independent state that secures claims to a primordial identity. 
My data demonstrated that a perceived threat to national Serb integrity was perpetuated by a 
suspicion of the EU’s power and interest. The institution was predominantly portrayed as a 
powerful entity led by self-interested Western states. Any policy imposed by Brussels was to 
therefore benefit its already-powerful members. We saw this narrative dominate museum and 
textbook discourses, where now EU member states and members of ‘the West’ are described 
as having taken advantage of Serbia in the past. They allegedly provoked the under-resourced 
country and forced Serbs to fight. Similarly, my interview participants suggested that the EU 
only wished to include smaller countries such as Serbia out of ‘sheer interest’. Serbs would 
therefore be exploited as they had been previously. When my participants spoke about a 
culture that pushed Serbs to behave negatively, some spoke of capitalism and a ‘fake’ 
democracy that only appreciated criminals and accepted corruption. The ideologies that were 
negated by my participants were therefore those that were ultimately associated with the 
West. 
Nevertheless, the EU was presented as a ‘need’ for Serbia. It seems logical that if Serbs are to 
become successful, they ought to follow the steps of other successful nations. And since 
Western Europe is perceived as successful—and there is a rejection of the negative image of 
the Orient—then the road to success may be to become like these Western nations. The EU 
would thus serve as a tool for creating these changes in Serbia and amongst Serbs. The 
common view of the EU as powerful also suggests that Brussels would have the authority to 
enforce the necessary reforms in Serbia. Despite a lack of European identification, prospects of 
economic prosperity and political stability entice some enough to support membership. 
 
Recent developments 
The EU is certainly not the only possible path for Serbia. It is only an example of how geo-
politics influence the way that the national self-identity is perceived, as well as how the 
national imaginary influences geo-politics. The comparison of Serbs against the West 
reinforces Anderson’s (2006) argument that beyond one’s own nation lie other nations. Yet the 
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image of Serbs as helpless in the current climate and in need of outside help for meaningful 
reforms suggests that governments and citizens may continue to look for relationships with 
other communities. These connections may be economically and politically modern, which 
appears to have been accepted as a necessity. In Chapter Six I demonstrated what may be the 
beginning of political elites offering alternatives to Serbs; the media presented an emerging 
image of the Serbian government building relationships with the Middle East and China, as 
well as ‘rebuilding’ its connection with Russia. Again, these relationships are promoted as 
necessary for Serb prosperity, while the Russian relationship has the benefit of a perceived 
inherent connection. If such images become more constant and spread, they may have the 
potential of offering a non-EU future to Serbs. 
The aforementioned vic on the crisis coming to Serbia also speaks to the doubts of the EU. In 
this joke, the kriza has made Europe a place no better than Serbia. In fact, the many crises that 
the EU is going through currently raise questions of its solidarity. Besides the economic 
difficulties of member states, the migrant crisis, Brexit and terrorist attacks have no doubt cast 
a shadow over what the Union stands for. They would be influencing Serbs’ perceptions of the 
Union and what it means to them as a community. 
 In 2015 and 2016, hundreds of thousands of migrants made their way for the Schengen Area in 
the hope of a better future. The media reported extensively on this, pointing out their wish to 
reach the wealthier EU countries (Harding, Oltermann, and Watt 2015). Many of these states, 
however, have been reluctant to accept the refugees that they see as burdens and security 
problems. We have consequently seen 
raised physical borders and strict 
policies put in place. Even more 
recently, came the Brexit; in 2016, the 
United Kingdom, a key EU member 
state, voted to leave the Union 
(Asthana, Quin, and Mason 2016). 
Although the referendum results were 
close, the consequences of it are large. 
Both the EU and the UK are still 
figuring out the details of this 
separation and how to deal with it, as 
well as what it means for their futures. 
31. Fair exchange 
Political cartoon titled ‘Fair exchange’ from the 
Politika newspaper (Petričić 2015a). 
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What we can assume is that the UK’s decision encourages doubts of EU solidarity. Those who 
see the EU as an institution made up of self-interested states may very well be proved correct; 
this powerful state was dissatisfied with the Union, and subsequently saw fewer benefits to 
remaining a member. 
Serbs are not only spectators in these events; they are part of the stories. Serbia has been a 
transit country for migrants, and the media had portrayed Serbs as kind and welcoming 
(Avramovic 2015). A redemptive image of sorts was spread for a community who had been 
portrayed negatively for decades. These acts, however, had their own limitations. The Serbian 
government has since agreed to close its own borders, responding to pressure that comes with 
being on the EU periphery (“Balkan states close borders in domino effect” 2016). Reports of ill 
treatment of refugees eventually emerged as well. 
Nevertheless, the events have forced Serbs to question politics, war, Western power and 
identity. We can speculate the effect these post-fieldwork events may have on the Serbian 
national imaginary. I have included here 
three political cartoons from the Politika 
newspaper that may give us a glimpse 
into how Serbs’ worldviews are 
understood (Petričić 2015a; 2015b; 2016). 
The first is from late 2015 and depicts 
US/EU arms being shipped towards the 
Middle East (Petričić 2015a). Underneath 
are dingy boats overflowing with 
helpless migrants heading in the 
opposite direction towards Europe. The 
title reads “Fair exchange”. 
A few weeks later came another cartoon referring to the migrant crisis (Petričić 2015b). Under 
a ‘United Europe’ title, EU member states were depicted by different forms of barricades. 
United they stood against refugees, but they looked out for their own national interests. The 
cartoons are to some degree a visualisation of some of my data. For example, the cartoons 
depict Europe and the EU as a Western self-interested power, one using its abundance of arms 
against weaker countries. They push civilians out of their homes, yet do not take responsibility 
by taking them in. The two cartoons also articulate the critique of the ‘Union’ and moral 
32. United Europe 
Political cartoon titled ‘United Europe’ from the 
Politika newspaper (Petričić 2015b). 
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claims made by the institution. If we return to my interview with art critic Branislav, his 
opinion is that: 
[the] European Union always has to, have to put this interest of theirs in some kind [of], I 
don’t know, humanitarian logic? Human rights logic? Some kind of ideological blander? But 
then at the end you know that [it] is just a sheer interest. 
The cartoon depicting walls as flags is an articulation of Branislav’s statement: moral claims 
are made by the EU, yet they are keeping refugees out. His statements may have become more 
common by late 2015, when issues regarding the migrant crisis came to the fore. 
Brexit has most likely further hindered the view of a solid institution. Another cartoon by 
Petričić (2016), this time from July 2016, depicts the UK turning its back on the EU. A rather 
crude visual depicts the situation. No doubt 
that the 2016 context would be a fascinating 
continuation or comparison to my thesis here. 
The questions surrounding Serbia’s pending 
geo-political decisions highlight the claims of 
nationalism that Hearn (2006) points out: 
claims to identity, jurisdiction and territory. 
Although the latter two were secondary to my 
thesis, debates such as that of the EU’s future 
do touch on both of those claims. Adoption of 
more modern values could change the 
meaning of traditional markers, while accepting laws appointed by Brussels would mean 
undermining the Serbian government’s authority over their own territory. It would mean 
putting trust in a now questionable power. On the other hand, internal problems are dire 
enough that there are moments where an authoritative government seems to be the best 
possible solution. In fact, we saw that a powerful authority is viewed, by some, as the only 
solution for meaningful reform in Serbia. There were other references to sovereignty too, such 
as perceptions of a corrupt government lending to a corrupt society, while disappointment in 
the political system has also led to disillusionment with politics. 
What I’ve demonstrated in this thesis is a strained community in a struggling world. Serbia 
may seem disorderly, but the powers that once appeared to be established, successful and 
functional beside it may be disintegrating too. Serbs are attempting to make meaning of how 
33. Brexit 
Political cartoon titled ‘Brexit’ from the 
Politika newspaper (Petričić 2016). 
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they see themselves, their world, and their place within that world. This thesis is an insight 
into how that meaning is negotiated. 
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